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FRONTLINE and Forbidden Films, the documentary arm of Forbidden Stories, investigate the powerful spyware Pegasus, which was sold to governments around the world by the Israeli company NSO Group. This two-part series, which is part of the Pegasus Project, examines how the electronic hacking tool was used on journalists, activists, the wife and fiancee of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and others.
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00:00In collaboration with Forbidden Films, a two-part investigation.
00:26This story would be huge.
00:28NSO was established with the ambition to make the world a safer place.
00:32Into powerful spyware.
00:33It's a military weapon used against civilians.
00:37Used around the world.
00:38There is no control over how countries use it, and they have been using it in the worst
00:43way you could imagine.
00:44Now on Frontline, part two of Global Spyware Scandal, Exposing Pegasus.
00:58When you have your hands on a technology like this, the power must be quite intoxicating.
01:20You can get into the phone of most people in the world.
01:26You can get into the phone of most people in the world.
01:40No one is looking over your shoulder.
01:50You can do a brief.
02:02It's really explosive.
02:17Pegasus.
02:18Pegasus.
02:19Pegasus.
02:21It's like a person over your shoulder,
02:23a person who will see what you are seeing,
02:25a person who will watch what you are watching,
02:27your emails, your encrypted communication, everything.
02:30So once you are infected, you're trapped.
02:38It was against so many people in civil society
02:42who clearly were not terrorists or criminals.
02:45And you got a real sense that it was a free-for-all.
02:50The Washington Post, The Guardian, LeMond, and other media.
03:02A joint investigation by 17 news outlets.
03:05Activists, lawyers, and journalists are reportedly among those
03:09who've been targeted by the phone spy nerds.
03:11Phone numbers belong to some big-name politicians.
03:20An SO says they sell the software to governments for legitimate purposes,
03:24fighting terrorism or violating local laws.
03:27You have here a go-to spy service for tyrants.
03:34When we started analyzing the list,
03:36we decided to look for tyrants.
03:37We decided to look for tyrants.
03:39When we started analyzing the list, we saw a lot of French numbers.
03:54More than 1,000 potentially targeted by Morocco.
04:11There were journalists, lawyers, activists, but not only.
04:15We also saw members of the French government
04:18and the President Macron himself.
04:23We immediately realized that this story would be huge.
04:28So, can I explain to you?
04:30Yes.
04:37Okay.
04:38So, this is the telephone number.
04:40This is in the data base.
04:41Yes.
04:42Oh!
04:43Edouard Philippe.
04:46Edouard...
04:47Oh, lala, lala.
04:48Oh, Gérald Darman!
04:50Oh, le Drian!
04:51Ah, bah, Agnick Girardin aussi.
04:52Oh, lala.
04:53Il y a vraiment de quoi.
04:54He's a talk de mal.
04:55C'est tout.
04:56La question, ça ne va plus être...
04:58C'est qui les yeux.
05:00Voilà, c'est ça.
05:01C'est qui est ce qu'ils ont raté.
05:02Ah, allez, Julien Denormand.
05:03We knew politicians were on the list,
05:05and to prove that they had actually been infected with Pegasus,
05:09we needed their phones.
05:10But politicians wouldn't...
05:12wouldn't hand you their phone that easily,
05:16specifically if you're an investigative journalist.
05:27Yeah, yeah.
05:28After, I understand if you don't want to do it,
05:31it's, of course, your right is the most strict.
05:33Bye.
05:38I think he's going to say no.
05:42It's true that among the people in the list,
05:48there is an old minister who is no longer in the government
05:51and who has a greater freedom than someone who is currently in the power,
05:57and it's François de Rugy.
06:03So we contacted François de Rugy
06:05to explain that we wanted to talk about something extremely confident.
06:08You're not the only minister or ex-ministre concerned.
06:13We have, in total, 14.
06:20And so, at his credit,
06:22he ended up accepting it.
06:24So we were looking for a technical analysis of his phone.
06:29And it allowed us to confirm that he had been targeted
06:34and that he had been targeted by the client
06:36that we identified as being the Royal of the Maroc.
06:39He didn't look at all when I announced the country.
06:42Oh, really?
06:43He told me that he met the king.
06:44Which is, in my opinion, a good way to put on the radar of these people.
06:47The phone number that he attributed to Emmanuel Macron,
06:54the first step was to verify that the number was still active today
06:57and that it was always Emmanuel Macron who used it.
07:01And so, the easiest way to verify if he used it,
07:04is to write it.
07:05So, in fact, we're sending a SMS to Emmanuel Macron.
07:09Monsieur le Président de la République.
07:11Monsieur le Président de la République.
07:13On a eu une enquête internationale...
07:17...sur la cyber-souverte.
07:21Dont vous-même avez été la cible.
07:23Dont vous-même avez été la cible.
07:24C'est plus clair, soyons clairs.
07:26En plus, c'est pour ça.
07:27C'est ça que vous allez lui dire.
07:28Ah bah oui.
07:29Dont vous avez été la cible.
07:32C'est parti.
07:37Emmanuel Macron ne répond pas directement à son SMS,
07:41mais une heure ou deux heures après avoir envoyé ce SMS,
07:43les services de l'Elysée nous rappellent
07:46à propos du SMS qui lui a été envoyé.
07:47Donc, il l'a bien reçu.
07:48Enfin, le téléphone est toujours actif.
07:52Ouais, ouais, bah là, on va à l'Elysée, là.
07:57Quelques heures après avoir envoyé ce SMS à Emmanuel Macron,
08:00on a reçu une invitation à se rendre à l'Elysée,
08:03qui venait des services de l'État,
08:05pour discuter de ce que nous avions trouvé.
08:06Pyramide.
08:10Pyramide.
08:18Notre rendez-vous de ce matin,
08:21j'ai l'impression que ça nous a donné à tous.
08:22The panic, not panic, it's horrible, but it's all the potential implications of this
08:33affair on all the judicial, diplomatic, security, and that, in fact, it
08:45stops the communication.
08:52Very quickly, the state experts will confirm that there was an infection or infection, in some cases, on the phones of some ministers and on the phones of a certain number of French employees.
09:06The result of the analysis of the phone of the President of the Republic is called Secret Défense and we will never have access.
09:14We don't know exactly who in Morocco was using Pegasus.
09:19There were Moroccan descendants on the list, even the king of Morocco himself was on the list.
09:24But we do know that NSO only sells to governments and government agencies.
09:29We were reaching out to another dimension of the project.
09:33We were at this stage entering a space, a dangerous space, where we were talking about a country, a state, attacking another one.
09:43Each time you look at how a client of NSO Group
09:48used the technology, it tells you something about that government.
09:53In the UAE, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum is a member of the U.S.
09:58prime minister, vice president and, of course, the ruler of Dubai.
10:01Here is an example of the U.S.
10:03of the U.S.
10:04of the U.S.
10:05of the U.S.
10:06of the U.S.
10:07of the U.S.
10:08of the U.S.
10:09President.
10:10Each time you look at how a client of NSO Group used the technology, it tells you something
10:16about that government.
10:18In the UAE, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum is prime minister, vice president and, of course,
10:25the ruler of Dubai.
10:26Here is an autocratic leader, massively powerful.
10:30powerful.
10:37Princess Latifah is the daughter of Sheikh Mohammed.
10:40She had for a long time been, by her account, unhappy about her life in Dubai.
10:47She had been incarcerated effectively by her father's regime.
10:54I'm making this video because it could be the last video I make.
11:04This video can help me because all my father cares about is his reputation.
11:10He will kill people to protect his own reputation.
11:15He only cares about himself and his ego.
11:23Princess Latifah concocted this extraordinary attempted escape that involved jet skis,
11:30a yacht and a trip to the Indian Ocean.
11:34I mean, it's an audacious thing to do.
11:37Incredible even that she attempted it.
11:39I think remarkable that it nearly succeeded.
11:53The day after Princess Latifah went missing from Dubai, we saw her number entered into the list.
12:00And in the days after that, as she was travelling toward India on this yacht, her friends, people she knew, people within her orbit, their phone numbers also appeared on the list.
12:15If you look at the dates and times that her number and those people close to her were entered into the system, you have something that has to be more than a coincidence.
12:26Eight days after her escape, Indian special forces boarded the yacht, and then the princess was forcibly returned to Dubai.
12:36We don't know exactly why the attempted escape didn't succeed, but NSO's technology was, it seems, from the evidence we've seen, one of the tools that was being used by the state in a desperate attempt to find Princess Latifah, kidnap her, and return her back to Dubai.
12:53We tried hard to get hold of a phone that Latifah had used, but we couldn't.
12:59So we contacted her friends and her associates to ask if we could check their phones to see if they had been targeted with Pegasus.
13:11Given how much David Haig was working on the Latifah case, it wasn't a surprise when we discovered that there was Pegasus activity on his phone.
13:18I was infected on the 3rd of August 2020 with Pegasus, I believe at 3am in the morning and the next day as well.
13:36The fact that the EU can be hacked on British oil and that they can do that, it's frightening. It really is.
13:50My name's David Haig from Detained International.
14:02Then we founded the campaign to free the Dubai princess, Princess Latifah, in 2018.
14:08David Haig was actually imprisoned in Dubai for alleged fraud and it was after his release that he became a human rights campaigner.
14:16Princess Latifah began to message him after her failed attempted escape.
14:23This is a picture that Latifah drew of the jail villa, Villa 96 in Jumeirah, Dubai, near the Virgin Arab.
14:31And you can see here a beach in this direction where she was held captive.
14:35This villa has been converted into a jail. All the windows are barred shut. I can't open any window.
14:44There's five policemen outside and two policewomen inside the house.
14:48I don't know what can happen to me and how long this will last.
14:52And if they decide to release me, like how my life will be. But I'm not safe at all.
14:58That week before I attacked, our secret contact with Latifah had stopped suddenly.
15:12The several hours became a day and then two days.
15:17And then we started to worry because that was not normal.
15:22We had recorded a lot of videos and a lot of evidence Latifah had that could be used to tell the world about her predicament, the fact that she's been held hostage.
15:33At the time I was hacked, we were in London with the videos that Latifah had recorded the evidence to meet media to decide if we were going to use it at that time or not.
15:43It was effectively dynamite evidence on that phone.
15:53The fact that they know your location.
15:57If someone could be listening to us now and seeing what we're doing.
16:01And it's that, sitting in the back of your head every day.
16:06We can't let NSO and the governments that abused their system get away with what they've done.
16:16Because if we do, and if nothing happens, and people are not brought to justice, people are not put in jail, and people are not taken to court,
16:22the next company, and the next company, and the next company, wherever they may be, will do exactly the same.
16:27And it will just carry on, but get worse.
16:29And it will just carry on, but get worse.
16:30Quite the same thing.
16:31Let's kill themшей soul or Angels will start to fall, which is the only one thing.
16:32It can be Russia and France.
16:33So many of them hoping to live safe.
16:34Let's try to trust but Yarna.
16:35Whether the standard line of Japan is really frail, chimes t ScientificPyro Monkey,
16:36they're one of these.
16:37They're just saying, we берäonosorers are in the end of our страны.
16:46And for us are hard to get wet air producers in event, this morning.
16:52But I'm going to find a moment to hide our machine without turning on the back before.
16:54But just get worse.
16:56cu salvar problems of mistakes that are cut their Люs.
16:57But get worse.
16:58.
17:08.
17:10.
17:12.
17:17.
17:22.
17:27.
17:28.
17:29.
17:34.
17:39.
17:42.
17:47.
17:56They have knowledge from our enemies.
17:58These are the people who will do it.
18:00They have knowledge that it is clear.
18:03They take children from 18 years old and they teach them very fast and very long.
18:21Israel has this advantage of not only developing new technologies and weaponry,
18:26but testing it live.
18:29And this is something Israel knows it can use to sell outside.
18:41When you want to control a huge population, like we do with Palestinians,
18:46you have to have assets everywhere, so everyone can be a target
18:51because you don't want only the, I don't know, terrorists from the Hamas,
18:56but also maybe his neighbor or his cousin or the person who sells milk in the corner of the street.
19:02If you want to recruit human agents, you need to collect their weaknesses,
19:15things that you can use to blackmail.
19:17And so part of what A200 does is to collect this blackmail potential information about everybody.
19:29If you're gay or if you have medical, special medical condition,
19:33or you have financial problems or someone from your family has one of those,
19:39then that's something we can use against you to blackmail you and get you to cooperate.
19:43Israeli intelligence has a strategic view of how their employees should be used after they leave
19:53their employee. They promote them, they want them to start these companies,
19:58and they see a deep communications, a continued relationship between the government and their
20:05former employees as valuable to Israel's national security interests.
20:14There's a lot of evidence to suggest that NSO Group had the direct backing and support of Bibi Netanyahu's government.
20:26In order to sell its product to governments around the world,
20:29it required permits, effectively licenses from the Israeli Defense Ministry.
20:36I decided several years ago to turn Israel into one of the five cyber powers of the world.
20:43In order for the companies to develop, they need to make, what do they need to make?
20:49Money.
20:49Money.
20:52They need to make money.
20:54Now, the easiest way to make sure that they don't make money is one, high taxes, right?
21:01What's the other one?
21:04Regulations.
21:06Have you ever heard of regulations?
21:09We have a problem with regulations.
21:12So the policy we have is keep taxes low and keep regulations low.
21:18Minimize regulations.
21:20There is no industry more susceptible and more inviting of regulations than cyber security.
21:26It's like weapons. It is a weapon.
21:41We have to make a business.
21:44So the policy of the American American湖 government.
21:46That's not as good as Israel.
21:49There's this even a couple of funding.
21:50The policy of the 핵 Pokémon for the military.
21:55And we have to know about the technology that is not worth legal service.
21:58We are a human being.
21:58The employment of the military in the earth was not heard of Israel.
22:01You have to know about the military, the military in the state,
22:04and the military in the world.
22:05And since the United States was not treated,
22:07the military in the world,
22:08and the military in the world,
22:09The timeline for hunger was the first time,
22:12and in the first time,
22:14the government was in the same state.
22:17Sometimes, the government was in the same state,
22:20and sometimes the government was in the same state,
22:23but the correlation was the same
22:25that it was impossible to get away from it.
22:27One example is Hungary,
22:29which, under the Prime Minister of Populist,
22:31Víctor Ørban,
22:33the state was supposed to be
22:34one of the elite United States of Israel
22:36in Europe.
22:38The timeline for Hungary is that
22:41the visit was in July 2017,
22:44and the operation of Hungary,
22:49we know almost the exact date
22:51by the database of Forbidden Stories.
22:54It's February 2018.
22:56So, similarities.
22:59In this timeline of the telephone numbers,
23:02you can find numbers from Morocco,
23:05from Bahrain,
23:06from Morocco in May Republic,
23:08from Saudi Arabia.
23:12We know that the State of Israel
23:14wanted to be to deal with them.
23:16She wanted to be to feed them.
23:18It wanted to make sure
23:20that they were established
23:22by the Arab Saudi Taylor,
23:24and the Arab Arab Saudi, which is still not traditional,
23:27and there are still a lot of ties that are still in the middle.
23:33We see that the State of Israel is starting to understand
23:37the work that there is for the NSO,
23:40that there is for the Pegasus,
23:41over a part of the countries,
23:43that there are no good ones,
23:45that there are no good ones and no good ones.
23:47And Israel is working on Pegasus
23:51in terms of diplomatism,
23:54in terms of something that can be offered to countries,
23:57and that they want something else,
23:59and so they can bring the connections
24:01or move forward in the future.
24:03And in general,
24:05this is the key point for me
24:07that is the amazing project that is called Pegasus Project.
24:21Going through all the numbers on the list was a huge job.
24:38More than 15,000 of the numbers were in Mexico,
24:42and one of those numbers belonged to a journalist
24:46who was murdered just weeks after he was put on the list.
24:51Was Pegasus used in that case
24:54to spy on a journalist
24:56or to geolicate him?
24:59Is the key time?
25:12Do you really know Quinhaera is in a list?
25:14Yes?
25:15The, who was asterious?
25:17Yes.
25:18Yes in a list Anthony.
25:20What a strong one.
25:25In Mexico, it's very grave that Pegasus had been used as it was used.
25:49I'm referring to Cecilio Pineda.
25:54The Pegasus Project showed publicly that his phone was ingresed days or weeks before he was committed.
26:16The state of Guerrero is one of the most impacted by the organized crime.
26:21There are places where the state doesn't have dominion.
26:26The authorities are mixed with the organized crime.
26:31And there is activity of narcotics.
26:34There is activity diversa, delincuencial.
26:43And according to the report of the police,
26:46several armed subjects arrived at an auto lavado
26:50where the journalist Cecilio Pineda expected to give his car and shot him.
26:55And he shot him.
27:05No me sorprende que Cecilio Pineda estuviera en esa lista porque el tema que se estaba tocando era serio.
27:14In Scalentano, we are tired of violence.
27:17But no one has a safe life.
27:21We live in a region where we are alone.
27:24In a region where all the authorities don't support you.
27:28And here, one has to defend himself with his own son.
27:39Good afternoon.
27:40I'm from the Terra Caliente.
27:41Here we are back.
27:42After we are in two municipalities of the region.
27:45And we are here with this.
27:47Cecilio Debech un video.
27:49Venía en camino y quiso dar un mensaje anticipado de lo que iba a presentar después.
28:00Él dijo que unas horas después iba a mostrar el video de la relación que había entre el gobierno del estado y el grupo del tequilero.
28:12Después de eso ya no presentó nada.
28:14A él lo asesinaron.
28:17Adiós.
28:18Adiós.
28:20Adiós.
28:21No.
28:34A él lo asesinaron.
28:35Y ya estén.
28:36En ese diálogo.
28:37No.
28:38No.
28:39Amén.
28:40En ese diálogo.
28:41And when I got to the clinic, I wanted to go and see him.
28:52So the lady said, no, they are attending him.
28:54So I thought he was going to be fine.
28:56I said, no, it was just something.
29:02At 3 minutes, the doctor came and said, no, he already died.
29:11And it was the only time in my life that I had to die.
29:18When I came back, I was all tired.
29:20I said, no, I didn't know what to do.
29:22And it was when they came back and said that he had died.
29:27That he had almost almost died.
29:41You can only prove infection if you do forensics on the phone and find traces of Pegasus.
29:48But in many cases, the phone was not findable.
29:52That was the case of Cecilio Pineda.
29:56We can't say, categorically, that what was obtained from the possible espionage
30:03was what was causing the murder.
30:05But we can't be honest.
30:08Pero tampoco podemos ser ingenuos.
30:38We were able to set up a date where we all agreed that will be the day of the publication,
30:57in 2021, July 18.
31:02We knew that the most dangerous phase was those two weeks before the publication.
31:10When you knock on the door of the NSO group to say, hey, we are forbidden stories, we
31:15are 80 reporters, we investigate your businesses, and we have evidence of a global misuse that
31:21is threatening democracy.
31:22On rent dans la phase un peu d'inconnu, peut-être qu'en face, il va y avoir une vraie stratégie
31:27pour discréditer tout ce qu'on a fait.
31:29They can blackmail the source, they can hack me, one of the person of the team.
31:36They can follow us, they can come into our offices.
31:44By now, the members of the consortium had managed to do forensics on over 60 phones connected
31:49to numbers on the list.
31:52And we had forensic proof that at least 37 phones had been targeted or infected with
31:57Pegasus.
31:59The more publication day was approaching, the more paranoia we all became.
32:05Before publication, we already had that habit to switching off the phones or even our computers
32:12before having any conversation about the investigation.
32:15So most of the day, we were living and working without our phones or even our computers.
32:21So we had different ways of working, we had other devices we could work on.
32:25And we had to wait for that.
32:26And we had to wait for our partners to have reserves because NSO has approached them or
32:33close to NSO has approached them to tell them that we were wrong.
32:37I remember that day clicking on the button sent, I was sending the official request for command
32:51from the 80 reporters with dozens of questions inside.
32:56We were giving a deadline to the NSO group and to all the state actors and we were expecting
33:04some answers.
33:24This is Laurent Richa from Forbidden Stories, how are you doing?
33:28Yeah, I'm good.
33:30Thank you for taking the time to answer.
33:34I was just wondering if you are planning to answer our question.
33:40Yeah, you can see it in your email now.
33:43Yeah.
33:44Okay, I see it.
33:46Okay.
33:48Bye.
33:49Bye.
33:50Bye.
33:51Bye.
33:52Okay.
33:53What we got is an email from the NSO group saying that all you think is wrong.
34:00Best regards.
34:01NSO group firmly denies false claims made in your report, which many of them are uncorroborated
34:06theories that raise serious doubts about the reliability of your sources as well as the
34:12basis of your story.
34:14It's incredible.
34:15It's incredible.
34:16It's incredible.
34:17But then when I woke up in the next morning, I opened my phone, and I saw that NSO had
34:35send letters from lawyers to most of the partners on all continents to threaten them and to tell
34:41them that if you publish anything, we will sue you.
34:46It's a bit tense here, if I'm honest.
34:47Yeah.
34:48Yeah.
34:49Yeah.
34:50Yeah.
34:51Yeah.
34:52Um, we've had a provisional response from NSO to the Washington Post, um, and we will have
35:09the formal, another response from them to us in about 15, 20 minutes.
35:15So we're going to keep this call really quick.
35:18The stakes are really high when you do this kind of reporting.
35:22Here was a company valued at over a billion dollars.
35:27And the NSO group and its clients, these governments, were not going to put their hands up and confess
35:33to this activity.
35:35They were fighting it as hard as they possibly could.
35:39All going well if we're proceeding with this project.
35:42I think the crunch point really is going to be in the next 12 hours.
35:45What do you mean in the sense of if we are proceeding, Paul?
35:49Yeah.
35:50Is that in doubt?
35:52Well, it's always, it's never, it's never confirmed until it's confirmed, right?
36:11Oh, ****.
36:18We can confirm at least au moins trois noms de votre enquête.
36:21Emmanuel Macron, King Mohamed Six and Tedros Ghebreyesus ne sont pas et n'ont jamais
36:26été des cibles ou sélectionnées comme cibles par des clients de NSO group.
36:32Yeah.
36:52Yeah.
36:53On a NSO qui demande nominement pour le PR, Mohamed Six et le mec de l'OMS.
37:01Je suis en route pour le bureau de la direction.
37:05A tout de suite.
37:08En mars 2019, alors que le président Macron suit très près la crise politique qui secoue
37:14l'Algérie.
37:15C'est à ce moment-là que l'un de ses numéros est enregistré par un service marocain.
37:20So Paul, just to be 100% clear, you guys are ready to hit the button on a version
37:24of the story in 42 minutes.
37:27The heads of state story.
37:29We're not ready now, but in 42 minutes we will be ready.
37:36Here we were simultaneously publishing 17 different media outlets all over the world
37:41in several different languages, all at the same time, at the same minute, on the same day,
37:47after months of investigating.
37:54Investigation into the NSO group.
37:57That's okay.
37:58That's okay.
37:59I'll just say, yeah, and its clients.
38:01Let's jump.
38:02Five, four, three, two, one, go.
38:06Zero, it's gone.
38:08End.
38:09End.
38:10We've done it.
38:11Tiff.
38:1218.
38:13On est bon.
38:1418.
38:15Woo!
38:1618.
38:1718.
38:18So the story is now live.
38:19An explosive investigation from the Washington Post and a consortium of media partners.
38:25Activists, lawyers, and journalists are reportedly among those.
38:27It's an investigation of the diverse media that revealed a list of cellulaires.
38:32The use of Pegasus in the world.
38:34The Elysée takes this deal with a lot of seriousness.
38:37What can be done to protect our country from commercial spyware?
38:54The kind of threat that is now being reported at the top of the news across the nation.
39:04There had been reporters who'd been doing stories on Pegasus for years.
39:10This sort of tipped the scale because it was in so many countries.
39:15It was against so many people in civil society who clearly were not terrorists or criminals.
39:22And you got a real sense that it was a free-for-all.
39:28We even found out afterwards that the FBI considered using a version of Pegasus that could hack into U.S. phones.
39:39But that fell apart and the Biden administration actually blacklisted NSO Group.
39:46They've made a bigger deal than I would have expected against not just an Israeli company, but really they're criticizing the Israeli government for allowing this to happen.
39:58Because it actually could not happen without the Israeli government's permission.
40:02You have here a go-to spy service for tyrants.
40:14What the executives of these companies and the engineers are hoping for most is to make a whole lot of money and do it in a way where there's minimal regulation and minimal oversight.
40:33The U.S. appeals court is allowing WhatsApp messaging service to move forward with a lawsuit against NSO Group over allegedly targeting...
40:43Silicon Valley has a big role to play.
40:45Companies like WhatsApp, companies like Apple, they are suing NSO.
40:50They are the ones with money.
40:52They are the ones who promise you safety and security.
40:55All we've seen NSO Group is deny, deny, deny, and that's shown up entirely through the legal process as well.
41:04The way I think about it is tech companies can and should do everything they can to make their software as secure as possible.
41:13But at the end of the day, if there's no consequences for people who try to break that software to commit human rights abuses, then there will always be people trying to do it.
41:23It's just like the only solution to stopping bank robbery is not to have the best technology in banks.
41:29Yes, you do that too.
41:31It's also that bank robbers get caught and have consequences for trying to rob banks.
41:36And we need that for the spyware industry.
41:38Pegasus spyware is once again back in the spotlight.
41:50This time for targeting pro-independence supporters in Spain's...
41:53Several members of Poland's opposition have produced evidence they were hacked by Pegasus...
41:58This scandal is being dubbed the Polish Watergate.
42:01In Europe, we were discovering new victims of the spyware and new countries were accused of using Pegasus to spy on their opponents.
42:15At the European Parliament, representatives from NSO agreed to answer questions from politicians.
42:21It was the first time they've done this.
42:25I'm Hannah Neumann, a member of the European Parliament.
42:29I'm the member of the UN.
42:30I'm the member of the UN.
42:31The member of the UN.
42:33The member of the UN.
42:34The member of the UN is a member of the UN.
42:36We know that NSO is now on the market. So maybe they are trying to polish their image.
42:48That would be interesting to see.
42:52We know that NSO is now on the market. So maybe they are trying to polish their image.
42:58That would be interesting to see.
43:06Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
43:33On behalf of NSO, I want to thank the members of the Committee of Inquiry for having us here today.
43:38Before we begin, we should note that there are limits to the information we can share with the committee and others.
43:43As you know, NSO is a private company providing export-controlled cyber-intelligence technologies only and exclusive to government agencies for the purpose of preventing and investigating terrorism and other serious crimes.
43:56As a result, we are unable to share details about our customers as well as the crimes prevented and criminals tracked and apprehended using our technologies or trade secrets of the technology.
44:07It is not true that NSO Group operates Pegasus and collects information about individuals.
44:12It is not true that NSO Group sells its technology to private companies.
44:17The issues that came up about Jamal Khoukji, about President Macron, the system was not used on those numbers.
44:26I will go immediately into the Q&A session of today's meeting.
44:30We already have about 15 members who have asked for the floor.
44:33Have you ever terminated a contract with an EU member state?
44:39We have terminated contracts with the EU member states, but to get into the exact numbers.
44:46That's fine. Thank you.
44:47Next question.
44:48If a country does not give you a permission to audit, is that a reason for you to terminate a contract, yes or no?
44:58I stated before, if they do not allow us to do the audit and do not participate in the, provide us with the information we need in our investigation, yes, that is a reason to terminate a contract.
45:07I can state with you that we've terminated eight customers over the past several years.
45:12Have United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia ever gone through your due diligence check and have they passed it?
45:22As I said, I'm not going to respond to questions regarding specific potential customers.
45:28Yes, I hear.
45:29Hello, sir.
45:30I'm from Poland.
45:31I cannot negate it.
45:32Are you using Pegasus software who are legitimate actors to issue warrants in these countries according to your checks?
45:38Again, I repeat it again and I'm not going to respond to questions regarding specific customers.
45:43Yes, I hear.
45:44I cannot, and again I repeat, I cannot because of various confidentiality and secrecy issues, I cannot get into specific questions regarding specific customers or specific cases.
46:10I have some questions regarding this.
46:13Are there any more living actions in the Hungarian government?
46:17If there is no living actions in the Hungarian government, then what are they going to do and what are they going to do and what are they going to do?
46:24And there is a possibility that the Hungarian government will be able to do this new unit with the NSO-C team, and will be able to do this new action.
46:34First of all, every customer that we sell to goes through the due diligence review in advance and very often if concerns are raised regarding the rule of law, because what we're looking at is also rule of law.
46:50And any country that we've decided to sell to has been approved in this matter.
46:56Please stop the storytelling. I'm going to continue in Hungarian.
46:59I don't want to mention Hungary's example, but if you have a member of a member of a different rule of law, then what does it mean for you a safe country? What does it mean for you a guarantee?
47:12This is my question. Thank you very much.
47:24Not again, it was a new question. So please.
47:25I have not said, we have not said that we have determined recently that Hungary is or is not a secure country.
47:34You did consider it secure because you sold the stuff to us.
47:37Excuse me, I said now.
47:39Let's keep a little bit of order in the meeting as well. I understand there is frustration, but you have the concrete question.
47:45We have a concrete answer. And please.
47:48You keep repeating the same thing.
47:50And there seems to be a complete disconnect between reality and between what you're saying.
47:54This is like, you know, it's an insult to our intelligence. Sorry.
47:57You keep repeating the same thing.
48:27This is an absolute threat that people are afraid of,
48:30people are afraid of, and there is a lot of pressure.
48:39I think that a lot of people are afraid of this world,
48:42they are going to be with Pegasus.
48:44I tell you that no one has been warned
48:47to the government and the government of the parliament,
48:50to the technology and technology,
48:52that there was no connection in any way,
48:54in any way, not in a way,
48:56No to the Retsch, no to the Shoggy, no to the people around him.
48:59No, no, no, I know that this is a problem, I know that this is a problem.
49:03And when I tell you that this is a gas gas, we know how many times that this is not right.
49:08And in fact, it is necessary to stop this gas gas gas.
49:21What is Israel doing after the Pegasus is destroyed?
49:26The formal process is used by the Pegasus, which is the Pegasus, which is the Pegasus.
49:36And when I say formal, the Pegasus is the Pegasus, which is not the Pegasus,
49:42and we don't know what was in the Pegasus, we don't see a protocol,
49:45we don't have to do it, and we don't know how to deal with it, and we don't know what the decision is.
49:49We don't know what the decision is.
50:02My name is Aram Ben-Barak.
50:04Before that, I did a career in the MSW, and I got to go to the MSW.
50:10I'm standing in front of the MSW, and I'm standing in front of the MSW.
50:16I told you whether the Israeli regulation is good at all.
50:26I think that I've done a lot of progress, but in a way,
50:30and how she works, she was a good one and even a very good one.
50:37The most important thing is that the knowledge that we have in the country
50:42is to do what she has to do and not to do it.
50:46Because the companies, like that, are like F-35,
50:52the country and they have to do it with a different country in a different country.
50:58So I think, why, why, why?
51:01I'm going to let Martin Lockheed because
51:04someone did not good job in his car.
51:13The bottom line is nobody regulates these companies.
51:16That's the bottom line.
51:17Technology is just so far ahead of government regulation.
51:21And even of public understanding of what's happening out there.
51:25It's the Wild West, and this is where we are
51:31when you have a private secret company meeting state actors
51:35with no regulation in the cyber-surveillance space,
51:39and when it's possible to use military weapons against civilians.
51:47In some ways, we can talk about the impact on the company
51:51and say it's been really profound.
51:53A more pessimistic view would be to look at the entire industry,
51:58which remains unreformed, pretty wild, unregulated.
52:05NSO may vanish.
52:09But I feel no more secure talking in front of my phone now
52:15than I did when we first published.
52:18You know, I don't think these issues have gone away.
52:20Go to pbs.org slash frontline for a Q&A with the journalists
52:39at Forbidden Stories who led the Pegasus investigation.
52:41And once in the phone, it can extract and access everything from the device.
52:46Everything. So once you are infected, you're trapped.
52:50And an archive of stories with our reporting partners on the Pegasus Project.
52:55Connect with Frontline on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter,
52:58and stream anytime on the PBS app, YouTube, or pbs.org slash frontline.
53:04Not all backgrounds.
53:24For more on this and other frontline programs,
53:30For more on this and other Frontline programs,
53:34visit our website at pbs.org slash Frontline.
53:55Frontline's global spyware scandal exposing Pegasus
53:59is available on Amazon Prime Video.
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