- 6/1/2025
What’s really happening behind the scenes in the tense US-Russia relations? 🇺🇸🤝🇷🇺
In this episode, Fyodor Lukyanov joins Glenn Diesen to uncover the silent negotiations, strategic maneuvering, and high-stakes diplomacy shaping the global order. From sanctions and NATO expansion to backchannel discussions, we explore the real power dynamics driving the geopolitical chessboard ♟️🌍.
Get deep insights into how Washington and Moscow navigate conflict, compromise, and communication behind closed doors — and what it all means for the rest of the world 🌐🕊️.
#FyodorLukyanov #GlennDiesen #USRussiaRelations #Geopolitics #DiplomaticGames #GlobalPolitics #BehindClosedDoors #RussiaUS #NATOTensions #WorldAffairs #InternationalRelations #GeopoliticalAnalysis #ColdWar2 #RussiaToday #USForeignPolicy #GlobalPowerPlay #DiplomaticTensions #EastWest #PoliticalStrategy #WorldOrder
In this episode, Fyodor Lukyanov joins Glenn Diesen to uncover the silent negotiations, strategic maneuvering, and high-stakes diplomacy shaping the global order. From sanctions and NATO expansion to backchannel discussions, we explore the real power dynamics driving the geopolitical chessboard ♟️🌍.
Get deep insights into how Washington and Moscow navigate conflict, compromise, and communication behind closed doors — and what it all means for the rest of the world 🌐🕊️.
#FyodorLukyanov #GlennDiesen #USRussiaRelations #Geopolitics #DiplomaticGames #GlobalPolitics #BehindClosedDoors #RussiaUS #NATOTensions #WorldAffairs #InternationalRelations #GeopoliticalAnalysis #ColdWar2 #RussiaToday #USForeignPolicy #GlobalPowerPlay #DiplomaticTensions #EastWest #PoliticalStrategy #WorldOrder
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NewsTranscript
00:00Hi everyone and welcome. Today we are joined by Fyodor Lukianov, the chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy.
00:10He's also the editor of Chief for the very popular journal Russia in Global Affairs.
00:15And as many also know him, interviewing President Putin every year at the annual Valdai discussion club.
00:22So welcome back. It's good to have you back on the program.
00:25Thank you very much for this invitation. Hi.
00:27So you've been writing a lot lately about the talks between the United States and Russia in terms of the possibility of finding a new way of cooperating to some extent irrespective of what's happened in Ukraine.
00:47So again, Trump is a very difficult man to analyze. He's, I guess, unpredictable. He swings a bit back and forth.
00:53He has a lot of divisions within his administration.
00:56That being said, he obviously has very different objectives than that of his predecessors.
01:02So how are you reading now Trump's comments these days?
01:06Do you think it's still possible for the United States and Russia to come to some kind of a peace?
01:13And does it require an agreement or even resolving the Ukraine issue?
01:20That's a good question.
01:23I would slightly disagree with the characteristic of President Trump as unpredictable.
01:32You know, I think we know him pretty well since several years.
01:44His first term, his in-between term, his term now.
01:49And we can say that back and forth, in his case, means tactics, while objectives and actual line is extremely consistent.
02:04He never changes.
02:05And if you go back to his statements made 40 years ago, 30 years ago, 15 years ago, his worldview has never changed an inch.
02:21So that's very remarkable.
02:23You don't find so many political figures with such a record.
02:28In case of Ukraine, I think point number one is that people in Russia, those who analyze Trump, I think Mr. Putin as well, assume that at the end of the day, this is his interest to disengage from this issue.
02:52It's not because he, I trust him when he says that he's terrified by bloodshed and he wants to stop fighting.
03:01In this particular case, I think he's sincere.
03:04But this is, so to say, the entourage and the real wish expressed by Trump and his close, his inner circle, not all in his team, but his inner circle.
03:22It's based on the conviction that Ukraine has nothing to do with the United States' vital national interests.
03:30And the United States should stop participating in that in one or another form.
03:36The optimal ideal form is to achieve sustainable peace and, of course, proclaim that as an enormous, brilliant, great success by the great president.
03:49And maybe even apply for Nobel Peace Prize in your country.
03:57But that's the maximum program.
04:01If not, and it doesn't look very likely at this point, then at least to disengage and to minimize risks for the United States from being part of this extremely complicated issue.
04:18And coming back to Russian assessment, I think some people believe that if Trump wants it, then there is a broader space for Russia not to make concessions.
04:35Because this is, at the end of the day, his interest as well to stop or to disengage.
04:43Is it possible to achieve an agreement?
04:48Yes and no.
04:50What we mean by agreement, that's in these days and this international environment, very unclear what a real agreement, how the real agreement could look like.
05:02One thing is quite obvious.
05:07When the whole process started, I mean, this telephone call, phone call by Trump to Putin, then the first meeting in Riyadh and some other technical level meetings.
05:20Both Russian and American officials said that, OK, we have this Ukrainian stuff, but we have some other or many other problems between Russia and the United States, which should be resolved.
05:34And we can do it in parallel.
05:36And let's look at the easier issues, like, for example, normalization of functioning of embassies in Moscow and in Washington.
05:50Let's try to do this step by step.
05:53And so, as I understand now, nothing, nothing happens.
05:57And the Ukrainian issue is a core issue without anything on this field, we cannot expect any other moves, be it business, be it diplomacy, be it whatever.
06:12So that means that at the end of the day, we come back to this process, which we see these days, negotiations or how to call it meetings between Russians and Ukrainians and Istanbul.
06:24And everybody, which is including Trump, I think Trump doesn't want to break with Russia.
06:30He passionately wants to be in touch.
06:35But, of course, at a certain point, he can conclude that Putin or Russians or both sides are using him to achieve their goals.
06:47And then he might be might be said.
06:49And regarding this, well, by the way, let me just say this idea that Trump has consistent objectives and changing tactics, that's actually probably a very, very good point.
07:02I didn't actually distinguish properly there.
07:04But regarding the, if Russia has this calculation that there's no need to make any real concessions because Trump wants this, would that fail to incorporate that, you know, that Trump kind of stands a little bit alone in the U.S. authorities, that it's going to be very hard for him to sell any deal to his own people?
07:27But also, if Ukraine is, yeah, as you say, very correctly, I think the Ukraine is the core issue, it's very difficult to move beyond it before it's solved.
07:37And what is required now?
07:40Is there a real possibility to actually meet because to meet some common ground?
07:44I noticed that a lot of the focus, as you have pointed out as well, is on territory.
07:49But, of course, the territorial issue, it seems to me, is more of a consequence of the, you know, the failure to resolve a wider problem.
07:59So what is actually Russia's demand here and where could it possibly make concessions versus where it most certainly cannot?
08:10Yeah, you know, it's a very tricky picture.
08:14And unfortunately, on both sides, here as well, but even more in the West and, of course, in Ukraine, people try to simplify the process and to bring it, understandably, I understand it very well, because, to be frank, many are tired of this and want to see some kind of
08:43silver lining, but, unfortunately, the simplification at this point doesn't work.
08:51What do I mean?
08:56You say, you ask, and many people ask, what kind of concessions Russia would be ready to do.
09:03From my point of view, which might be incorrect, because we don't know the whole picture, and the whole picture is actually, to be frank, in one particular mind.
09:16So, the current stage is not about substance of negotiations.
09:22We should separate substance from procedure.
09:29It might sound a little bit weird and crazy, but it is not, because at this point we are in a classical diplomatic game, pretty high-stakes diplomatic game, game of nerves.
09:43What will be the framework of the future substantial negotiations, which are to come at some point, not yet.
09:56If you follow developments in recent weeks, starting from early May, approximately, you can see that Ukrainian side and Europeans, who supported and support Ukraine,
10:14they tried all the time to enforce their vision, what should be done, how the procedure should look like.
10:23First, since fire, then negotiations.
10:27Putin should negotiate himself.
10:29The only person with whom Zelensky will speak is Putin.
10:33If not Putin, then no one, and so on.
10:35What happens in reality, none of Ukrainian and European demands have been considered and fulfilled, of course.
10:47Just the opposite.
10:49Responding to those demands, without mentioning them, by the way, Putin offers something else, offers a different mode, a different framework.
10:59Ukraine is rejected immediately, but then they accept.
11:06That happened with these Istanbul negotiations, when Zelensky first said that only one person is welcome, Mr. Putin.
11:16If not, forget.
11:17Then he said, okay, they will send some technical delegation of no names, we will do the same.
11:24And then he sends a delegation which is higher in status than Russian one.
11:28And so on.
11:28Now, with this ongoing, coming meeting in Istanbul, we don't know whether it happens or not, but it looks like it might be on Monday, June the 2nd.
11:46Initial Ukrainian claim was no meeting without memorandum delivered before.
11:55Russia said no.
11:56And it seems that the meeting will take place anyway.
12:01So why I think it's important.
12:03You might see it as a stupid game of thrones or so, but it's not.
12:09Because Putin is a legal person with legal background.
12:14He believes, it might sound strange to our Western audience, but he believes in procedures and norms.
12:20Of course, his understanding of procedures and norms is not the same as the understanding typical for rules-based order, but it is a very clear, clear understanding.
12:33That's why he, for example, that's why he insists on the issue and taking into account the issue of legality, legitimity of Zelensky, his presidential mandate, which expired and so on.
12:49And I think that Trump and his team, including even persons who are not at all in favor of Russian position, like General Kellogg or Marco Rubio,
13:00they actually push Ukraine to accept Russian framework because they understand that the only way to keep going, keep it going is to accept it.
13:13If Ukraine will try to impose its own terms, then it will just fail and Russia will stop coming.
13:21Why it's important?
13:22Because I think that in this particular situation, when both sides are maneuvering before anything substantial will happen,
13:32it's very important to see what kind of framework at the end will be applied for these negotiations.
13:40Again, Americans seem to believe that any kind of process is better than no process at all.
13:49And Ukrainians, despite their unhappiness about this, but they understand, they are experienced enough.
13:57They understand that if they follow European advice, that will make their situation worse and worse.
14:04If they follow American advice, it might give them a chance that Trump and the American team will try to, will help them to achieve some goals.
14:14And coming back to the question about Russian concessions, again, Trump is consistent, but Putin is very consistent as well.
14:25And if you disregard a lot of nuances and a lot of rhetorical statements and details,
14:35actually, Russian position never changed from the very beginning, from the pre-war diplomatic game, which started in late 21.
14:47Putin said repeatedly to Ukrainians and to the West that we have a certain package of criteria and demands.
15:00We are ready to discuss.
15:02If you are not ready, we will be back after a while, but then conditions will be worse for you.
15:08And so far it happens.
15:10Each next round is much worse for Ukraine in terms of general situation than the previous one.
15:18I'm afraid that this time we will see another incarnation of the same, not the last one.
15:24So we will be back to negotiations again after a while.
15:29And this while might be a combination of increased military activities, and we see it already now on both sides,
15:42while continuing to try to shape these negotiations framework.
15:48Yeah, I thought about that as well.
15:51The American just sort of pragmatism.
15:54If they want to put some pressure to bring the parties closer together, the U.S. doesn't really have any leverage anymore over Russia.
16:02They already sent all their weapons and used all their sanctions, so they kind of have to lean on Zelensky and the Europeans.
16:10But behind this U.S.-Russia diplomatic game, of course, there's a lot of different calculations.
16:19Of course, the United States has to be a bit cautious about its own domestic opposition.
16:25Zelensky, it's limited what he can accept as well, it seems.
16:28If he would embrace the American-Russian format fully immediately, he would probably have some big problems with the various nationalist groups.
16:39And obviously, the Europeans have their own problems.
16:41On this continent, all the leaders have been saying Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union, Putin is Hitler, all of these things.
16:49So they kind of painted themselves in the corner, where it's impossible to, again, even talk to Moscow.
16:57So it's a very difficult situation.
16:59But it seems, if you're correct, the Americans and the Russians are able to agree on the format and incrementally bring the Ukrainians on board, what about the Europeans?
17:13Does it matter anymore?
17:15Or do you see that Moscow and Washington have more or less agreed that Europe doesn't have to be part of anything?
17:23First of all, how you describe circumstances, it's absolutely correct.
17:31Everywhere, be it in the United States, in different European countries, in Ukraine, there are particular domestic situations which put clear limitations on what politicians can do or cannot do.
17:50No doubt about that.
17:51The problem is that the scale of events which we follow has long ago exceeded over the more or less normal political process.
18:12And that was a product of many factors, starting from very bold and big Russian decision to launch this operation,
18:24and then equally big decision on the West to try to defeat Russia on the battlefield.
18:32And that created another scale, another size of the whole situation.
18:41So now, to refer to particular domestic situations, it's important for understanding,
18:49but I'm afraid it's not the main issue which will guide at least the Russian side,
18:58especially given the fact that, unfortunately, Russia has an extended big experience from the past,
19:06when Russia, at different occasions, has been convinced to take into account domestic situations in different countries,
19:16be it, I don't know, United States or Germany or France or whatever,
19:20and did it, including Putin did it a couple of times.
19:25He tried to accommodate to needs and requests from the partners,
19:37and then it has never paid out, paid back.
19:42So people, politicians in the West, leaders in the West, they consumed those moves and then forgot about this.
19:49So now I'm afraid that Russia will act consistently based on the fact that political atmosphere might change,
20:02be it anywhere, but facts on the ground will not.
20:08And that's why this very firm insistence, stop of fighting only after the basic agreement will be reached.
20:22Because the basic agreement, you can change something diplomatically.
20:27And to be frank, in Russian tradition, Russian history of Russian diplomacy,
20:32there's not so many examples when Russia could gain more after having stopped military activities.
20:40Russian diplomacy usually had to defend and maybe step back a little bit from what military forces achieved.
20:53So that's why I think that Putin will be patient and consistent in what he's doing,
21:02of course, looking very closely to what is happening.
21:07Look at, I'm sorry, I will go to Europe immediately,
21:11but look at the dynamics of the American position.
21:15General Kellogg, who is maybe the least Russia-friendly person in the entourage of Trump,
21:24said two days ago in an interview that,
21:27yes, we understand that enlargement, expansion of NATO,
21:31is a threat to Russian security, they are fair, they are right, so we can stop it.
21:39Could we imagine such kind of statement half a year ago, not to talk about five years ago?
21:46This report that Putin has outlined these conditions for ending the war,
21:50including demanding Western leaders' pledge in writing that NATO won't expand eastward.
21:55Is President Trump willing to make that kind of commitment to Putin that NATO won't expand?
22:01Well, I think it's a fair concern, and we've said that repeatedly.
22:04Like we've said that to us, Ukraine coming into NATO is not on the table.
22:11And we're not the only country that says that.
22:13You know, I can probably give you four of the countries in NATO,
22:15and it takes 32 of the 32 to allow you to come into NATO.
22:18And we've seen other countries say, no, we're not too sure about that.
22:21And that's one of the issues that Russia will bring up.
22:25And they're only us just talking Ukraine.
22:26They're talking the country of Georgia.
22:28They're talking Moldova.
22:29They're talking, obviously, Ukraine.
22:31And we're saying, okay, comprehensively, you know,
22:34we can stop the expansion of NATO coming close to your border.
22:37That's security concerns.
22:39Security concerns.
22:39Absolutely unbelievable.
22:42And we see it now.
22:43So that brings, of course, that fuels Russia.
22:45And again, it's not Witkow.
22:48It's not Trump.
22:49It's the most hawkish person in the administration.
22:53But the person who is hawkish but realist-minded, which is important.
22:59And that's why I think Russian leadership in Putin in the first line
23:04believes that we are at the end of the day on the right track.
23:09Very slowly.
23:10The price is heavy, but still.
23:12About Europe.
23:13For now, it looks that Europe lost the course.
23:20Because it's very difficult to understand what is the goal of Europe.
23:25Because statements made by different leaders are very controversial and contradict.
23:31Merz says one thing, his member of his government denies it, then Merz corrects.
23:40And so Macron's tactic has been like this since the beginning.
23:47Now, and the previous chancellor of Germany was different.
23:50He was much more clear in what Germany will do, what Germany won't do.
23:55Merz is trying to adapt Macron's approach to the strategic ambiguity.
24:02Okay, fine, but it doesn't contribute to perception of Europe as a very reliable counterpart.
24:12And I think that at this point, even Ukrainians start to understand that Europe plays rather a provocative role
24:23instigating continued war, continued fighting, without having in mind to seriously help Ukraine.
24:32And that's the difference between Biden America, for example, and Europe today.
24:37Because Biden's team, Biden team, whatever we think about them, but they were serious about supporting Ukraine by military and other means.
24:47Rightly or wrongly, that's another thing.
24:49Europe talks like Biden, but these are completely different.
24:55And I think everybody understands that Europe is unable to support Ukraine to the extent it will be needed to continue a big war against Russia.
25:05I've seen some, well, you've probably seen as well the kind of remarkable statements, not just coming from, you know, people like Arostovic,
25:11who's obviously now critical of Zelensky, but even the pro-NATO former presidential candidate, Julia Tymoshenko,
25:17which is now essentially accusing the Germans of using the Ukrainians as meat, you know, just to weaken Russia.
25:25So it is something happening within Ukraine as well, it seems.
25:29But, well, I think the internal pressures in U.S., Europe and Ukraine are evident.
25:34I'm curious to, are there any similar pressures within Russia than on President Putin?
25:40Because, well, internationally, one can see that it seems now, at least in the beginning,
25:44the countries who are a bit ambiguous, what position to take once, you know, this could go either direction.
25:49But now that it's becoming evident that Russia has, you know, winning or has won this war,
25:55you see countries from China to Serbia, they become less ambiguous in leaning towards Russia.
26:03On the other hand, more confidently, at least, you know, not sending weapons and such to the opponent.
26:09On the other hand, you see countries like Germany now seemingly contemplating or, you know, going into a direct war almost with Russia by sending these Taurus missiles.
26:20But on the domestic sphere especially, is there any pressure?
26:25I mean, I'm assuming there's a lot of people who want an end to the war.
26:29On the other hand, on the other side, you might see a lot of people who would be very hesitant to allow, to accept any excessive concessions.
26:38Again, as you said, after all the suffering that Russia has also gone through, that, you know, it won't, you know, give away too much, you know, in a deal which doesn't necessarily end the war finally, but could be another Minsk agreement.
26:52Where is the pressure coming on Putin, if there is any pressure, though?
26:59Frankly, I don't see any pressure on Putin.
27:03As you know very well, the political system in Russia is different than in liberal democracies.
27:10I will never say that public opinion does matter here, just the opposite.
27:18It's very important.
27:19And those who take decisions, including the president himself, they monitor what people think and feel on the daily basis.
27:31That's the pollsters.
27:33It's like in the United States almost now here.
27:36Pollsters are those who are the most important people.
27:40And I think it's very correct and very fair in this force majeure situation as a war.
27:47But so far, as I can understand and as I can judge based on what I know,
27:56there are no signs of any leverage which can be applied by anybody on Putin
28:08and pushing him to accelerate the peace deal.
28:16Not now.
28:17I don't know what will happen half a year after or a year after because the situation is changing.
28:26Everybody understands, including the president, understands that Russian economy is robust, but sanctions work.
28:37Sanctions, of course, create troubles for economy and military spending, which contributes to significant growth and success of certain branches of economy.
28:54They have backside, of course, and sooner or later, Russia will need to address economic problems.
29:07No doubt about that.
29:08But not now.
29:10So at this point, and this point is clearly decisive.
29:15I think that both political and economic consolidation of Russia is enough to keep it going without necessity and without need to take abrupt decisions.
29:32So unexpected or game-changing decisions.
29:38And that's very important for Vladimir Putin because, as I mentioned, he is an extremely patient person.
29:46So I remember the reaction of the whole audience at the Valdai discussion club in October 22,
29:59when the military situation for Russia was, to put it mildly, very bad in Kharkov, Kherson region, and so on.
30:08And, of course, when he met this audience, people wanted very much to see how he feels.
30:19And he was absolutely calm, relaxed, and very positive, actually, which shocked many people.
30:27And I, as a person who was close to Putin on the stage, I received a lot of questions.
30:34Don't you believe that he just is detached from reality?
30:39He doesn't know what happens.
30:41No, it was not the case.
30:43He knew what happened.
30:44But he was so much committed to the idea that what Russia and what he himself was doing was right, historically.
30:58That he was absolutely sure that this best stage will be replaced by the better stage.
31:03And now, three years after, we see that he was right.
31:07And that brings him, certainly, to the conclusion that patience and resilience is the best policies today.
31:19I don't see this on the other side, because both Trump and the Ukrainians are really impatient.
31:26They hope to conclude it soon.
31:29And we will see what will happen.
31:31Of course, Russia has these advantages as well.
31:34But in this situation, I guess that Putin's approach is more solid and stable.
31:44Yeah, well, that seemed like a place in society, in Russian society, a question that comes up as well.
31:53Why not finish it quickly?
31:55But I guess this slow and steady, as you said, has been working.
32:02So, you know, just one thing.
32:06I think we discussed it with you in one of previous podcasts.
32:09I just remind our audience the basic difference.
32:13So people in the West believe, based on the experience of Western countries in previous conflicts, in previous wars in the 1990s and 2000s,
32:23that the result of the war should be an exit strategy, how to stop it, how to withdraw.
32:29And that was the case in Iraq.
32:31That was the case in Afghanistan and so on.
32:36For better or for worse, the Russian position, Putin's position is not this.
32:43It's not about how to end.
32:44It's about how to win politically, militarily.
32:50And that's a completely different approach, I must say.
32:53So the overarching objective then, is it still, you know, to, well, essentially put an end to this, to the post-Cold War security architecture?
33:06Well, if you define it as incrementally pushing NATO military infrastructure closer and closer to the Russian border,
33:12is this effectively what Putin wants to achieve by either, you know, diplomatic or military ends?
33:19Absolutely, that's another long discussion, whether success in this war or victory over Ukraine, let's assume that it might happen,
33:33whether it will finally settle the issue about European security, I'm not sure.
33:40But certainly it's seen as a crucial element and it's seen, the Ukrainian issue is seen as the most vital thing about immediate Russian security.
33:52Maybe not the whole security architecture in Europe, but at least to profoundly, profoundly lower risks for Russian security,
34:02which those risks are associated with the Ukrainian membership in American-led alliances.
34:12It's not necessarily NATO, it might be something else.
34:14But whether the biggest goal is achievable, that's a matter of discussion, but the more realistic goal, maybe.
34:27Well, it's a topic we could discuss next time.
34:30So, yeah, thank you again for your time.
34:31I appreciate it.