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A look into the progresses gained and compromises made in negotiations to peacefully end Apartheid rule in South Africa.

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00:01Frontline is a presentation of the Documentary Consortium.
00:08In South Africa, there's hope of a political settlement for the promise of elections and a new democratic government.
00:17Tonight, the story of what happened in the three years since Nelson Mandela's release from prison.
00:24Three years of violent confrontations.
00:27Stalled negotiations.
00:33Police brutality.
00:38And massive protests.
00:41We want peace standing on our feet, not kneeling on our knees.
00:50The story of a country trying to reinvent itself and the passing of the old order.
00:55Tonight, apartheid's last stand.
00:59With funding provided by the financial support of viewers like you.
01:10And by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
01:14This is Frontline.
01:20South Africa is waking to the promise of a new start.
01:24These days, there's talk of hope, of the chance to escape poverty, and of a political settlement to end the long years of apartheid.
01:34The optimists are already learning a new language, the language of the ballot box.
01:48No parent, no husband can stop you from voting if you want to.
01:51That is within your rights.
01:52All you need to qualify to vote is to be 18 years old and above.
01:54And have a South African ID and be a South African citizen.
01:58Knowledge is the best and most powerful report.
02:00That is why we've registered and teaching people how to vote.
02:02These elections are totally different from...
02:04A troupe of actors tours the townships.
02:05Explaining to audiences what millions outside South Africa take for granted.
02:06The meaning of the vote.
02:07Sir, has this thing of voting and elections got anything to do with democracy?
02:08Yes!
02:09It has got something to do with democracy.
02:10But first can somebody say that,
02:20the townships, explaining to audiences what millions outside South Africa take for granted,
02:25the meaning of the vote.
02:28Sir, has this thing of voting and elections got anything to do with democracy?
02:33Yes, it has got something to do with democracy.
02:37But first can somebody tell me what is democracy?
02:39Come again, come again.
02:43Democracy is the government of the people, for the people, by the way!
02:50The people have put their hopes in one man, Nelson Mandela, and his African National Congress.
03:02For three years, he's been negotiating on their behalf with the white government.
03:07He now has to persuade his most militant supporters to accept a compromise with power.
03:12There can never be co-existence between liberation and apartheid, between Comrade Nelson Mandela and de Klerk.
03:27One must lose, one must be defeated, and that is de Klerk.
03:31President F. W. de Klerk also has to sell a deal to his people.
03:37The man given the credit for breaking with 300 years of white rule,
03:42has to reassure his followers that he hasn't given away too much,
03:45and that while he is relinquishing absolute power, he will find a way to protect them.
03:51We do not ask for minority, continued minority domination.
03:58But we say that a system within which, with 51% of the vote, you have 100% of the power,
04:06is not the right system for self-happiness.
04:09De Klerk's national party created the policy of apartheid.
04:15De Klerk has always been a party man.
04:18His father was in the cabinet, and his uncle was prime minister.
04:22But de Klerk has never acknowledged that apartheid was fundamentally immoral.
04:26He's only expressed regrets for some of its effects.
04:31He personally, as far as his concern, was never involved in anything that dehumanized people.
04:38He sees himself not as an inheritor of an evil system.
04:44He sees himself as a liquidator of everything that didn't work.
04:50And therefore, when he apologizes, he apologizes for inadvertent hurt and dehumanizing.
05:02He is not part of that.
05:04In his guts, he is not part of that.
05:06In the 80s, as the government of P.W. Boerter was losing control, de Klerk became party leader,
05:14backed by the party's conservative wing.
05:16I think he is a sort of, more of a realist and less of an ideologue than some of the others.
05:23And I'm prepared to say there was no conversion in the Klerk's case.
05:28I mean, all this Damascus experience and things like that, I don't think that was the case.
05:33I think what happened is that in the middle of the 80s, and there was 88, especially,
05:39the state of the economy, the state of the economy, this economy was in a mess.
05:43It's still in a mess.
05:45That message got through to the politicians.
05:47He called in business leaders to tell him about the economy, what they thought was important.
05:54And what they said was that if sanctions go on, there ain't going to be no economy in a year or so.
06:02He then went to visit foreign heads of state to ask about the sanctions, whether they could do anything.
06:09And they said that they couldn't do anything further.
06:13In fact, they couldn't go on holding sanctions where they were, unless he demolished a party.
06:21De Klerk's strategy was a bold one, to release Mandela and legalize the ANC.
06:27It was an act that caught the world's imagination, but his words were cautious.
06:32We approached this meeting profoundly aware of our responsibilities to all the people of South Africa.
06:41It provides the opportunity for another important and constructive step in the irreversible process of normalization, which has already started.
06:53Mandela and the ANC had played their part.
06:56For years, he'd been writing to the government from prison and even meeting with the leadership, persuading them that the ANC was not the threat they feared.
07:05At the same time, exiles like Thabo and Beki had been negotiating outside the country with senior government officials.
07:12At this first official meeting in 1990, there was great optimism, encouraged by what was seen as a special relationship between de Klerk and Mandela.
07:27It was an eye-opener to all those who took part.
07:35That meeting left its mark and influenced the views both of the government and ourselves on the whole question of negotiations, how it should be handled.
07:48And all this aroused expectations on the part of the public, both black and white, that would soon have a breakthrough.
08:03But how far was de Klerk prepared to go to embrace real change?
08:08He'd set himself an extraordinary task to change the direction of his party and his people, and at the same time to protect them.
08:15He was promising reform, but he brought no new faces into his inner circle, relying instead on the familiar members of the white Afrikaner establishment.
08:27The Klerk and his government have become spoiled by being in power for such a long period.
08:36He and his whole government's approach is one of, yes, we want to reform because we have no choice to reform,
08:44but the whole approach is that, well, we will try to outwit the ANC.
08:54Allow them to make mistakes, allow them to explode the myths which will build up around them with the hope that if there is an election somewhere down the road,
09:07two or three years or even four years, then the ANC would not have that sort of standing internationally and also nationally to be a major political threat to the establishment.
09:22So there was an idea that the process should be delayed?
09:26I have no doubt about that.
09:29They hoped that the release of a Mandela, for instance, would serve to demystify him.
09:37Once you let him loose in the streets, he wouldn't deliver what people expected he could deliver the following day after his release,
09:45that he would make mistakes, and therefore that in the end you would be dealing with a person who was a little bit more human
09:54than he seemed to be when he was in prison.
09:59Perhaps the most painful problem Mandela would face came soon after his release.
10:04A bloody political war among Zulus in Natal had claimed thousands of lives.
10:09He appealed for peace.
10:11My message to those of you involved in this battle of brother against brother is this.
10:23Take your guns, your knives, and your pandas, and throw them into the sea.
10:39It was not a message his supporters wanted to hear.
10:46They had lived through five years of fighting while Mandela was still in prison,
10:50and they were convinced that to put down their arms now would be suicidal.
11:00Their opponents were more traditional Zulus,
11:03many from the rural areas of the so-called homeland of Kwa Zulu.
11:09For Pretoria, their leader, chief Mungasutu Butelezzi, was a natural ally.
11:18At the time of Mandela's release,
11:20de Klerk's government paid secret funds into his Encarta movement,
11:25fueling rivalries in Natal,
11:27and exploiting Butelezzi's antagonism to the ANC.
11:30It seems ironic
11:40that people talk of peace and democracy
11:44when their behavior indicates the opposite.
11:49We see our people being killed not in face-to-face combats,
11:55which can shower to our people.
11:58We see people being attacked in their homes
12:00when they are asleep at the dead of night.
12:06Butelezzi turned Inkarta into a national political party
12:09to make an impact beyond his region.
12:12In the months that followed,
12:14the political battle spread from Natal
12:17to the black townships around Johannesburg.
12:19Beginning in July of 1990,
12:44there was a spate of murders on the township commuter trains.
12:47Mysterious attackers would arrive at a station,
12:52open fire on commuters, and disappear.
12:56The police had no answers,
12:58but locals had little doubt where the attacks came from.
13:03Hostels for migrant workers house mainly single men,
13:07many of them Zulus from Natal.
13:11Encarta has many recruits here.
13:13One resident explained how hostile leaders organized train attacks.
13:17The workers in the back of the world are the same townships.
13:43At Nansfield Station early one morning, those selected joined the crowd waiting for the
13:52train to Johannesburg and carried out their orders.
13:55The station was a 1,000th of the station.
14:01It was a great station.
14:05It was a great station.
14:11The station was a 1,500th of the station.
14:18On this one occasion, 13 people were killed and more than 30 wounded.
14:39Over time, there would be almost 400 deaths, but until recently, not a single prosecution.
14:52Township residents had their own ideas about who to blame, and were ready to take revenge.
15:00The song is an insult to Butelezi.
15:11Hostel residents were prepared to retaliate in turn, threatening the peace process almost
15:17before it had got off the ground.
15:27It was against this background in August 1990 that de Klerk and Mandela came to Pretoria
15:32for their second formal meeting.
15:37To get the negotiation process moving, the ANC was ready with a major concession to suspend
15:44all operations against the state by its underground guerrilla army.
15:50We came to this meeting already having decided that we will declare a ceasefire with immediate
16:01effect.
16:03So we have made a very significant concession.
16:08But this concession was apparently no surprise to the government.
16:12Just two weeks before the meeting, one of the ANC's most senior negotiators, who was carrying
16:18ANC documents, had been arrested.
16:23My chief interrogator, in fact the head of the security branch, General Bassi Smith, saw
16:27me at my request.
16:30Because in my briefcase was the resolution mandating the ANC delegation as to what positions they
16:35should take at the forthcoming Pretoria meeting.
16:39And I drew his attention that he was using that information improperly, that if they were
16:43genuinely committed to the negotiation process, that information was not meant to be transmitted
16:49to the ministers.
16:51He made no bones about it, that it had given them an advantage.
16:54And he went further, actually foreshadowing that while I was in detention, violence swept
17:01through this country.
17:02He said to me, we have now got you people by the shorties.
17:09The violence that is going to hit this country, is going to be seen as attributable to you people.
17:15The only solution is to go and evict those people from that hostel, nothing else.
17:22ANC supporters did launch attacks on hostels.
17:26General Bassi Smith denied Maharaj's story, and the government denied it was involved in
17:31fomenting the violence.
17:35But with the confrontations came firearms.
17:38It wasn't clear where they were coming from.
17:49The effect of residents taking matters into their own hands was devastating.
17:59ANC leaders were seen as neither able to protect their people nor to discipline them.
18:11The portrayal of violence on South African television was further damaging to the ANC's
18:17image.
18:18Things have escalated to an extent that it's completely unacceptable.
18:23Clearly the ANC, who perceived their...
18:26But Encarta's own role has been brought into question by this man, once a spokesman for
18:32the party.
18:33...in Alexander.
18:34It appears that they have launched a revolutionary war against our people.
18:38Bruce Anderson was an Encarta delegate at talks with the government.
18:41...to attack Zulu peoples or Encarta members, and you know, really we don't want to see
18:46this thing blow up.
18:48Anderson is now disowned by Encarta because he claims that the security forces collaborated
18:53in the violence.
18:54The ANC have quite a number of arms caches scattered around.
18:59We try to find out where these arms caches are.
19:03We would then report that to the security police.
19:06The security police would go and raid the place, capture the arms.
19:10Sometimes the whole amount of the arms would be handed over to us.
19:14Sometimes a portion of the arms would be handed over to us.
19:16But I know of that happening on numerous occasions, and I've certainly heard it discussed openly.
19:22So Encarta has a free supply of weaponry provided by the South African police?
19:29By sections of the South African police.
19:31I think, if you try to say all the SAP are handing over weapons sort of willy-nilly to
19:38Encarta, no, that's not the truth.
19:43Anderson claims the police helped Encarta in other ways.
19:47When they raided the townships for arms, the hostels were tipped off.
19:55There were a number of raids on Alex that, in fact, no weapons were found at all.
20:00When there were weapons there at 6 o'clock in the evening, but when the raid went on there
20:04were no weapons, the weapons were taken out because we knew specifically that there was
20:08going to be a raid.
20:10How senior are these officers?
20:11No, we're talking about very senior officers, we're talking about very, very senior officers.
20:16Brigadier?
20:17Colonel?
20:18That sort of thing.
20:23How actively were the security forces encouraging the violence?
20:27No other issue would have as great an effect over de Klerk's so-called special relationship
20:32with Mandela.
20:39De Klerk's failure to investigate thoroughly charges against the police confirmed ANC suspicions
20:46about a third force, senior officers working with or without government approval, but certainly
20:52protected by de Klerk because he couldn't afford to lose their support.
20:57We're talking about a small number of people who, against orders, against the policy, are
21:05doing it as an own initiative and we want to stamp that out.
21:10The security forces, per se, are clean and this concept that there's a big third force and
21:18there's a big cabal, there's simply no evidence to substantiate that there isn't such a thing.
21:27But under de Klerk, there was evidence of military interference in other political events.
21:33In the Siskii, one of the so-called independent homelands created under apartheid, a new leader
21:38had come to power.
21:41But to the government's dismay, Brigadier Opar Gozo seemed supportive of the ANC.
21:47He even appeared on a platform with Mandela.
21:53So military intelligence in Pretoria set out to turn Gozo against Mandela by telling him
21:58he was the target of ANC assassination plots.
22:02An intelligence briefing prepared for him as late as November 1992 said,
22:08The ANC do not believe in negotiations to solve the problems in the region.
22:12For them there is only one solution.
22:15Brigadier Gozo and his supporters must either be killed or chased out of the region.
22:22A former colonel in South African military intelligence saw all this happening.
22:28Colonel Geert Hugo transferred to the Siskii to head their military intelligence.
22:33This was an undercover military operation that they made him paranoid about his own safety.
22:43They fabricated threats against his life on a daily, weekly basis.
22:50The standing joke was that on Friday, you know, you just say they are coming.
22:55They have been, Mkonto Evesizwe, out of the trans sky.
22:59It was going to launch it back on Gozo's life.
23:03Mkonto Evesizwe is the ANC's guerrilla army.
23:07Yes, of course, it is clear and evident that they have been trying to dodge.
23:14To seal his allegiance, military intelligence, according to Hugo,
23:18set up two former government officials to cross the border from neighbouring trans sky.
23:24They fed him with information that people under the previous regime that wants to come back to power
23:30is planning a coup in conjunction again with the trans sky.
23:35The two people came in and one of them was summarily executed on the spot.
23:39They just shot the car to pieces.
23:41One got away and was later on executed in the nearby village by the military on orders from Gozo,
23:50because this was the final proof to Gozo that these threats that was pumped into him the whole time were true.
23:57I had no illusions that what these people were saying was right.
24:05I couldn't take it as manipulation because they were evidence.
24:08There has been a wrong impression created to people that we are puppets and little boys of Pretoria.
24:18We are not. We are independent and we are sovereign.
24:25It was no secret that the ANC wanted to get rid of the government's allies, homeland leaders like Gozo.
24:31But the political battle between Gozo's forces and the local ANC was fuelled by the Dirty Tricks campaign.
24:38About 1500 tomorrow afternoon.
24:42Is this an attempt to derail the peace process?
24:45I wouldn't say it's an attempt to derail the peace process.
24:48I would say it's a strategy to prolong the negotiation process.
24:54To in the end to negotiate the best bargain for a small handful of individuals.
25:00Then who's giving the orders for things to continue?
25:02I believe it's a discipline within the military.
25:05There's two scenarios.
25:08Either the politicians have to accept the fact that the security forces are out of control and not listening,
25:14or disciplines within the security forces are not in tandem with the reform initiatives.
25:20That's the one they have to accept.
25:22If they don't accept that, they have to acknowledge that they are part and parcel of the hidden agenda.
25:28The facts of the case is things keep on happening.
25:39Suspicion about a hidden agenda was reinforced when de Klerk set aside a hundred-year-old law
25:45banning the carrying of so-called Zulu cultural weapons.
25:49Mandela was outraged.
25:51When de Klerk changed the law and made it legal for people to carry these weapons of death,
25:59it was the act of a white person who regards the lives of blacks as worthless.
26:06That changed the whole situation completely from the point of view of the mutual trust we've been
26:14trying to build between the African National Congress and the National Guard.
26:19I happened to be in his office when this was happening and Nelson Mandela had just made a statement
26:31attacking him for having signed it. And he was so utterly upset about that and said,
26:36now I have signed something to make the carrying of weapons illegal.
26:42And he was so, it looked absolutely genuine. He was really upset about that.
26:51I think he signed that bill without knowing what was in it.
26:55I believe there could have been a little bit of internal sabotage.
26:59But once he realized what he'd done, why didn't he reverse it?
27:02That's the puzzle about him. There are a few things like that where you wonder why he doesn't take action.
27:14After February 2nd, 1990, could President de Klerk have stopped the security force dirty tricks?
27:22He could have done more.
27:23The lack of, for example, putting out a date, saying after this date, no indemnity will be considered.
27:36In my mind, he is allowing a situation to continue which suits the politicians.
27:46And that is prolonging the negotiation process.
27:48No, not anywhere has a clear-cut message been given, stop. Stop your activities.
27:55In the form of saying, after this date, no indemnity will be considered.
28:02Despite the violence, the negotiation process was moving forward.
28:06In December 1991, the first multi-party Congress opened, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa.
28:14Outside, right-wing white protesters called de Klerk a traitor.
28:22Fearful of what the government might have already conceded.
28:26It was almost two years since de Klerk had set the whole process in train.
28:30Nearly 20 groups were represented at the table, dividing almost equally behind the government and the ANC.
28:37The task was to devise a form of transitional government to help South Africa move from white minority rule to real democracy.
28:49The delegates would take their cue from the readiness of the leaders to compromise.
28:53I believe that the chemistry of the individuals is an important factor.
29:03But more important is whether the individuals arranged around that table are in a problem-solving frame of mind,
29:13or whether they are in a party political platform to extract gains.
29:18The event was supposed to have been largely ceremonial.
29:23So no one was expecting what would happen when de Klerk made what was billed as the last speech of the day.
29:29There is only one party sitting in this room with a private army and with arms caches, illegal arms caches, admitting to it.
29:41All the other parties do not have a dualism.
29:45We believe one cannot be totally committed, totally committed to peaceful solutions if your major speakers constantly until two weeks ago from certain platforms with arms caches make an appeal for the struggle to continue and adhere to the concept of armed action.
30:15Outraged at the attack, Mandela asked for the microphone.
30:26If a man can come to a conference of this nature and play the type of politics which are contained in his paper,
30:39very few people would like him to deal with such a man.
30:43There are two stories about why this happened.
30:47One says de Klerk thought Mandela had been warned that he was going to make a public attack on the ANC's military wing to appease his white constituents,
30:56and that the message had not been given to Mandela.
31:00The other says de Klerk broke a private agreement.
31:03It confirms what we have been saying all along, that the national party and the government have a double agenda.
31:12They are talking this to us.
31:16They are at the same time conducting a war.
31:20If a head of the government doesn't know about it, then it is not fit to be a head of the government.
31:26Whatever had happened behind the scenes, the clash left a public perception of a profound divide between the ANC and the government at the very start of formal negotiations.
31:41I think the Klerk Mandela confrontation illustrates in a way some of the miracles of negotiation in the last three years.
31:52Time and again this confrontation, breakdown, deadlocks, and the train moves because there is no alternative.
31:59And the remarkable thing is that in terms of the decisions taken by CODESA-1, notwithstanding the confrontation, four weeks later, right on time, the first preparatory meeting started and the whole process got underway.
32:14But the private-special relationship was damaged further, as publicly de Klerk held to his tough line, playing to his own constituents.
32:23Negotiations are not going to be easy, and I raised the fundamental issue, and it will have to be cleared, and there is only one way to clear it, and that is through negotiation, and that is what we intend to do.
32:35He believes he has to deliver a deal that is acceptable to the mainstream white population, that if that does not happen, there will be a revolt,
32:47and that it is not a particularly Afrikaner, the ultra-right-inspired revolt, but a mainstream revolt.
32:58You! You! Yes, you! Don't look around, I'm talking to you! Did you vote yes today?
33:07Suddenly, de Klerk called a white referendum. He was losing some mainstream white support to the growing right wing.
33:15What about the guy next to you? Well, what's his excuse?
33:21However unsubtle, it was an expensive campaign by South African standards, with millions from big business.
33:28If friends or colleagues have forgotten that the referendum is on today, please remind them to vote yes.
33:36De Klerk ran his campaign like an American presidential candidate.
33:39He was asking the white electorate to give him a mandate to negotiate their future with the ANC.
33:47He knew he had popular support, but until the last minute, his advisors put out the story that it was too close to core.
33:54When the votes were counted, he'd won by 68% to 32%.
34:08It was a political triumph.
34:15The referendum, which was an astounding sort of victory, also strengthened the mood among the white population.
34:25Listen, we have some vested interests, we regard the clerk as the guardian of our interests, and we have now given him this vote of confidence, now we expect him to deliver.
34:41However, this tough line immediately after the referendum was perhaps one of his most serious mistakes.
34:49He and his advisors completely misinterpreted the referendum, as if it was not only the whites, but the total population that gave him a 70% support.
35:01I'm told that the Monday after the referendum, the attitude of the national party negotiators at CODESA too, was completely different.
35:14The old arrogance, so typical of the national party, was back again.
35:19We couldn't even agree on the composition of the daily management committee of CODESA, we couldn't agree on the appointment of the next chairperson, because government took the position, ANC, I don't have to discuss with you, I don't have to come to any common understanding of this problem.
35:36But by now, the working groups at CODESA had already developed the outlines of a negotiated settlement.
35:53There'd be elections leading to an interim government.
35:56De Klerk's side had conceded that an elected body should write the constitution.
36:02The ANC agreed to include De Klerk's party in a coalition.
36:06But when the government introduced a new percentage needed to approve a constitution, the talks collapsed.
36:13Each side blamed the other.
36:15Looking back at it, I would rather say the question of the percentages was used to a certain extent as the reason to call off talks by the ANC.
36:27Primarily, I think, in the background was the fact that things went too smooth, from the government's point of view, for them.
36:35And that they felt that things should actually be stored for that purpose.
36:41My own impression is somewhat different.
36:43In many discussions with some of the government negotiators, ministers, MPs, it became very clear in the last two weeks, before CODESA 2 took place in the middle of May, that the government had no intention that CODESA 2 must take final decisions.
36:58In private discussions, they were talking of there must be another follow-up in August, September.
37:04Others spoke of there will be CODESA 3, 4, and 5.
37:07And they openly spoke of at least a year before CODESA could finally make decisions to prepare the way ahead.
37:15But tragedy would once more intervene.
37:24One night at a place called Boipetong, more than 200 armed men entered a squatter camp.
37:3046 people, mostly women and children, were brutally killed.
37:52The attackers were identified as Incarta supporters from the nearby hostel.
38:10Then de Klerk came to Boipetong, but his gesture of sympathy was met only with anger.
38:16An hour after de Klerk left, the police opened fire.
38:29Then an officer shouted in Afrikaans,
38:44Who told you to shoot?
38:51Then, no one gave the order to shoot.
38:59When Mandela came to Boipetong a few days later,
39:15it was clear that the people were not interested in any more talking.
39:18The negotiation process is completely intact.
39:37I can no longer explain to our people
39:45why we continue
39:48to talk to a government,
39:52to a regime
39:53which is murdering our people.
39:57His method
39:58of bringing about a solution in this country
40:01is war.
40:04We are going to respond to that.
40:05This was Mandela's referendum.
40:15The ANC campaign of mass action
40:17brought him to the steps of the capital in Pretoria.
40:20The government must now accept
40:23that we want peace
40:27standing on our feet,
40:32not kneeling on our knees.
40:35The ANC...
40:37De Klerk was in his office above.
40:40It was clear that the ANC had not been as weakened
40:43over the past few years
40:44as the government believed.
40:45I think not just the government,
40:48but also white people in this country
40:50got the following message from mass action.
40:53The ANC alliance
40:55has the ability to mobilize people
40:58and get them on the streets.
41:02And secondly,
41:03they have the ability
41:04to destroy the economy
41:06and to disrupt
41:08normal sort of services.
41:10And everyone
41:11looking realistically at the country
41:15must accept
41:16that if we can't straighten out
41:18the economy,
41:20then no democratization
41:22will in any case
41:23succeed in the country.
41:26Big business
41:27had pushed De Klerk
41:28into reform from the beginning.
41:30Now his new finance minister,
41:32Johannesburg businessman
41:34Derek Keyes,
41:35sounded the alarm.
41:36Problems
41:36which have been there
41:38for a long time,
41:39but which can no longer be avoided.
41:44He laid out the consequences
41:46of further delays
41:47in reaching a political settlement.
41:50Privately,
41:51he briefed Mandela
41:52and the ANC leadership.
41:54...could reach
41:557%
41:56in the current fiscal year.
42:00I think it was a presentation
42:01that was
42:02truly devastating
42:03because it brought home
42:05the fact
42:06that
42:08this economy
42:09is actually
42:11in danger
42:11of entering
42:12into a downward spiral.
42:15And
42:15those who have
42:16studied economics
42:18to any superficial degree
42:19realize
42:20that once you're
42:21in that spiral
42:22it's
42:23very, very difficult
42:24if not impossible
42:25to pull out.
42:26It's a very big change
42:27for the ANC
42:28which had
42:29adhered
42:30to the principle
42:31of Phoenix rising
42:32from the ashes
42:32and citing
42:34Japan and Germany
42:35as examples
42:36as recently
42:38as a year ago
42:39for instance.
42:41I believe
42:42that it now
42:43has sunk in
42:43that this
42:44isn't the case.
42:45That they will not
42:46be rectified
42:47the situation
42:48once they are in power.
42:51There was an urgent need
42:52to come together
42:53but the legacy
42:55of two and a half years
42:56of confrontation
42:57would lead
42:58to one more tragedy.
42:59The ANC
43:02wanted to challenge
43:03government-allied
43:04homeland leaders
43:05on their own ground.
43:07They set out
43:07to march
43:08to the Siskii
43:09guarded by
43:10Brigadier Gozo's troops.
43:12The ANC leaders
43:14had a court order
43:15restricting their protest
43:16to a football stadium.
43:18They believed
43:19the Siskii soldiers
43:21were no threat.
43:22We were all convinced
43:24that they were
43:26demoralized
43:27that they would not
43:28shoot at their own people
43:30because
43:30they had relatives
43:32amongst those people
43:33who marched there
43:33and that they would not
43:35accept orders
43:36you know
43:37to mow down
43:38people who were not
43:39you know
43:40fighting and carrying
43:41weapons.
43:43Suddenly
43:44a group of militant
43:45ANC officials
43:46led a charge
43:47towards the capital
43:47Bishu.
43:48Inevitably
44:00forces in the
44:01South African military
44:02were blamed.
44:04Why didn't
44:05the SADF
44:06intervene
44:07the day of the march?
44:09Why weren't
44:09the SADF troops
44:10deployed on the ground
44:12knowing the track record
44:14of the Siskii
44:15Defence Force
44:16being a Mickey Mouse
44:17rabble
44:17that will shoot
44:19if they feel threatened?
44:22In my mind
44:23there's no doubt
44:23that
44:24this was to be used
44:26as an example
44:28for the Progressive Alliance.
44:30Stop
44:30your nonsense.
44:32This is the way
44:33we will act against you.
44:36If the government
44:37had a part in this
44:38how could the ANC
44:39keep talking to them?
44:40But where
44:47had the ANC
44:47led its people?
44:54And without talking
44:57where might it all end?
45:00We hate
45:00the clock
45:01we hate
45:02apartheid
45:03we hate
45:04capitalism
45:04and we shall
45:06continue doing that
45:07until we defeat
45:08this government.
45:11The ANC
45:12is not fighting
45:13for power sharing.
45:15When we fight
45:16against Bozo
45:16we are doing so
45:17because we don't want
45:18to share power with him.
45:20We are fighting
45:21against the clock
45:21because we don't want
45:22to share power with him.
45:24People cannot share
45:25power with the enemy.
45:27The enemy
45:27must be crushed.
45:28How many more
45:47confrontations
45:48would there be
45:49between protesters
45:50and soldiers?
45:55It was as if
45:57people
45:57sort of looked
45:58into the abyss
45:59and said
46:00listen
46:00this is
46:01where things
46:02will take us
46:03if we don't
46:04develop
46:05a strategy
46:06to compromise
46:07and to
46:09cooperate
46:09and establish
46:10a culture
46:13of cooperation.
46:14And this
46:15looking into
46:17the abyss
46:17played a major
46:19role
46:19in bringing
46:20the clerk
46:21and Mandela
46:21together.
46:23It is no longer
46:24possible to say
46:25that the responsibility
46:26for violence
46:27was caused
46:29by this
46:29particular
46:30organization
46:31or by the
46:32security forces
46:33alone.
46:33We are now
46:34all involved
46:34and the important
46:36thing is not
46:37to blame
46:39one another.
46:40The important
46:41thing is to work
46:42out strategy
46:43as to how to
46:43address the
46:44question of violence.
46:47As they met
46:48in September
46:491992
46:49it was clear
46:51to both sides
46:52that they had
46:52to establish
46:53an interim
46:53government
46:54as soon
46:55as possible.
46:57The pressure
46:58was on
46:58de Klerk
46:59not just
46:59to clean up
47:00his security
47:01forces
47:01but to agree
47:02to joint
47:03control of
47:04them
47:04with the ANC.
47:06He had to
47:07break the
47:07negotiation
47:08deadlock.
47:09the whole
47:11mood
47:11in the country
47:12down
47:13at ground
47:13level
47:14is that
47:16people are
47:17getting disillusioned
47:19with political
47:19leaders
47:20because of
47:20the lack
47:21of progress
47:21which is being
47:22made
47:22and all
47:23political leaders
47:24are feeling
47:26this pressure
47:26and hopefully
47:28that
47:30will have
47:31a positive
47:32effect.
47:32It had been
47:40three years
47:40since de Klerk
47:41had promised
47:42his white
47:42supporters
47:43that he would
47:44lead them
47:44safely
47:44through great
47:45changes.
47:49The old
47:50order still
47:51seemed intact
47:52but behind
47:53the scenes
47:53government
47:54and ANC
47:54negotiators
47:55were agreeing
47:56to create
47:57a coalition
47:57government
47:58for a limited
47:59period of five
48:00years.
48:01In early
48:011993
48:02de Klerk
48:03presided over
48:04the last
48:05white parliament.
48:19The government
48:20has a clear
48:21mandate for
48:21the constitutional
48:22model towards
48:23which it is
48:24working.
48:25Power sharing,
48:27strong regional
48:28government and
48:28checks and
48:29balances to
48:30prevent...
48:30The phrases
48:30were familiar
48:31and reassuring
48:32but de Klerk
48:33had been forced
48:34to settle
48:34for less
48:35than he'd
48:35hoped.
48:37Still,
48:37he'd persuaded
48:38the ANC
48:39to accept
48:39a form
48:40of federalism
48:40but he had
48:42no white
48:42veto
48:43and now
48:44he had to
48:45keep his
48:45bargain
48:45to bring
48:46the security
48:47forces under
48:48joint control
48:48in an ANC
48:50majority
48:50government.
48:51The simple
48:52truth is
48:53that a
48:54devastating
48:54war will
48:55ensue
48:55if negotiation
48:56does not
48:57succeed.
48:58there is
49:00already in
49:01this country
49:02an incipient
49:03counter-revolutionary
49:05onslaught
49:06and nobody
49:09can guarantee
49:10that that
49:13onslaught
49:14will not
49:15continue
49:15and be
49:16strengthened
49:17when a
49:18democratic
49:19government
49:19has taken
49:21over power
49:22and the
49:24best thing
49:24the best
49:25strategy
49:25to adopt
49:26therefore
49:26is to
49:28ensure
49:29that we
49:30pool the
49:31resources
49:32of all
49:33political
49:34parties
49:34which
49:36believe
49:36in a
49:37non-racial
49:38democracy.
49:39The National
49:40Party has
49:41declared in
49:41favor of
49:42a non-racial
49:43democracy
49:44and we
49:45must accept
49:46that that
49:47is what
49:48they want
49:48and therefore
49:50it's natural
49:51at least
49:52for the
49:52five
49:53for the
49:54first
49:54three to
49:55five years
49:56to have
49:58a government
49:59of national
50:00unity.
50:03Not everyone
50:04was pleased
50:05with the
50:05news.
50:07The idea
50:08that the
50:09ANC and
50:09the government
50:10could work
50:11out a deal
50:11without him
50:12infuriated
50:13the head
50:14of Encarta.
50:16But Elezi
50:16wanted to be
50:17treated as a
50:18major player
50:19in the future
50:19government.
50:21We don't
50:25question the
50:25right of
50:27any party
50:28including the
50:29ANC to
50:31have any
50:31discussion
50:32with the
50:32government.
50:33But we
50:34resent that
50:34any party
50:35with the
50:36government
50:37should reach
50:38an understanding
50:39and make
50:39a decision
50:40which impacts
50:41on the rest
50:43of South
50:43Africans
50:43without any
50:45representation
50:45of the rest
50:46of us.
50:47That is the
50:48crux of
50:48this
50:49demonstration.
50:54But Elezi
50:55still has to
50:56prove his
50:56support beyond
50:57his regional
50:58base in an
50:59election.
51:00And in
51:00Attal his
51:01bitter war
51:02with the
51:02ANC will
51:03not be
51:03easily set
51:04aside.
51:07But both
51:08the ANC
51:09and the
51:09government
51:10know they
51:10have to
51:11bring him
51:11into the
51:12process.
51:19Three years
51:20ago,
51:21de Klerk may
51:21have believed
51:22he could
51:22outmaneuver
51:23Mandela and
51:24the ANC,
51:25split their
51:25ranks,
51:26and even
51:27retain power.
51:29Now he's
51:29had to accept
51:30that genuine
51:31cooperation with
51:32Mandela and
51:33his ANC is
51:34the only hope
51:35for South
51:35Africa.
51:36the man he
51:39released from
51:39prison has
51:41never wavered
51:42in his
51:42readiness to
51:43share the
51:43future with
51:44whites.
51:46Now he
51:46expects de
51:47Klerk to
51:47help him
51:48keep the
51:49country
51:49together.
51:54Soon de
51:55Klerk will
51:56find himself
51:56fighting for
51:57a new
51:57constituency in
51:58the first
51:59democratic
52:00elections.
52:00the man
52:06who rightly
52:06claims to
52:07have closed
52:07the book
52:08on apartheid
52:09will have
52:12to live
52:12with its
52:13legacy
52:13and have
52:21to accept
52:22whatever power
52:23he can win
52:23from the
52:24ballot box.
52:30For Mandela
52:32the problem
52:33will not be
52:33winning an
52:34election.
52:38It will be
52:39the expectations
52:39that come
52:40with victory
52:41and how much
52:46he can deliver
52:47beyond hope.
52:53Ladies and
52:53gentlemen,
52:54we are now
52:55going to
52:55demonstrate to
52:56you how to
52:57go about
52:57with voting.
52:58My sister here
52:59is going to
53:00demonstrate for
53:00us.
53:04I am an
53:05ID checker.
53:06I check whether
53:07the face that
53:08is on an ID
53:09corresponds with
53:10that of an ID
53:11holder.
53:12I also check
53:13whether she or
53:13he is a
53:14South African
53:14citizen.
53:17In a hall,
53:18in a township,
53:19people line up
53:20to learn how
53:20to vote.
53:24Hold your
53:25ballot paper
53:26like so that
53:27it feeds into
53:28the ballot box.
53:31He will be balanced in this Todos.
53:56The song says it's time for elections,
54:09time for Africans of all races
54:11to choose our leaders and to be governed with love.
54:26The song says it's time for elections,
54:56the song says it's time for elections,
55:26the song says it's time for elections,
55:28the song says it's time for elections.
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