- 6/14/2025
Jappandeep Kour a doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University speaks with C Uday Bhaskar on Israeli strikes on Iran | SAM Conversation
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00:00Greetings and welcome to SAM Conversations, an occasional program of South Asia Monitor.
00:18Today, the focus is on the Israeli strike on Iran and Iran's nuclear facilities and its top
00:27military leadership as also the nuclear scientists. This has been a very dramatic attack by Israel
00:37and it has very, very tectonic implications both in relation to West Asia and in the extended
00:49region as far as Southern Asian geopolitics are concerned. The Israeli strike in a purely
00:58military sense has been very, very successful, very dramatic and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
01:05the Israeli Prime Minister has said that this is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon
01:12and he's also made this out to be a case of self-defense to ensure Israel's survival
01:21because there has been a certain precedent in the past where Iran had said that it would
01:30wipe Israel off the map. So that was supposed to be more rhetorical at that point in time.
01:35That having been said, Prime Minister Netanyahu has also said that this is an ongoing operation
01:44and that they would assess the damage and proceed further if required. Iran has threatened to retaliate,
01:52drones have been launched and the situation is very, very brittle. The immediate impact for the region,
01:59of course, has been that oil prices have, the market has reacted in a panicky way. Oil prices have gone up
02:07and late in the day today they were hovering at about 75 US dollars per barrel. This is the Brent index.
02:17So this would have very serious implications for countries like India which are large oil importers
02:22and India in particular will be impacted by the current conflict if it escalates in a very, very
02:32sudden and dramatic manner by way of the Iranian response, the Israeli counter-attack and if any of
02:40the other regional actors whether states or proxies decide to enter. So for India it is about hydrocarbons,
02:47the price of oil, it's about connectivity, maritime shipping routes in that area will be affected.
02:54They have already been affected by other activities such as the Houthi attack on the Israeli shipping.
03:01A large amount of merchant shipping is now going around the Cape of Good Hope. This increases prices and time.
03:07And in the long term, if Iran is destabilized by Israel, this would impact India's long-term plans for
03:18West Asia particularly in terms of connectivity. So in a nutshell there are a number of implications for India.
03:25But let me welcome Ms. Japandeep Kaur. She is a West Asia scholar and has been following the region
03:33very diligently. I often turn to her whenever I want to clarify something on West Asia.
03:39So Ms. Kaur, welcome to the conversation.
03:44Thank you for inviting me sir. It's a pleasure to be here.
03:48And in the first instance, can I ask you to share your thoughts and you know whatever I have identified
03:54as some of the major determinants in terms of the implications for India. And then later we will
04:01move to the larger context and what it means for West Asia. Japan, all yours.
04:07Thank you sir. So as you correctly pointed out, first of all, this major escalation in the region has
04:14implications for energy security in India because this will obviously push energy costs. Already we've
04:22seen that the Brent index has shown a 12% increase. And the last I tracked the crude oil was nearing $78 a
04:31barrel, which is a sharp increase from the comfortable $65 a barrel we had until a few days ago.
04:39And for India, which is one of the third largest importers of oil and that imports over 80% of its crude
04:48oil requirements, this is going to be a very difficult situation. Also because oil prices are up
04:54and shipping costs will also go up because the state of Hormuz becomes a major flashpoint here.
05:01And in case Iran pursues retaliatory attacks on Gulf states, oil prices will further shoot up. So this
05:08is also going to be a problem. But we should also understand that India is not just importing crude oil,
05:15India is also importing petroleum derived product, which is LPG fertilizers. And these risks will also
05:23kind of transfer to the market leading to inflation and the rupee will also weaken. The rupee has already
05:30weakened by 54 paise in it as compared to the dollar. So these are some issues. And then the airspace
05:39issue is also emerging as a major problem for India. Already with the Pakistani airspace closed,
05:46India was using the Iranian airspace. Now it has been closed. The Iraqi airspace has been closed.
05:51So all flights taking best world routes from India will also face that problem. And this will increase
05:57fueling costs and travel costs for the Indian travelers as well. And then we have the question
06:04of security of almost nine million Indian nationals in the Gulf region in case Iran decides to retaliate
06:12through US interests in the Gulf. So that is going to be a problem as well. And this recent escalation
06:19has also hit the very cautious diplomacy and the multi alignment that India was pursuing in the region,
06:26where it was also engaging Iran, because Iran is a key gateway state to Central Asia for India,
06:31and also balancing Pakistan, as far as balancing Pakistan is concerned. And similarly for Iran also,
06:39allying with India was something that helped it to counter Pakistan's allies in the West Asian region.
06:45So India will also have to play a very cautious balancing game there. And for now, it has given a
06:52very neutral statement where it's calling for de-escalation and showing deep concern. But as the crisis
06:58kind of escalates, this balancing act will be very difficult for India. And India is also a key
07:07ally of Israel. So condemnation that way has not been very easy for India. And so this creates uncertainties
07:15in terms of the geopolitical trajectory of the conflict, the way shipping lanes and maritime trade routes
07:23will go ahead in this conflict. And then obviously, the domestic policy, the rising inflation and
07:29how India is going to be addressed, going to be addressing that, that is also going to be a key
07:34problem for India. And plus, this rising inflation and capital movement away from India due to these
07:40rising oil prices will also affect domestic industries, and also industries where crude oil is a key
07:47intermediary good for production. So yeah, on a preliminary level, these would be very severe
07:54implications for India.
07:55Yeah, that's very comprehensive. And I think the fact that you have highlighted, not only the price
08:02of oil, but also the impact on the rupee. Because for India, which is already dealing with a number of
08:08other what I would call an economic challenges, this is going to be an area of concern. But that having
08:16been said, you know, if you look at what you referred to as this delicate balancing act,
08:21I thought it was also very significant that the trigger for this entire Israeli attack is the
08:28resolution passed by the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. As you may recall, the vote was
08:38carried by almost 19 members of the IAEA supporting the resolution. And three had opposed. Interestingly,
08:49the three countries that opposed it were China, Russia and Burkina Faso. And there were 11 abstentions.
08:57And among the abstentions, India was also one of the major countries. And I think this is reflective of
09:05this delicate balancing act, as you said, because there are two issues here. One is India's stance on
09:12Iran's nuclear aspirations. I mean, this goes back to almost the period when Dr. Manmohan Singh was the
09:19prime minister and we had the first major vote. And at that time, I think India had stated that it would
09:26not be desirable, if I remember right, the exact quote, for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon and also
09:32reminding Iran of its obligations as a signatory to the NPT, as a non-nuclear weapon state. So that is the
09:42nuclear kind of context. But more recently, because of India's warming up of ties with Israel, you can
09:50see that there is also a certain reluctance or hesitation on India's part to take any definitive
09:57stand in relation to Israel and West Asia. Whether this was about Gaza, Palestine and what has been
10:04happening there since the Hamas attack of October 7th or now. So I think this is part of the, you know,
10:11what I would call as India's challenges in terms of West Asian diplomacy. But if you look at the larger
10:18context, even you've been following this very closely, how would you assess, you know, the different
10:25stakeholders? We have not yet spoken about the United States, but my own reading is that Israel would
10:31not have acted in this manner without a tacit nod from Washington. Even though Secretary of State
10:38Rubio has distanced America and said that we are not part of what is happening and we do not. He
10:43didn't quite say that we are critical of Israel, but neither did he come out emphatically in support
10:48of Israel. So there's another delicate balancing act going there. But from the military point of view,
10:53we have already noticed that America is likely to move an aircraft carrier into the Iranian sea.
10:58I presume that would be to provide certain assistance, you know, in a very quiet way in terms of surveillance
11:05and so on. But what is your reading about the larger regional picture and the different stakeholders
11:11and what roles they are playing? Jafar?
11:13Right, sir. Sir, as far as coordination between America and Israel is concerned, there has been this
11:21kind of strategic ambiguity where we had Secretary of State Rubio saying that the Americans were not
11:27involved with the strike. But they did evacuate non-essential American staff from the neighbouring
11:34states. And if we look at this for the longest time, we also had reports of heated exchanges between
11:43President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu about whether they could strike Iran or not since the
11:49negotiations for the deal were going on. But then, at the same time, the President would also threaten
11:56Iran with a military action time and again. And after the statement of Secretary of State, we had
12:05President Trump's tweet on Truth Social, where he says that we make the most lethal weapons and the
12:10Israelis know how to use it. And we had put Iran on a strict timeline as to when they could, by when they
12:18could actually agree on a deal. So that was two months. So that is something that is also something
12:24we have to consider. But since the sixth round of schedule, round of talks was scheduled on Sunday,
12:30there's also a lot of ambiguity as to why this attack has come now. And whether this is just America
12:37pursuing brinkmanship and pushing Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear program. Because if we look at it,
12:43a key obstacle in getting the deal was the question of enrichment and Iran would not want to give up
12:50enrichment and because it claimed that it was its sovereign right under the NPT as the NPT signatory
12:56state. And Americans wanted an end to enrichment. But even there, there has been a lot of contradictory
13:04detailing wherein President Trump has called for zero enrichment, whereas his envoy for Middle East,
13:13Steve Whitecoff, had offered proposals and insider details are such that they would allow Iran to
13:21enrich, but they would have to stop it in the interim. And later, a regional consortium could also take
13:27over something that Iran was also on board with and something that goes back to the nuclear program under
13:32the last Shah itself. So a lot of ambiguous detailing that way. But there are no qualms in saying that,
13:42of course, this could not, this attack could not have taken place without green light from America.
13:47So Americans were also kind of confusing Iran with the next round of deal, and then this strike also
13:52coming in. And Steve Whitecoff has still called for the sixth round on Sunday, which seems implausible
14:02right now. But this does look like a case of brinkmanship at the moment.
14:06And you know, now that you mention it, actually, I think it might merit recall, particularly for our viewers who are
14:13following this program and the developments in West Asia, that the Iranian nuclear deal, the way it is
14:21referred to, has also become a victim of American domestic politics. Meaning, the way I would frame this
14:30is that if you remember, you will remember for sure, you're the expert. But for our viewers, that when
14:37President Obama was in his second term, in 2015, if I remember right, we had the Iranian nuclear deal,
14:45the JPOC, right, the Joint Plan, you know, the JP, what was it? COA, it's a long, it's got a long
14:53joint comprehensive plan of action. It's JCP.
14:56It's a rather unwieldy acronym. Now that had the United States, it had the B5 plus one,
15:03Germany was also on board. And at that time, I thought it was a very welcome kind of attempt
15:08at negotiations, and trying to evolve a win-win situation. This was 2015. But when President Trump
15:16began his first term, he completely gutted this. I mean, he withdrew unilaterally. And I remember at
15:23that time, the Europeans were not very happy with the way it was done. So you have what I would call
15:28as a very sharp divide within American politics at the highest level, about how to deal with Iran
15:37and its nuclear aspirations. And now in Trump too, you remember that when he started, it seemed as if he
15:43was going to offer a deal. And you rightly pointed out that the sixth round of bilateral talks between
15:48Iran and the US are supposed to take place on Sunday, the 15th in Moscow, if I remember right,
15:56Omar. And now whether that will proceed or not, we don't know. But last week, whatever I saw on social
16:01media coming out of West Asia, there seemed to be some hope that Iran and the United States would
16:08be able to arrive at a modus vivendi. And this would then allow realization of the plan for the regional
16:13nuclear so-called cooperation, where Saudi Arabia and UAE were both supposed to be major players.
16:21So all that has now, I think, gone south. But again, one interesting sort of observation from
16:27my perspective, which is that the major Arab states led by Saudi Arabia and UAE have been critical.
16:36They have denounced Israel in public. Do you see that as rhetorical or is there something more
16:43substantive because they spoke about a brother nation, et cetera, et cetera, in terms of Iran,
16:48how they refer to it as being a victim of Israeli aggression? What is your take on that?
16:53So I wouldn't call it rhetorical because we also have to see that the positions have shifted since
17:03the second Trump administration. So under the first Trump administration, the Washington's policy was
17:09to create an axis between Israel and the Gulf states. So that is where you also see Abraham Accords.
17:16And this was in the context of the fact that Iran, with its axis of resistance, was really powerful in
17:22Bahrain, in Iraq, in Lebanon, and in Syria. And this had become a major problem for the Gulf states,
17:30especially in light of the Arab Spring protests, this kind of power projection in Levant.
17:37So that kind of, and this was also a problem for Israel because Hezbollah and Hamas were clearly
17:42adversaries for Israel. And therefore, Israeli and Gulf axis was a really significant solution to this
17:51whole thing. But with the Gaza war, we see that that kind of unraveled. Israel went too far in its
17:58decimation of Hamas and Hezbollah. And this weakening of axis of resistance also kind of created an opening
18:06for the Gulf states as far as Iran is concerned. And if we also remember that China had also mediated a
18:13rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. So that is also something that the Gulf states were
18:18considering. And the Gaza war also shifted the way how the Gulf states view Israel itself. So increasingly,
18:28they started viewing Israel as a regional hegemon who was willing to do anything with impunity, which
18:33was not suiting the Gulf states as well. So if you look at it, they also lobbied the Trump administration
18:40to kind of move away from Israel in the sense. So in this respect, the recent visit by President Trump
18:48to the Middle East is very significant. Firstly, because he met with President Shara and lifted
18:53sanctions from Syria. Israel was not on the itinerary for this visit. And this also came on the heels of a
19:02recent truce between the Americans and the Houthis. The Americans then also negotiated with Hamas to release
19:09an American hostage. So Israel was increasingly feeling isolated on the diplomatic stage as well.
19:16So all of these things, the Gulf states also kind of lobbied the Americans to move away from Israel for
19:21a bit. But as we see now, that has not properly happened. But this was an axis was shifting. So now
19:28the Gulf states were trying to balance Israel also. Earlier, the balancing act was just with Iran.
19:34Yeah. No, you know, I'll tell you why I was making this kind of observation or statement suggesting that
19:40the official response to the Israeli attack coming out of Saudi Arabia, UAE and even Jordan, etc,
19:47are in a way trying to assuage the sentiment as far as the street is concerned. Meaning all the Gulf
19:54rulers, whether they are monarchies, kings, whatever they are, have to be sensitive to the pulse of the
20:00street. Which is why, like the Hamas attack and so on, that while there may be some quiet
20:04negotiations going on, initial responses will by and large reflect the public sentiment, particularly
20:10when it comes to Israel. But there's one strategic dimension here, which as a student of the nuclear
20:17issue, I have always felt, is that over the last 20-25 years that I can remember, both in terms of
20:25back two deliberations, back 1.5 where one has been, you know, following some of these deliberations in
20:31West Asia. There is one consistent position from Saudi Arabia and UAE in particular, that come what may,
20:40Iran should not acquire a nuclear weapon. You know, there is also an undercurrent of what I would call as the
20:47religious divide, the Shia-Sunni kind of animosities. Because paradoxically,
20:53the region is living with the Pakistani bomb. But in many ways, that is seen as our bomb, you know,
21:00largely because of Pakistan's own demography and its Islamic orientation. But there's also a kind of
21:06unstated US endorsement of the Pakistani capability. The United States has also endorsed Israel's opaque
21:15nuclear capability. Meaning Israel has often said that you ask an Israeli saying that with the standard
21:20response, does Israel have nuclear weapons, it's neither yes nor no. But they talk about what will
21:28happen in the event the nuclear card is played, that they would not be on the defensive and, you know,
21:34some kind of very, very ambiguous statements. But United States does not want an Iranian weapon.
21:42Saudi Arabia, UAE do not want an American weapon. So this is my point that, you know, I think
21:47deep, you know, within the Arab states, I think there is a certain kind of anxiety that Iran should
21:53not be allowed to cross the red lines. And therefore, even if they do not say it in public,
21:59they may be quietly supportive of the Israeli action. Would that be a fair formulation or is it
22:04too binary? Japan?
22:06Yes. So the fact that Gulf states and the United States do not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon is
22:15kind of consistent with them pursuing a nuclear deal also, because this is a sure shot way of limiting
22:21the Iranian nuclear program for at least 10, 15 or the next 20 years. And if the deal is not pursued,
22:28and Israel continues its retaliation against Iran, we could give it max to max one year, because Iran would
22:34also end inspections from the IAEA. And it would continue to enrich at a greater speed right now.
22:41And even if we look at the response to the IAEA censure resolution, Iran has announced a new enrichment
22:46facility. So that would just fasten the nuclear weapon and not delay it. So the nuclear deal was
22:55the best chance for United States and Gulf states to not have weaponized Iran at the moment.
23:03That's true. I think, you know, as we were saying earlier, the Obama kind of plan of 2015 is perhaps the
23:10most viable way ahead. But clearly, the United States now is following a different policy. And I was very struck
23:17by a statement made ascribed to President Donald Trump, where he was suggesting to Iran, that you
23:24may as well close the deal quickly. Otherwise, there'll be nothing left. When if I remember the
23:29quote, he used the phrase nothing left, meaning almost that what is happening in Gaza would well
23:34happen to Iran. Now, that's a non-starter. Iran is not Gaza. But even then, I think the kind of signals
23:40that are coming from Washington are not very encouraging about whether or not it can be a
23:48neutral peace broker in terms of what is happening. But today is only day one. And we have to see what
23:54kind of a response Iran is trying to mount. But we will keep our eye on this. And let me thank you,
24:02Ms. Chappanzip Cor, for sharing your thoughts with us. And in the event where there is something more
24:07significant, perhaps we will request you to join us again. But on that note, you know, clearly,
24:13developments in West Asia and in Iran, in particular, are cause for concern. As we have noted,
24:19not only are there immediate implications for India, in terms of economy, trade, energy security,
24:26and so on, any kind of instability in the region, in the extended Southern Asian region, does not augur
24:34well for the entire South Asian, Southern Asian geostrategic context. So, we wait and watch.
24:42And if there is something more significant, we will circle back and review the situation again.
24:47Thank you for joining SAM Conversations. We will be back again very soon.
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