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The effects of discriminatory mortgage-lending practices by American financial institutions.

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00:01Frontline is a presentation of the Documentary Consortium.
00:07Tonight on Frontline, is there racial discrimination in mortgage lending?
00:11I would categorically say no.
00:13I think there are too many factors that go into whether an applicant does or does not get a mortgage.
00:19Isn't it all over and done with here?
00:21Correspondent Bill Schechner investigates the issue of race and credit.
00:25I was advised, oh the committee, turn your application down.
00:30Why was green turned down?
00:32Because of the location of the area.
00:34How will the bank ever get to know the neighborhood?
00:36They don't have to.
00:37Tonight, your loan is denied.
00:46With funding provided by the financial support of viewers like you.
00:50And by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
00:58This is Frontline.
01:04This program is a co-production with the Center for Investigative Reporting.
01:09Additional funding provided by these funders.
01:21South Central Los Angeles 1992.
01:311044 buildings damaged.
01:39Sixty people dead.
01:42More than 735 million dollars in losses.
01:50Obviously, you gentlemen know this is the Baldwin Hills, Crenshaw shopping center.
01:53After the fires died out, a group of bankers came to look around.
01:58What was this here?
01:59There is an irony in this.
02:01Community activists have long charged that South Central was underserved by banks.
02:07In fact, only 13 branches serve a population of over 250,000 residents.
02:13In nearby Melrose, 90% white, with one-tenth the population, there are 15 banks.
02:23The issue is race and credit.
02:26Do our financial institutions avoid lending because of color?
02:31We went to Chicago, where Frontline has investigated race and credit for six months.
02:48Chicago, America's third largest city, home to one of the nation's largest black communities.
02:5580 years ago, they began coming here in search of the American dream.
03:05Today, blacks live in a Chicago at least as divided as the South they left behind.
03:11Who lives over here?
03:13Mostly this side, German-Irish probably.
03:15White?
03:16White.
03:19Basically, east of California would be black.
03:22Okay, on this side of California is what?
03:26This side of California is basically, right now, it's more black now.
03:32But it's still a mixture.
03:33On the other side?
03:34On the other side, it's basically white.
03:36Now, the church is closed.
03:37On the black side of one of Chicago's color lines is Englewood, a neighborhood on the south side of the city.
03:44There I met Henry Llewellyn, a retired homeowner.
03:47He's lived here half his life.
03:49I don't know what's wrong with the banks.
03:51Near his house, he showed me how a lack of credit hurts a neighborhood.
03:55The banks have redlined this area.
03:58And the banks want to lend money into the area for the peoples to rehab and take care of their property.
04:06So what peoples do, they walk out of the neighborhood and they leave the house abandoned.
04:10This is a shell now.
04:12Can you see it?
04:12If we can walk around the back.
04:13We can go around the back, yes.
04:14Yeah, come on.
04:15Let's walk around the back.
04:16Okay.
04:16And I'll show you what I'm talking about.
04:17Yeah.
04:18You live right across the street, right?
04:19I live right in front of this house.
04:20And this is so high to me.
04:22I'm going to show you what I'm talking about here.
04:24This house was perfect.
04:26All the back was closed in and had nice windows up there.
04:30Well, how do you figure that, Mr. Llewellyn?
04:31I mean, here's a house and you're telling me that a year ago it was in good shape and it got wrecked.
04:36How come nobody just came along and bought it?
04:38Couldn't get a mortgage?
04:39They can't get a mortgage in this neighborhood to buy.
04:41There's nobody to lend money and if you can't get money, you can't buy a house.
04:47Isn't it all over and done with here?
04:50I mean, isn't it too late?
04:51No, it's not too late because if we get money, we will rehab these buildings and put them back on the tax roll.
04:58That's what it takes.
04:59Now, you've lived here for how many years?
05:01I lived here for 32 years.
05:03What goes through the middle of you when you look around and you see what happens?
05:06I cry.
05:07It tears the inside out of me.
05:09This was a beautiful neighborhood.
05:12I mean, we need you to give our community service as you give other communities.
05:20This is what we're asking you.
05:22Our problem is we need banking in the low and modern income era where our community is 100% black.
05:34And everybody help redline our community.
05:39Llewellyn fights for his neighborhood through the local chapter of ACORN, a housing advocacy group.
05:45Here, ACORN activists meet with representatives of Affiliated Bank of Chicago,
05:50whose parent corporation is planning a merger with another bank, Comerica.
05:55But mergers need federal approval.
05:57And approval can be withheld because of local opposition.
06:01That gives ACORN a hammer.
06:03It's not up to us now.
06:04It's up to you.
06:05You're going to have to deal with us now.
06:07If you don't deal with us, we're going to hold up your merger.
06:10We need your commitments that you're going to put some service in our community,
06:18whereas we show you we are just as trustworthy as any other peoples on the face of the earth.
06:24This is all we're asking for.
06:25We don't want you to give us anything.
06:27We, if you lend us money, we're going to pay you back like any other red-blooded American.
06:36You have all your banksters out in the rich part of the city.
06:40You have nothing for us.
06:42Does ACORN, do you have your outreach and your programs that you're operating?
06:47Are you in certain parts of the city?
06:49Brenda Schneider is director of community relations for the bank.
06:53Is it real?
06:54Is racial discrimination and mortgage lending real?
06:57I would categorically say no.
06:58I think there are too many factors that go into making up whether or not an applicant does or does not get a mortgage.
07:06Is it possible that the people at the meeting were really angry at the way they've been treated by the banking system?
07:13I would say that your assessment is absolutely right.
07:16Angry is an accurate description of what I felt listening to them.
07:23Should that anger be vented at financial institutions?
07:26I don't believe so.
07:27Financial institutions in and of themselves have a niche in addressing reinvestment patterns in urban cities.
07:35But in and of themselves, they are not the single way of addressing or resolving all of the urban problems that are facing America.
07:43What did you bring tonight that you can ensure us that you're going to deal with us in good faith?
07:51I think the fact that we're here.
07:53The fact?
07:53The important thing is that we are here.
07:56We are listening.
07:57I'm taking diligent notes as it is Mr. Hemmon.
08:00And it is our intent to respond to you.
08:02See, if you don't lend us money, then we got to move in your community and then you got to start running.
08:09Because you don't want to stay where black's at.
08:12So why don't you put a branch in Inglewood so I don't have to give you trouble?
08:17Huh?
08:23Laws protecting consumers against lending discrimination date back to 1968.
08:29It was then that Lyndon Johnson signed into law the Fair Housing Act, which courts have ruled prohibits redlining, the practice of denying loans in a particular neighborhood.
08:38I urge every American to join in this effort to bring justice and hope to all our people.
08:49Since then, Congress has made several attempts to strengthen fair lending law.
08:57In 1974, it passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which outlaws lending bias against individuals.
09:04In 1977, Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act.
09:08The CRA stated that banks had an obligation to serve low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.
09:15Stop redlining neighborhoods first! Stop redlining neighborhoods first!
09:20Over the years, community groups have used the law to pressure banks to provide more service.
09:26Stop redlining neighborhoods first! Stop redlining neighborhoods first!
09:31Austin, on the western edge of Chicago, is the type of neighborhood fair lending laws were intended to help.
09:42Income here is close to average for Chicago, but mortgage investment last year was 35 percent below the citywide average.
09:51Austin's population is 91 percent minority.
09:54Maria Saldana and her husband, Donald Davidson, know just how hard it is to get a home loan here.
10:05I really thought this was the house. I mean, I said, this is the house.
10:10I wanted a house where the kids could grow up in and they would have memories about living in a house and, you know,
10:18all the nooks and crannies of a house that only a kid can really appreciate.
10:22It would seem that Maria and Donald are good candidates for a loan.
10:27Donald is a real estate developer and mortgage banker.
10:30Maria earns $69,000 as a lawyer for the city of Chicago.
10:35She holds the couple's assets, which, according to her attorney, top $1 million.
10:41But they did have trouble.
10:42When Maria Saldana, who had earlier received a smaller loan from Citibank,
10:48applied to the bank for a $191,000 mortgage construction loan, her application was denied.
10:56They sent me a letter saying you got turned down for two reasons.
10:59One, bad credit history, and two, that you have too many outstanding loans.
11:04Citibank told Frontline Maria Saldana was turned down due to her credit performance on her own personal loans.
11:11Did the bank have a case?
11:14Maria Saldana's credit report included two late mortgage payments two years ago,
11:20some credit cards at their limit, and an unpaid $6 fee on an old student loan.
11:26The rest of her credit report was clean.
11:30Maria didn't see where there should be a problem.
11:32And when I got the credit report and I looked at it, I really couldn't figure out what it was they were talking about
11:37because, you know, my credit rating for the last 24 months was great.
11:42As far as I'm concerned, they made up their minds the minute we walked in,
11:46and I don't think they ever planned to make that loan.
11:49But oddly enough, Citicorp is probably the largest lender in black neighborhoods in the city of Chicago.
11:56And their average mortgage, if my memory serves me right, is about $45,000 or $50,000.
12:04And I think they've made a conscious decision that they don't like lending in black neighborhoods,
12:09but they'll do it, and they'll do it well because that's the law.
12:12But they've defined in their minds a risk level.
12:16And I think what must have happened was we went beyond their definition of risk level.
12:21After the Citibank rejection, Maria Saldana did get a loan at another bank, First Chicago.
12:29Loan officer Carol Janowitz reviewed the same credit report that Citibank had seen
12:34and agreed to loan Saldana $147,000.
12:38That's a very common scenario that we see, and we typically ask for someone to qualify,
12:45give us reasons if they have slow payments, why they happen.
12:48And in some particular situations, we may actually ask for documentation that explains why that's happened.
12:55Are you comfortable with the fact that you gave her a mortgage and that you'll be able to pay it off?
13:00Yes, I am.
13:01Janowitz's boss is Richard Thomas, president of First Chicago.
13:06We're not in the business of knowingly making bad loans.
13:09And so we have to satisfy ourselves that that loan has a reasonable, more than a reasonable,
13:16a very high probability of being repaid as scheduled.
13:19One bank says no.
13:21Another bank says yes.
13:24What turned the decision a particular way is not easy to determine.
13:28Citibank says Saldana was a bad risk.
13:31But she is considering suing Citibank to find out if there was another reason why her loan was denied.
13:37You know, I went to Stanford in undergrad.
13:39I got a Berkeley Law degree.
13:41I have a job to pay $69,000.
13:43But somehow I'm doing something wrong.
13:45I thought I was doing all the right things, but I'm not.
13:48It would seem that Peter and Dolores Green are a couple who wouldn't have trouble getting a mortgage either.
13:59He's a state employee, and she works for a publishing company.
14:03They are professional and well-paid.
14:07The Greens live in a neighborhood that's on the edge,
14:11with board-ups and fix-ups side by side,
14:15keeping people like the Greens here is important.
14:19They want to stay and, in fact, invest here.
14:23The Greens had hoped to buy the six-unit apartment building
14:26that has been their only home since they were married.
14:30Was it an important step for you to buy the house?
14:32Yes, it was.
14:33For me, and I'll just speak for myself,
14:35I think it was the fact that we had spoken so many times over
14:42about owning that piece of property
14:45and there's really nothing necessarily so beautiful or what have you,
14:50but it's still special, you know, in its own way.
14:53What do you mean?
14:54Well, that's where our roots were.
14:56We'd been living there for over 30 years,
14:59so it had a lot of meaning in that regard.
15:02Did you ever think about leaving the neighborhood?
15:04Oh, God, yes.
15:05Yes.
15:06That's the one thing that we could have done at any point in time.
15:10But we're not quitters.
15:12We're not runners.
15:13I think, really, that's it.
15:14We just didn't feel that we had to run.
15:18The Greens earn approximately $60,000 a year between them.
15:22They list assets of over $100,000,
15:25and they say they are paying all their bills on time.
15:27So when you went to the banks to look for a mortgage,
15:32what did you think their reaction was going to be?
15:34I thought I was white, and let me just explain what I mean by that.
15:39I had all of my documents together,
15:44the kinds of documents that I knew would be needed in making an application,
15:50such as tax returns, description of the property,
15:56a record of where I was doing my banking,
16:00a record of where I was employed,
16:04copy of operating expenses for the building,
16:07all of the kinds of things that one normally would need
16:10if they're going in to make application for such a loan.
16:13I fully expected to be treated fairly and receive a mortgage.
16:20But when Green began to contact banks,
16:23he says he couldn't even get an appointment.
16:26After several tries,
16:27a friend suggested the Avenue Bank of Oak Park.
16:31The loan officer at the time was John Hill.
16:34My job at the bank was a little different than the staunch banker.
16:39I mean, I was a business developer.
16:41And when you're a business developer,
16:44you want to bring in loans.
16:47You want to bring in deals.
16:49So I would, a lot of times,
16:53go out and look at something that a regular banker wouldn't do.
17:00Then you went and visited the neighborhood.
17:03Why did you go to do that?
17:04Before I make the presentation, I like to take pictures.
17:07And so I just took some Polaroid shots
17:09of the 6th flat of the neighborhood around,
17:12put them inside and say,
17:13this is what it's going to look like.
17:15What was your impression of the neighborhood?
17:18Rundown.
17:19It's one of those that I think I know why he would have bought the place
17:24because it's one of those that it's run down to the point
17:27where the only place to go is up.
17:29The evening John Hill made his assessment,
17:33he phoned Peter Green.
17:34He made mention of the building next door to me,
17:37seemingly having some problems,
17:39namely in that the structure had had a fire recently.
17:43And he raised the question about,
17:44gee, the same thing could very well happen to your property.
17:47And I said, well,
17:47why didn't you take a look at what's going on down the street?
17:50And I pointed out to him that there were numerous new townhouses
17:54that were going up, not only in that corner,
17:56but throughout the general area.
17:58He made no mention whatsoever of the positive.
18:00He only wanted to apply his thoughts to the building next door.
18:04Then I submitted to my boss, Gary Collins.
18:10Gary Collins took a look at the thing and said,
18:12this one you should show to the president, Michael Spacey.
18:20See what he thinks of it.
18:22So I did.
18:22I went and I talked to the president,
18:25showed him the thing.
18:26And this took all of about two minutes.
18:30And where was it located?
18:32You know, I told him a little bit about the neighborhood.
18:37And he says, do we really have to do this loan?
18:40I mean, well, we don't really have to do this loan.
18:45How did you find out what happened?
18:47I rang up the bank.
18:50And I was advised,
18:53oh, the committee, turn your application down.
18:57Who told you that?
18:58John Hill.
19:00Did he give you a reason?
19:02No.
19:04What did you say?
19:06You will be putting that in writing.
19:08And you'll be indicating as to why.
19:11Why was Green turned down?
19:14Because of the location of the area.
19:17If he were a longtime client or just, you know,
19:21a client of the bank for, let's say, a year or a couple of years,
19:25again, it probably would not have been turned down.
19:28What's the problem with lending money to someone you don't know
19:31if they have what it takes in terms of their assets and qualifications?
19:36Well, it's like, okay, if he were stronger, you know, it's like the case,
19:44it's a banker who really wants to loan money to somebody who doesn't need the money.
19:48Um, that's a good client.
19:50Well, he wasn't that strong.
19:53I mean, you know, he was still, I mean, he was very good.
19:57But, I mean, he wasn't that strong that you'd go way out on a limb.
20:04And going out on a limb was going into a neighborhood that we don't typically go into.
20:08How will the bank ever get to know the neighborhood?
20:10They don't have to.
20:12Why would the bank have to do that?
20:14They're setting up a service to help the community in which they are in.
20:19Man, there are branches everywhere.
20:21Those branches are supposed to know.
20:23I mean, you can't go into, there's probably banks in the neighborhood that Mr. Green is concerned about.
20:29There used to be, but no more.
20:32In fact, the bank where the Greens were regular customers,
20:36the one bank where they may have stood a better chance of getting a loan,
20:40that bank moved out.
20:42And we were customers at this bank probably pretty close to 10 years, more or less.
20:47What happened?
20:48One day we got an announcement that the bank was going to be moving or closing down.
20:54To go to another one?
20:55Yes.
20:56The same thing happened.
20:57That bank moved away.
20:59Bank by bank by bank, if you will, that at one time serviced this whole area.
21:04They just all disappeared.
21:05When a written explanation from Avenue didn't arrive,
21:09Peter phoned the bank's president.
21:11Dolores took the return call.
21:12He immediately says to me,
21:15well, John Hill should never have accepted the application.
21:20And I said, why not?
21:22He said, well, we don't give commercial loans.
21:25The bank president says Mrs. Green is wrong.
21:30He says he told the Greens only that John Hill wasn't authorized to make commercial loans.
21:35But when the bank sent the Greens a letter, it gave them no explanation for being turned down.
21:41Federal law requires the bank to give a reason for its rejection.
21:45Peter Green lost patience.
21:47He complained to the Federal Reserve Board in Washington.
21:51He expected a full investigation.
21:53But usually in an investigation of the person who was making the complaint,
21:58usually that person is contacted to get their side of the story.
22:02But they didn't do that?
22:03No.
22:03So I thought that rather strange, not having been contacted,
22:09and yet they wrote back and said, well, we don't see anything wrong.
22:12In a letter to the Greens, the agency that investigated,
22:16the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC,
22:19said the problem was a low appraisal.
22:22Now there seemed to be three reasons the Greens were turned down.
22:27Wrong kind of loan, said the bank president.
22:29Wrong side of town, said John Hill.
22:33Low appraisal, said the FDIC.
22:36We wanted to ask the FDIC and Avenue Bank about the Greens.
22:41The FDIC refused to comment.
22:45Avenue Bank, in a letter to Frontline,
22:47put the blame on their former loan officer, John Hill,
22:50for not completing the loan application.
22:53I'm not Dr. King.
22:56I don't want to be thought of as a Rosa Parks or anything.
22:59But it appears that there's been a serious problem in this area
23:05dealing with banks for some time.
23:08And the FDIC and those other agencies
23:11which have been mandated to oversee these institutions,
23:15it seems that they're falling short.
23:18I'd like to think that there are persons out there
23:21who are going to develop enough courage
23:24to stand up and say, no, not here.
23:27If it were a case of, say, I spoke too loudly or something,
23:33I could always learn to soften my voice.
23:36If I dressed in a particular manner,
23:40I could always buy different types of clothes and change that.
23:44But if it's the color of my skin,
23:46I can't change that.
23:47Time and again,
23:56the U.S. Congress returns to the issue of race and credit.
24:01Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
24:02At hearings last month before a House committee,
24:05community activists complained about lax enforcement of the law.
24:09The individual cases like I can bring up
24:12of the Peter and Dolores Green
24:13on the west side of the city of Chicago
24:16who were discriminated against by a lender.
24:20The people had impeccable credit.
24:22Gail Sincotta has testified before Congress
24:25more than a dozen times during the past 20 years.
24:29She is part of an array of community groups,
24:32public interest watchdogs,
24:34and lawmakers who know this is an old story.
24:37The Federal Reserve is one of four federal regulatory agencies
24:42that oversee financial institutions.
24:46Last October,
24:47the Fed released the first comprehensive national study
24:49of loan discrimination.
24:51The new data show that loan approval rates
24:54differ among different ethnic, racial, and income groups.
25:00The information was collected
25:02under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975,
25:05known as HMDA.
25:08The database was all mortgage applications
25:10filed nationwide in 1990.
25:13The study included the following statistics
25:16on conventional mortgage rejection rates.
25:19For black Americans,
25:21the rejection rate was more than twice as high
25:23as for whites.
25:25And even more troublesome,
25:27high-income blacks were being rejected
25:29more often than whites of much lower income.
25:32The debate over what these numbers mean goes on.
25:38John LeWare is a governor of the Federal Reserve.
25:41These most recent HMDA data,
25:43which caused quite a stir when they came out last fall,
25:48are like a lot of smoke.
25:51You've got to believe there's some sort of fire
25:54down there creating the smoke,
25:56but it's hard at this stage of the game
25:58to tell just what that is.
26:01The problem, bankers say,
26:03is the study did not include information
26:06on credit histories and level of outstanding debt.
26:09They say further study is necessary
26:11to determine whether the numbers show racism
26:13or legitimate credit decisions.
26:15But retired Senator William Proxmire,
26:19who sponsored the Community Reinvestment Act,
26:21says the data is clear.
26:23Well, I make plenty of those numbers
26:25because what it showed was
26:26people with the same income.
26:29The rejection rate on blacks
26:30was more than twice as high.
26:33Furthermore, the really bombshell here
26:36was the fact that the blacks
26:38who had the highest income
26:40were turned down more often
26:41than whites who had the lowest income.
26:44Now, that's the cruelest,
26:47most direct, explicit kind of discrimination
26:50on the basis of race.
26:53The Fed's numbers also showed
26:55that as the percentage of minorities
26:57in a community increases,
26:59so too does the number of loan denials,
27:02regardless of income level of the neighborhood.
27:05As the debate about what these numbers mean
27:07has continued,
27:09this group,
27:10the Federal Reserve Consumer Advisory Council,
27:12has studied ways to detect discrimination.
27:15We at least are alerted to a problem
27:18in the home mortgage lending field,
27:21and we can then take steps to address it.
27:23We can argue about what the nature of that problem is
27:25and what the appropriate steps are,
27:26but at least we all agree
27:28that there's some kind of a problem out there
27:29that we should be looking at.
27:30The council includes bankers, academics,
27:33and consumer advocates.
27:35Last year, it considered using testers,
27:38paired black and white examiners
27:39posing as loan applicants.
27:42Kathy Cloud, a fair housing expert
27:44and new member of the council,
27:45supports testing.
27:47If you don't make an application,
27:48there's no paper trail of your visit there.
27:51So there's no way to assess
27:53the percentage of people
27:54who are being turned away
27:55without even having a chance to apply.
27:57So testing shows us
28:00what happens at that stage.
28:02In 1990,
28:04Cloud supervised
28:05an experimental testing program in Chicago
28:08which showed clear discriminatory behavior.
28:11At a couple of institutions,
28:13the black testers were not given any information,
28:15were not assisted by the loan officer,
28:17and were told that they would only be assisted
28:19when they had completed an application
28:20and brought in their application fee as well,
28:23paid their money.
28:24That did not happen to the white counterpart
28:26of the minority testers.
28:28They were assisted,
28:30provided information,
28:31and encouraged to apply.
28:34But when the Consumer Council
28:36recommended testing
28:37as a way to detect discrimination,
28:40the Fed said no.
28:41We have kind of backed off the testing now.
28:44If you use it generally
28:45to try to pinpoint the problems,
28:48the cost is just going to be phenomenal.
28:52And we have long had
28:57the authority for Federal Reserve examiners
29:00to use testing
29:02if they sense that there is a problem
29:04and they want to find out
29:05or they want to confirm their judgment.
29:07To what extent do they use it?
29:09So far it has not been used.
29:11Why not?
29:11Because we have not found evidence
29:14that it leads us to believe
29:16that there is discrimination going on.
29:18Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts.
29:20Last year, after the HMDA data was released,
29:23a mandatory testing bill
29:24reached the House floor.
29:26Its sponsor was Congressman
29:28Joseph Kennedy of Massachusetts.
29:30The problem is not bad laws.
29:32It's bad enforcement.
29:34Bank regulators are asleep at the switch.
29:36They treat banks like golfing partners,
29:38not banks.
29:39But Kennedy's amendment
29:40immediately ran into trouble.
29:42Finally, the testing program
29:43proposed by the Kennedy amendment
29:45is a half-baked idea.
29:46It is a proposal that was rejected
29:48by the Federal Reserve Board
29:49because it would not guarantee
29:51accurate findings.
29:52It would be very costly to administer
29:54and it is unclear
29:55who will pay for the cost of the program.
29:57It may be the ultimate intrusion
29:59in the American system.
30:00The problem is real.
30:02It's a secret police solution
30:04modeled more after the KGB
30:05than it is any part of the American model.
30:08Will the gentleman yell?
30:08But the amendment's co-sponsor,
30:11Republican Robert Walker of Pennsylvania,
30:13pointed out,
30:14testing is routinely used
30:16by other government regulators.
30:17That's exactly what we're talking about here.
30:19Regulators where they find
30:21massive violations
30:22being able to turn to a device
30:23to assure that they're right
30:25and getting the job done.
30:26People talk about
30:27not being opposed to redlining?
30:29Well, what are we going to do?
30:31This is the Congress of the United States.
30:33Let's do something about it.
30:36But don't tell me,
30:37as I've been told,
30:38all my life
30:39and people of African ancestry
30:41and Hispanic ancestry
30:42to wait for the next tomorrow
30:44and the next generation
30:45and the next election.
30:47We, too, were endowed
30:48with certain unalienable rights.
30:50They were life, liberty,
30:52and the pursuit of happiness.
30:53But the support wasn't there.
30:56Even though the HMDA data
30:57had been released a month earlier,
30:59the amendment lost by 89 votes.
31:02The only way to get at the truth
31:05as to whether or not
31:06there is discriminatory lending
31:08taking place in this country
31:09is to get the facts.
31:10And as long as the Congress
31:14or the banking institution
31:16doesn't really want to go out
31:17and find out what's wrong,
31:19we'll simply say,
31:20as the bankers say,
31:21well, please don't draw any conclusions
31:23from subjective data.
31:25Well, give me a break.
31:27People are hurting,
31:28and they can't understand why
31:29they are receiving
31:30a different standard of treatment.
31:31To Kathy Cloud,
31:34the refusal to test
31:35is only a sign
31:36regulators aren't trying very hard.
31:38When they have
31:39complaints of discrimination
31:41from bona fide applicants
31:42for mortgages,
31:43they do not effectively enough
31:46evaluate those complaints.
31:47They don't refer them to,
31:49for example,
31:49the Department of Justice
31:50for investigation
31:51and for the pursuit of relief
31:55for the persons who are victims.
31:57John Dunn is Assistant Attorney General
31:59for Civil Rights.
32:00His staff prosecutes
32:02discrimination complaints.
32:04The paperwork forwarded
32:06by the regulators
32:07has hardly been backbreaking.
32:09We just have not had the complaints.
32:11This has been acknowledged
32:13by the various regulatory agencies.
32:16Now, we're open for business.
32:18We're ready to respond.
32:20But we're not going to go around
32:21the country looking for problems.
32:24Why not?
32:25It's not your job.
32:26No, it is not our job.
32:28We are not investigators
32:29in order to try to dig up cases.
32:32We are prosecutors
32:33when a citizen claims
32:37that his or her rights
32:38have been violated.
32:39Then we go to court.
32:41But we don't just initiate
32:42these on our own.
32:44Only one case
32:45has been referred
32:46to the Justice Department
32:47in the 18 years
32:48since the Equal Opportunity Act
32:50was passed.
32:51We don't know really
32:52why we haven't had many referrals.
32:54but we're prepared
32:55to make up for any failings
32:57that may have been there.
32:59I'm not prepared
33:00to point a finger
33:01at a regulatory agency
33:03and say,
33:03you haven't done your job.
33:05We don't know enough
33:06about that,
33:07but we know
33:07that the result
33:08which was intended
33:09by Congress
33:10to be achieved
33:10has not been achieved.
33:13We asked Governor
33:14LaWare
33:14of the Federal Reserve
33:15if the situation
33:17means sloppy work
33:18by the regulators
33:19or that discrimination
33:20has disappeared.
33:22I don't know.
33:23If I knew the answer,
33:25you know,
33:25we wouldn't be
33:26trying to prove
33:28the answer
33:29with the investigation
33:31and the research
33:32that we're doing.
33:32We'd be out there
33:34sending in special teams
33:36to look at areas
33:38where we thought
33:38it was going on.
33:39What can you tell people
33:41then that will reassure them?
33:43Kind of like a bloodhound
33:44without a scent,
33:45you know.
33:47He just,
33:47he mills around
33:49and he doesn't know
33:50what direction to go in.
33:51The Office of the Controller
33:53of the Currency
33:54or the OCC
33:55is another federal
33:56bank regulatory agency.
33:58It oversees
33:59nationally chartered banks.
34:01A lawsuit forced the OCC
34:03to set up
34:04a Fair Lending Enforcement Office
34:05in 1978.
34:08Zena Green
34:08was the first director
34:09of that office.
34:11She says
34:11she came to an agency
34:12unwilling to change.
34:14The first inclination
34:15came the first week.
34:16The first thing
34:16we had to do
34:17was write testimony
34:17for the Hill
34:18and we had to tell them
34:20what wonderful things
34:21we were now going to do
34:22to find discrimination.
34:23So we were going to test,
34:24we were going to look
34:24for redlining,
34:25we were going to do
34:26all these wonderful things
34:27and at the end
34:28we said nothing.
34:30We had ten pages
34:31and we said nothing.
34:32We didn't mention
34:33the word redlining,
34:34we didn't mention
34:34the word testing,
34:35we didn't say a word
34:37about what we were going to do
34:37or how we were going to get there.
34:39That was 14 years ago.
34:41To learn if things had changed,
34:43we spoke to Susan Krause,
34:45a senior deputy controller
34:46at OCC.
34:47We, as you probably know,
34:49don't have very many
34:50successful cases
34:52of discrimination
34:53actually brought
34:53to conclusion.
34:55So that can be
34:57either good news
34:58or bad news.
34:58We don't find much
34:59overt, blatant discrimination
35:01and we think,
35:02and nobody does.
35:03I think that
35:04there probably isn't much
35:06overt, blatant discrimination,
35:08but there probably is
35:10subtle discrimination
35:10that we have a very
35:11difficult time finding
35:12and therefore
35:13we're not very far
35:14long on enforcement.
35:16These are a box
35:17of files that I use.
35:19The OCC's lack of action
35:20doesn't surprise
35:21Zena Green
35:22and two other
35:23former fair lending specialists.
35:25All three quit
35:26in frustration.
35:28Zena Green left
35:28in 1979.
35:30I knew this was
35:31an organization
35:32that did not want
35:33to find discrimination.
35:35It was clear.
35:36It was eminently clear.
35:37I came there
35:38as a director of division
35:39within a few months.
35:41It was rearranged
35:42and I was just
35:43off there
35:44by myself
35:45with a secretary.
35:46And I think
35:46that the people
35:48who followed me
35:49didn't even have
35:49the secretary.
35:50They were just
35:51director of civil rights
35:52but director of nothing.
35:55Michelle White
35:55took over the job
35:56when Zena Green resigned.
35:59White stayed
35:59for two years.
36:01Under the Bush
36:01and Reagan administrations
36:04we've seen an erosion
36:05of civil rights
36:06in general.
36:07There was never
36:08a commitment
36:09to civil rights
36:11from my perspective
36:13in the area
36:14of either lending
36:15or insurance.
36:17Ron Wink was next.
36:20He says the lack
36:21of interest
36:21in fair lending
36:22was still the case
36:23when he resigned
36:24in 1990.
36:25I quit as a matter
36:26of principle.
36:28I thought the interest
36:29particularly by senior
36:30management
36:31in fair lending
36:32had declined
36:32over the eight years
36:35that I was at
36:35the controller's office.
36:36The head of the OCC
36:42at the time
36:43Wink resigned
36:44was Robert Clark.
36:45You think you did
36:46a pretty good job?
36:47I believe so.
36:49What would you say
36:50to people who say
36:51no you didn't sir?
36:52I think they simply
36:53don't understand the facts.
36:55I understand why people
36:56feel the way they do.
36:57I just don't think
36:58they have a very good
36:59appreciation
36:59for what goes on
37:00in a bank supervisory agency
37:03and I think they rely
37:03too much on statistics
37:06without looking
37:06at what underlies
37:08those statistics.
37:10It makes you wonder
37:11if over the years
37:12this agency
37:13has really been interested
37:14in enforcing those laws
37:16and getting at discrimination.
37:22Has it been?
37:23How could it be
37:24that those three people quit?
37:25Well I don't know
37:27all those people.
37:28I wasn't involved
37:28in this particular area
37:30for as far back
37:31as they go.
37:32I think this agency
37:32has always been interested
37:34in fair lending enforcement.
37:36I think it's a very
37:37difficult area
37:38to try to establish
37:40a definitive record
37:42and we have the same record
37:44as the other federal agencies
37:45in terms of how successful
37:46we've been at finding
37:47and proving
37:48unlawful discrimination.
37:49Who's responsible
37:51for this situation
37:54taking so long
37:55to root out?
37:57I don't know.
37:58I refuse to accept
38:00responsibility
38:00on the behalf
38:01of the regulators
38:02because we conduct
38:05what we feel
38:06are responsible level
38:07of examination procedures
38:09to serve compliance
38:11and where we find
38:13any indications
38:14in the record
38:15of discrimination
38:16we take whatever steps
38:19are necessary
38:20to correct it.
38:21Regulators are doing
38:22a lousy job
38:22from any standpoint.
38:23A lousy job.
38:25Very poor.
38:26We have gross
38:27demonstrable discrimination.
38:30Racial discrimination.
38:31Gender discrimination.
38:32Discrimination against people
38:34with low incomes.
38:35If you understand this
38:36you've got to do something
38:37about it
38:37because it will eat at you.
38:39But if you say
38:39I don't understand it
38:40and maybe we should wait
38:41and study the data
38:42and we should not draw
38:44subjective conclusions
38:45it puts off
38:46the inevitable decision
38:48to act.
38:49And it is a fact.
38:50Frontline requested
38:51interviews with the
38:52cabinet level officers
38:54responsible for bank
38:55regulation and fair
38:56housing laws.
38:57Both Nicholas Brady
38:58Secretary of the Treasury
39:00and Jack Kemp
39:01Secretary of Housing
39:02and Urban Development
39:03declined our requests.
39:06These hearings
39:06could not be more timely.
39:08One week after
39:09Los Angeles exploded
39:10community groups
39:11were again on Capitol Hill.
39:13The urgency may have
39:15been new.
39:16The message remains
39:17familiar.
39:18The recent Rodney King
39:19decision just lit the
39:21anger and frustration
39:22and despair that was
39:24rooted in a long
39:25experience of economic
39:26injustice.
39:28There are many laws
39:29already on the books
39:30to see that these
39:32problems don't come about
39:33but we seem to come back
39:34here year after year
39:35basically report the
39:38same numbers
39:39and we'll come back
39:41again next year and do
39:42the same thing again.
39:43I hear this debate
39:45after 20 years
39:46that these banks
39:47might be good folks
39:48and there isn't any
39:49discrimination is like
39:51mind-blowing.
39:52I don't know when
39:53we're going to get on
39:54with the business
39:55of getting loans out
39:57to these communities.
39:58How many more
39:59Los Angeleses have
40:00to blow up?
40:01A-C-O-R-N
40:04The people's voice
40:05will rise again.
40:07Back in Chicago,
40:09ACORN, the neighborhood
40:10advocacy group,
40:11continues its fight
40:12against Affiliated Bank.
40:14We're working people
40:15and we deserve
40:16a fair share
40:17of whatever is going on.
40:19We need loans
40:20and we don't have
40:21to be realized.
40:22We're not going to
40:23stand for it.
40:24We will be back.
40:25For four months,
40:26they've kept up pressure
40:27on the regulators
40:28and the bank.
40:30Finally, last month,
40:32the bank and ACORN
40:33reached an agreement.
40:35Affiliated agreed
40:36to grant more mortgages
40:37in all of Chicago's
40:38low-income neighborhoods
40:39and gave ACORN
40:41a $25,000 grant.
40:43The Fed approved
40:45the bank's merger.
40:46Red lining.
40:47We're tired of it.
40:56But ACORN
40:57has won a small battle.
40:59Chicago's black neighborhoods
41:00are still far
41:01from receiving
41:01their fair share
41:02of financial services.
41:03We looked at
41:05what happens
41:05to these neighborhoods
41:06when banks are scarce.
41:08It's another side
41:09of the redlining story.
41:12Without banks,
41:13all kinds of opportunists
41:14are freer to operate here.
41:17We looked at
41:17one of the most
41:18common ripoffs,
41:19home improvement contractors
41:21offering questionable financing
41:22for shoddy work.
41:24We cannot borrow money
41:27from the bank.
41:28But then the banks
41:29will turn around
41:30and let these
41:31shyster contractors
41:32have it
41:33and sell it to us
41:34for three times
41:36or four times
41:37or five times
41:38the money
41:39and they make
41:40a fortune off of us.
41:42We were told
41:43how much the monthly
41:44payments would be,
41:45how long it would take
41:46to pay the loan off.
41:49But we weren't told
41:50that the interest rate
41:52would be 17.98.
41:55Wanda Grigsby
41:56lives with her husband
41:57and children
41:58on Chicago's south side.
42:00In 1989,
42:00she decided
42:01to refinish her basement.
42:03When there was
42:04a heavy rain,
42:04we get maybe
42:06an inch or two
42:07of water in the basement.
42:08And we were told
42:10that that was no problem.
42:11They could dig a trench
42:12on the side of the house,
42:14on the north side
42:15of the house
42:15and fill in the cracks.
42:17But two years
42:18after the work was done,
42:20after repeated requests
42:21for repairs to be made,
42:23the basement still floods
42:24after a hard rain.
42:27Okay, I would like
42:28to show you this awning.
42:30This awning right here?
42:31Yeah.
42:31I had to have
42:32this awning repaired
42:33because the awning
42:34fell down.
42:35So I had someone
42:36to come out
42:37and put it back up.
42:38Uh-huh.
42:38Doug Robinson says
42:39he too was cheated.
42:41He wanted new awnings
42:42and storm windows.
42:43This particular window here,
42:44this is the one
42:45that was hung upside down.
42:48Uh, this window here,
42:50see that?
42:51Right here.
42:53This came apart.
42:55And it was a bad storm
42:56in our back porch.
42:58It's an old building
42:59where we live in.
43:00It blew down.
43:02And finally, Annie Trice.
43:04She co-signed a loan
43:05for her mother
43:05so that their badly damaged
43:07porch could be rebuilt.
43:09It was in such a bad shape
43:11I had to, uh,
43:12we had to, uh,
43:14try to find someone
43:15right away to repair it.
43:17She too received
43:18substandard work
43:19and says the porch
43:20is usable for only
43:21half the year.
43:22You can see on the outside
43:24in the winter
43:24it gets real cold.
43:25When it rains,
43:26it rains on the inside.
43:29Contracts resulting
43:30in shoddy work
43:31are all too common
43:32in these neighborhoods.
43:34But what makes
43:34these cases
43:35especially troubling
43:36is that they all claim
43:38they were misled.
43:40Grigsby says
43:40she wasn't informed
43:42about the 18%
43:43interest rate.
43:44Trice and Robinson say
43:46they didn't know
43:46they were putting
43:47their homes on the line.
43:49What did you think
43:50when you signed up?
43:51Well, I felt
43:53that they would finance
43:54the, the work
43:55and I would pay them
43:56and they knew
43:57that they was going
43:58to take out
43:58a second mortgage.
44:00When did you sign
44:01the second mortgage?
44:04I, I never,
44:05the only thing I signed
44:06was a contract.
44:07The company behind
44:10the contractors
44:11was an outfit
44:11called the Dartmouth Plan.
44:14It's bankrupt now,
44:15but it once operated
44:16in 32 states.
44:18In Illinois,
44:19New York,
44:20and Connecticut,
44:21Dartmouth has been sued
44:22for misleading homeowners
44:24and fraudulently securing
44:25second mortgages.
44:27In 1985,
44:28Connecticut was the first
44:29to sue.
44:31Richard Blumenthal
44:31is the state's
44:32attorney general.
44:33The real deception
44:35in the Dartmouth Plan
44:37was that second mortgages
44:39were placed
44:40on people's homes
44:41without their
44:44knowing about it.
44:45And in some instances,
44:47documents actually forged
44:49their signatures,
44:50actually written in
44:51by someone else,
44:52notarized in their absence,
44:54and obviously
44:57misrepresented.
44:58In New York State,
45:00a similar suit
45:00is underway.
45:02Elizabeth Bradford,
45:03the assistant attorney general
45:05trying the case,
45:06explains how the
45:07Dartmouth contractors
45:08operated.
45:09When the contractor
45:10comes to the consumer's house,
45:12he gets the consumer
45:13to agree to a contract.
45:15He takes credit information
45:16from the customer
45:17at that point
45:18and asks him to sign
45:19a stack of documents
45:20on a clipboard,
45:21a whole stack of things,
45:22including the loan agreement
45:24and the mortgage agreement,
45:26which is buried
45:26under this pile of documents.
45:29It's not just
45:29that we deny the charges,
45:31which we do,
45:32but the charges
45:33really deal
45:35to the extent
45:36that there's any validity
45:37to a small,
45:39small handful
45:40of dishonest contractors.
45:43Dartmouth's attorney
45:44is David Perez.
45:45We monitored
45:47what was going on.
45:48We refused
45:49to do business
45:50with contractors
45:50that we thought
45:51were dishonest.
45:53Whenever a homeowner
45:54complained,
45:55we sent people
45:55out to their homes.
45:57Did we make mistakes?
45:58Sure, we're human,
45:59but very, very few.
46:00Nothing that approaches
46:01fraudulent conduct.
46:03I think that the judge,
46:05hearing these people
46:06get on the stand
46:07time and again,
46:08essentially telling
46:09the same story
46:10about how they were
46:10not aware of mortgages.
46:12They had no idea
46:13they were paying
46:14that interest rate.
46:14They didn't even realize
46:15how long they were
46:16supposed to pay
46:17on the loan.
46:18Well, realize that
46:19this is not just
46:19a series of isolated problems,
46:21but an underlying problem
46:24with the way
46:24this company did business.
46:26According to the lawsuit
46:28filed in Illinois,
46:30Dartmouth enticed
46:31contractors
46:31with expensive vacations
46:33to hook homeowners
46:34into higher interest rates.
46:36These profitable
46:37high-interest mortgages
46:38could then be sold
46:39to mainstream banks,
46:41the same banks
46:42often unwilling
46:42to make home improvement
46:44loans at conventional rates
46:45in minority neighborhoods.
46:47One of Dartmouth's
46:48biggest customers
46:49was Citibank.
46:50At the time
46:51when Dartmouth
46:52purchased the paper,
46:54it would turn around
46:55and sell it to Citibank
46:56or other banks.
46:57And they would be
46:58the investor,
46:59the one that held
47:00this paper
47:01in order to make money.
47:03And Dartmouth would
47:03do that over and over again
47:06with many thousands
47:07of homeowners
47:07to Citibank
47:09and other banks.
47:10In New York
47:11and Connecticut,
47:12Citibank was named
47:13along with other banks
47:14as a co-defendant
47:15with Dartmouth.
47:16In Connecticut,
47:17Dartmouth settled the case
47:18paying $3.5 million
47:20to 3,100 homeowners.
47:22The case against the banks
47:24was dismissed.
47:25In New York,
47:26the case against Dartmouth
47:27is still pending.
47:30Citibank has settled
47:31with a payment
47:32of $250,000
47:33to consumers.
47:35Citibank of Chicago
47:36canceled the scheduled
47:38interview
47:38when we told them
47:39we would ask questions
47:40about the Dartmouth plan.
47:42In a letter to Frontline,
47:44the bank wrote that
47:45in addition to its initial
47:46background check
47:47on Dartmouth in 1978,
47:49it did a second check
47:50after the Attorney General
47:51brought suit
47:52and found nothing
47:53that indicated
47:54any impropriety.
47:56The letter adds,
47:57Citibank was not involved
47:59in the origination
47:59of the consumer paper
48:00and did not know
48:02what specific practices
48:03the contractors use.
48:05So, the letter says,
48:07Citibank stopped buying
48:08Dartmouth's loans
48:09in Connecticut.
48:10Citibank continued
48:11to do business
48:12with Dartmouth
48:12in Illinois
48:13until 1989.
48:14In our complaint,
48:16we alleged that
48:18they knew
48:18or should have known
48:19that Dartmouth
48:21was not a licensed
48:22mortgage broker
48:23and that many
48:25of those mortgages
48:25were illegally procured
48:27because of the extent
48:29of complaints
48:30that followed.
48:31Citibank knew
48:32about the complaints
48:33that were made
48:34to Dartmouth.
48:37Citibank was regularly
48:38informed by Dartmouth.
48:40Citibank,
48:41as I mentioned,
48:42was not only
48:43a lending bank,
48:45a buying bank,
48:46and a financial advisor.
48:48And as a result,
48:49we were always
48:50giving them information,
48:51good information
48:52or bad information,
48:53financial information
48:54or any types
48:55of accusations
48:56that might affect
48:57our business.
48:58They were fully informed
49:00and nothing
49:01that was aimed
49:03at Dartmouth
49:04was withheld
49:05from Citibank
49:05and they know that.
49:06Meanwhile,
49:08homeowners continued
49:08to pay off
49:09second mortgages
49:10on homes,
49:11homes still in need
49:13of repair.
49:14Who are you paying?
49:15I'm paying
49:15Citibank
49:17in Hicksville,
49:18New York.
49:19Why don't you
49:20just stop?
49:21I lose my home.
49:22I can't.
49:24If I stop paying them now,
49:26I have a second mortgage,
49:27which means
49:28if I stop paying,
49:28they can take my home.
49:31Has this been hard on you?
49:32Mm-hmm.
49:33Tell me in what way.
49:37It put me
49:38up far behind.
49:39And I was,
49:47when I first
49:47became a caseworker,
49:49I was thinking
49:49about giving me a call.
49:51I couldn't get it.
49:54Couldn't get anything.
49:56There are human beings
49:57behind these pieces
49:59of paper.
50:00When those human beings
50:01file complaints
50:02with banks,
50:03our hope is
50:04that banks
50:04will be more careful
50:05and more energetic
50:07in trying to follow
50:09those complaints
50:09and stop doing business
50:11with people
50:12responsible for them.
50:16There are still
50:18neighborhoods
50:18in this city
50:19in which
50:20the market economy
50:22doesn't work properly.
50:24Jim Fletcher
50:24is president
50:25of South Shore Bank,
50:26one of the few
50:27pioneers of
50:28community development
50:29on Chicago's
50:30south and west sides.
50:31And part of the reason
50:32it does not work properly
50:34is that institutions
50:36that are active
50:38and can extend credit
50:39in those neighborhoods
50:40don't do it.
50:42They extend it
50:43in other places.
50:43And why don't they do it
50:44in those neighborhoods?
50:46As I said before,
50:47because their perception
50:48of that neighborhood
50:48is that the risk
50:51is too great.
50:53And why would they
50:53perceive the risk
50:54as being too great
50:55in that neighborhood?
50:56Is it race?
50:57Is it economics?
50:58Is it,
50:58what is it?
50:59It's,
51:00it's,
51:00it's race.
51:03Okay.
51:04And,
51:04and,
51:05and that gets tied to,
51:07that gets ties to economics.
51:08And it's a perception
51:09that those people
51:10that aren't like me
51:12won't handle themselves properly.
51:15Other bankers
51:16see the issue
51:17somewhat differently.
51:18What we need to do
51:19is to have people
51:21become qualified
51:24to borrow money
51:26from a bank
51:27or from any other lender.
51:28but,
51:29but I think that
51:30it's,
51:31access to credit
51:32is somewhere down the line.
51:33We,
51:33we need to do
51:34all we can
51:35to stimulate
51:35job creation,
51:37good education,
51:39a good credit record.
51:44Frankly,
51:45those are the kinds
51:45of things
51:46that are much more important
51:47than access to credit.
51:48Access to credit
51:48comes as a result
51:50of the other things.
51:51Bankers
51:52manage risk
51:54and they perceive
51:56that this is not
51:57the way
51:58to manage risk
52:01and to make
52:02maximum return
52:03on invested capital.
52:08And since they don't
52:09believe it,
52:10I don't.
52:11And,
52:12and it's hard
52:13to convince them.
52:16So they don't,
52:17this is not a business
52:18that they want to be in.
52:19We didn't listen
52:32in Los Angeles
52:33and we are not listening
52:35in other urban areas
52:36and we are not listening
52:38as it relates
52:39to the lending practices
52:41which I believe
52:42in many respects
52:43are discriminatory
52:44by,
52:44by some banks
52:45in this country.
52:49In the wake
52:51of the Los Angeles riots,
52:53bankers and regulators
52:54nationwide
52:55have pledged
52:56to do more
52:56to ensure fair lending.
52:59The Justice Department
53:00has told regulators
53:01they want fair lending cases
53:03justice can prosecute.
53:05The Department of Housing
53:07and Urban Development
53:07says it will begin
53:08funding the testing
53:09of mortgage lenders
53:10for discrimination.
53:15I'm the expert gardener.
53:17Uh-huh.
53:18Because...
53:18In Chicago,
53:20Donald Davidson
53:21and Maria Saldana
53:22continue to rehab
53:23their home.
53:24It has helped their block,
53:25but they are still angry.
53:27I know how the game
53:28is played
53:29and I know
53:30how you can hide
53:31any reason,
53:32any way
53:32you don't want
53:33to make a loan.
53:34I'm a real estate
53:35developer by trade.
53:36I'm a mortgage banker
53:37by trade.
53:38My wife is a lawyer.
53:40You can kid a lot of people,
53:41but you can't kid us.
53:43They are now
53:43considering a lawsuit
53:44against Citibank
53:45for discriminatory
53:46lending practices.
53:47I feel like
53:48I should do it
53:49because who's...
53:50How are you going
53:51to get changed
53:52if somebody like myself
53:54who knows
53:55that something went on
53:56that shouldn't have gone on
53:57doesn't get to the bottom of it?
54:00Back in Englewood,
54:01Henry Llewellyn
54:02is determined
54:03to see change.
54:04I'm not going to leave
54:05this neighborhood
54:06until I die.
54:09I'm going to stay
54:09in this neighborhood
54:10no matter what happens.
54:12I'm going to fight.
54:13I'm going to meet.
54:14I'm going to talk to people.
54:16Sooner or later,
54:17I will win.
54:19And the Greens?
54:20They finally got a mortgage
54:22and bought their apartment building.
54:24They are suing Avenue Bank.
54:26But it just should not have happened.
54:28That's all.
54:28I'm sorry.
54:28That's all there is to it.
54:29It's the law of the land.
54:34Born here.
54:36Educated here.
54:38Pay my taxes here.
54:40I'm entitled
54:42to a fair shake.
54:45Nothing special.
54:47Fair shake
54:48under the law.
54:59Fair shake.
55:08Fair shake.
55:10Fair shake.
55:11Fair shake.
55:12Fair shake.
55:13Fair shake.
55:14Fair shake.
55:15Fair shake.
55:16Fair shake.
55:17Fair shake.
55:18Fair shake.
55:19Fair shake.
55:20Fair shake.
55:21Fair shake.
55:22Fair shake.
55:23Fair shake.
55:24Fair shake.
55:25Fair shake.
55:26Fair shake.
55:27Fair shake.
55:28Fair shake.
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