• last year
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Tuesday on US policy on Taiwan.

Fuel your success with Forbes. Gain unlimited access to premium journalism, including breaking news, groundbreaking in-depth reported stories, daily digests and more. Plus, members get a front-row seat at members-only events with leading thinkers and doers, access to premium video that can help you get ahead, an ad-light experience, early access to select products including NFT drops and more:

https://account.forbes.com/membership/?utm_source=youtube&utm_medium=display&utm_campaign=growth_non-sub_paid_subscribe_ytdescript


Stay Connected
Forbes on Facebook: http://fb.com/forbes
Forbes Video on Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/forbes
Forbes Video on Instagram: http://instagram.com/forbes
More From Forbes: http://forbes.com
Transcript
00:00:00This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the
00:00:04Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy will come to order. I'd like to
00:00:10begin by thanking Ranking Member Romney for being a good and strong partner on
00:00:16the issues we take up in this subcommittee, including today as we
00:00:20discuss the challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy on Taiwan and the
00:00:25importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
00:00:30We're grateful today to be joined by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
00:00:34Pacific Affairs, Daniel Kritenbrink. Welcome. I will give you a fuller
00:00:39introduction in a moment. Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink recently
00:00:44returned from an official visit to China with Secretary Blinken, so we do look
00:00:48forward to hearing any takeaways from your trip, especially as they relate to
00:00:53cross-strait relations. This month marks the 45th anniversary of the Taiwan
00:00:59Relations Act, which provides a framework for the United States's unofficial
00:01:03relations with Taiwan. And in just a few weeks, Taiwan will undergo another
00:01:08peaceful democratic transition with the inauguration of a new president. So this
00:01:15is a timely hearing in many ways. Across the decades, U.S. policy across the Taiwan
00:01:23Strait has been consistent, guided by the TRA, the three joint communiques, and the
00:01:28six assurances. We are not the party that is seeking to change the status quo in
00:01:33the region. Our commitment has been and remains to ensure a free and open
00:01:37Indo-Pacific and to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo from either
00:01:42side by force or coercion. The People's Republic of China, however, has been
00:01:48employing increasingly bellicose rhetoric and utilizing gray zone tactics
00:01:52that seek to undermine the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Just this past
00:01:57weekend, following Secretary Blinken's visit to China, President Xi deployed 12
00:02:02fighter jets across the sensitive median line of the Taiwan Strait, which once
00:02:07served as an unofficial border over which neither side's military crossed,
00:02:11but now China's Air Force regularly sends aircraft over it. And earlier this
00:02:17month, the PRC unilaterally announced new civil aviation routes, running very
00:02:22close to two Taiwanese-controlled islands, as well as to the median line.
00:02:26These actions are part of an effort to pressure Taiwan to accept Beijing's
00:02:32claims of sovereignty, and they escalate tensions in the region. As a partner that
00:02:37is committed to helping Taiwan maintain its self-defense capability, the United
00:02:42States must work with our allies and partners in the region to sustain a
00:02:46credible deterrent to those malign actions that are attempting to move the
00:02:52needle on a daily basis. That's why it was so important that we passed the
00:02:56recent National Security Supplemental Bill with funding for Ukraine and for
00:03:00our Indo-Pacific partners. As Taiwan approaches its May 20th presidential
00:03:06inauguration, the PRC has ratcheted up diplomatic and military pressure against
00:03:11Taipei, underscoring the need for increased security cooperation between
00:03:16the United States and our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. And we were
00:03:21glad to ensure that the bill provided security assistance to Taiwan and other
00:03:27partners in that region. Additionally, we know this aid is vital to supporting the
00:03:32Ukrainian people in their fight against Putin, which also has critical
00:03:36implications for defending freedom and democracy worldwide. Our allies and our
00:03:42adversaries alike have been watching closely to see if the United States and
00:03:46our partners will keep our promises to the people of Ukraine in their hour of
00:03:50need or whether we will retreat. In particular, we know that President Xi has
00:03:55one eye on the war in Ukraine and the other on Taiwan. While we, of course,
00:04:01remain committed to helping Taiwan defend itself and protecting U.S.
00:04:04national security interests in the region, I am not one who believes that
00:04:08conflict across the Taiwan Strait is inevitable. We do not seek confrontation
00:04:13with China, and we must make clear through our words and our actions that we
00:04:17seek to reinforce the status quo regarding Taiwan, not upset it. I was
00:04:22pleased to see Secretary Austin recently connect with his PRC counterpart for the
00:04:27first time in the resumption of high-level military communication is a
00:04:32key way to avoid unintended consequences and misunderstandings. As we work to
00:04:38protect the status quo and support Taiwan's ability to defend itself, I'm
00:04:42looking forward to hearing about how we can further strengthen our commercial
00:04:45ties with the island, which has become an economic powerhouse in the region and a
00:04:50major trading partner for the United States. I'm glad that negotiations resume
00:04:54this week on the U.S.-Taiwan initiative on the 21st century trade. As the United
00:05:00States' eighth largest trading partner, it is also long past time that we enact a
00:05:06tax agreement with Taiwan to avoid double taxation of our businesses. Former
00:05:11Senator Sasse and I introduced a measure to encourage that back in 2022, and
00:05:16Senator Romney and I have been doing the same. I want to acknowledge the important
00:05:20investments that TSMC has been making in chips manufacturing here in the United
00:05:26States since the passage of the Chips and Science Act. I'd also like to hear
00:05:31more about what the United States can do to build international support for
00:05:34Taiwan and its democracy, and how we can strengthen the coalition of countries
00:05:39willing to call out the PRC when they engage in aggressive behaviors across
00:05:43the strait, and how we can effectively respond to China's economic coercion
00:05:48against those countries that support Taiwan. The strong people-to-people bonds
00:05:54between the United States and Taiwan, our shared democratic values, and our
00:05:58economic ties form the bedrock of our friendship and serve as the foundation
00:06:03for expanding U.S. engagement with Taiwan. I look forward to hearing further from
00:06:08Assistant Secretary Crittenbrink on each of these matters, but before I turn it
00:06:12over to you, Mr. Assistant Secretary, I want to turn it over to my
00:06:16colleague Senator Romney for his opening statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
00:06:22consistent with our personal relationship, I agree with virtually
00:06:27everything you said. I have no bones to pick in anything you described, and I'm
00:06:31happy to see our mutual friend, Assistant Secretary Crittenbrink, here as well.
00:06:35We have had the chance to meet and speak a number of times. Some weeks ago, I
00:06:42asked Taiwan's representative of the United States what was the single most
00:06:47important thing we could do to convince China that it would be unwise to
00:06:53consider a military action of invasion against Taiwan, and the representative
00:06:59said it would be to provide funding support for Ukraine. And like the
00:07:06chairman has indicated, I am very pleased that we finally got that done. I think it
00:07:11sends a signal to would-be aggressors around the world of all kinds that
00:07:18we will stand by our commitments and that we honor and respect the rights of
00:07:25democratic people to retain their freedoms and their vision for their own
00:07:30livelihoods. Unfortunately, we know that Xi Jinping has stated an intention to
00:07:38unify with Taiwan, potentially including a forceful measure, and we see a
00:07:48number of troubling developments that we have to take into account. Of course, he's
00:07:52building out extraordinary military capabilities, naval, space, rocketry, and
00:07:59other dimensions. He is exerting economic coercion on Taiwan, obviously making
00:08:06numerous threatening overflights, extending gray zone activities,
00:08:11particularly thinking about some of the disinformation that was shared through
00:08:14TikTok during the most recent presidential elections. I can tell you
00:08:18that from my reading, that hasn't had the impact that China may have hoped
00:08:24for. But clearly, Taiwan and its ability to retain its freedom is of
00:08:33great interest to us and to other nations around the world. It is our
00:08:37hope that Taiwan can be an aggressive competitor with China and with
00:08:45other nations, even with us, but not to be conquered by China. And one of
00:08:51the reasons that we are so anxious to help them invest in their own military
00:08:56might, as well as the reason we invest in our military might, is to assure that
00:09:02there's not temptation on the part of any nation, particularly China, to take
00:09:07aggressive military action against our friends in Taiwan. Like the Chairman, I'm
00:09:13happy that we're celebrating the Taiwan Relations Act. It's not as clear-cut as
00:09:18perhaps some would like, but I think it's good news that we found that this year
00:09:22China will – excuse me – the U.S. will surpass China as Taiwan's top export
00:09:28market. Taiwan's collaboration with semiconductor manufacturers here in
00:09:35the U.S. to help build a resilient semiconductor industry here in the U.S.
00:09:40is also a great note and great importance to us. And I hope that the
00:09:47people of Taiwan recognize that we are their friends, that we are anxious for
00:09:52them to be able to determine their own course and to chart their lives
00:09:58as they wish, and that we will in all ways honor our friendship and
00:10:05our commitment to one another. And so I look today to get a sense of what you
00:10:10believe, Mr. Assistant Secretary. China's strategy is with regards to Taiwan and
00:10:18what ours should be and what it is and what things we hope to do, everything
00:10:22from economic strategy, military strategy, diplomatic strategy, and how
00:10:29things are developing on both fronts, both China's success and our own. With
00:10:33that, Mr. Chairman, we'll turn the microphone back to you and we can turn
00:10:37to hear from the Assistant Secretary. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Romney. I'm
00:10:42now going to introduce our witness today, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.
00:10:47Daniel Kritenbrink became Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and
00:10:51Pacific Affairs in September 2021 and has worked to advance our nation's
00:10:57strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific region. This role is a continuation of
00:11:03his three decades of distinguished public service, having joined the Foreign
00:11:07Service in 1994. Before serving as Assistant Secretary, Mr. Kritenbrink
00:11:13served as the United States Ambassador to Vietnam from 2017 to 2021, and his
00:11:19deep background in Indo-Pacific affairs includes time as Senior Director for
00:11:23Asian Affairs at the NSC and Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States
00:11:29Embassy in Beijing. He speaks both Chinese and Japanese. As a Nebraska
00:11:35native, he earned a bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska, Kearney,
00:11:40and a master's degree from the University of Virginia later on. I want
00:11:44to thank him for his distinguished service to our country. We look forward
00:11:48to your testimony. We respectfully ask that you try to keep your opening
00:11:52statement to about five minutes, but we are eager to hear from you and look
00:11:57forward to the question period. Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink. Well,
00:12:02Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the kind introduction. Chairman Van
00:12:06Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
00:12:10thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you today about the
00:12:13administration's commitment to the United States' longstanding one China
00:12:17policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act or the T. R. A. The three
00:12:22joint communiques in the six assurances and which has promoted peace and
00:12:26prosperity in the region for 45 years across multiple administrations from
00:12:31both parties. I'd also like to thank Congress for its bipartisan support for
00:12:36the administration's national security supplemental, which both of you
00:12:39mentioned fully agree with your comments. Passage of the supplemental
00:12:43will provide critical security systems for the Indo Pacific region,
00:12:47including Taiwan. Today, I'll deliver the below statement, which is a
00:12:51summarized version of my longer written testimony, which has been submitted for
00:12:55the record. The U. S. Unofficial relationship with Taiwan, we are
00:12:59confident is stronger than ever. With credit to Congress for passing the T. R.
00:13:04A. In 1979, which President Biden himself voted for as a senator, the T.
00:13:08R. A. Has given us the tools that we need to pursue our overall objective of
00:13:12maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Far from being
00:13:17outdated or obsolete, the T. R. A. Provides an enduring framework under
00:13:21which we continue to adapt to face the challenges of today.
00:13:25Taiwan Relations Act is a remarkably prescient document. Nearly a half
00:13:30century ago, it laid down a marker that the United States would consider any
00:13:34effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a
00:13:38matter of grave concern. The T. R. A. Laid the foundation for the United
00:13:42States to provide Taiwan with the defense articles and services necessary
00:13:46to maintain a sufficient self defense capability, as well as to maintain our
00:13:51own capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
00:13:55against Taiwan. The T. R. A. Also astutely anticipated the need to
00:13:59strengthen support for Taiwan commensurate with the threat that it
00:14:03faces. Indeed, in the 45 years since the passage of the Taiwan Relations
00:14:07Act, the P. R. C. Threat to Taiwan has indeed increased, and the P. R. C. Has
00:14:12never renounced the use of force to unify with Taiwan. In response to this
00:14:17threat and consistent with our one China policy, this administration is
00:14:20bolstering cross straight deterrence using the full range of tools at our
00:14:24disposal. We're grateful to Congress for providing additional authorities
00:14:27and resources through the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and subsequent
00:14:31appropriations, which has allowed us to provide several security assistance
00:14:34measures to Taiwan for the first time, and which I detail further in my
00:14:38written testimony. This administration has also notified Congress of more
00:14:42than $6.2 billion in foreign military sales to Taiwan, including 20 sales
00:14:47between 2022 and 2023, the largest two year number of notifications for
00:14:52Taiwan in at least 30 years. The defense aspect of deterrence, while
00:14:57crucial, is only one element of our approach. Is the Taiwan Relations Act
00:15:03declared peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are not only U. S.
00:15:07Interests, but also matters of international concern. Therefore, we
00:15:12are working daily toward increasing the diplomatic costs of precipitous
00:15:17action against Taiwan by strengthening the international coalition of allies
00:15:21and partners who recognize the importance of peace and stability
00:15:24across the Taiwan Strait and who are willing to contribute to its
00:15:28maintenance. We also continue to advocate for Taiwan's international
00:15:32space, including Taiwan's meaningful participation in international
00:15:36organizations and pushing back against China's efforts to mischaracterized U.
00:15:40N. General Assembly Resolution 27 58. Finally, our partnership with Taiwan has
00:15:45grown dramatically and stands on its own, enabled by the tools and
00:15:50authorities provided in the Taiwan Relations Act. Taiwan is the United
00:15:54States eighth largest trading partner, with bilateral trading goods totally
00:15:58nearly totaling nearly $128 billion in 2023, up from just $9 billion in
00:16:051979. In addition, through the American Institute in Taiwan, this
00:16:10administration launched the U. S. Taiwan initiative on 21st century
00:16:13trade, the technology trade and investment collaboration framework and
00:16:18the inaugural science and technology cooperation dialogue, among other
00:16:22milestones. As another example, TSMC's historic $65 billion investment in
00:16:27Arizona is the largest greenfield direct investment project in U. S.
00:16:30History, supported with up to $6.6 billion in direct funding through the
00:16:35Chips Act. In conclusion, with the Taiwan Relations Act is a
00:16:40foundational element of our one China policy. We have deepened and
00:16:43expanded our ties with Taiwan over decades to reflect not only the threat
00:16:47Taiwan faces from the PRC, but also the vibrant partnership between the
00:16:51United States and Taiwan. We've been able to engage in extensive
00:16:55cooperation with Taiwan precisely because the TRA provides the
00:16:59authorities we need to carry out our unofficial relationship. We have the
00:17:03framework we need. We do not need to change it. What we need to do is
00:17:08respond to the present moment using all the tools at our disposal. I hope
00:17:12today I've demonstrated how this administration is doing just that in
00:17:15close partnership with Congress. Thank you. I look forward to your
00:17:19questions. Thank you, Mr. Assistant Secretary. Uh, let me start off with a
00:17:26question about your recent trip to China, where you and Secretary Blinken,
00:17:32um, had meetings with President Xi and others. Are there any key takeaways
00:17:39from your meetings in China, specifically with respect to the status
00:17:45of Taiwan? Well, Mr Chairman, thank you for that question. I'll say at the
00:17:52outset that I was honored to accompany Secretary Blinken to Beijing and
00:17:57Shanghai for an important series of meetings with China's leaders,
00:18:00including President Xi Jinping, Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi,
00:18:04the Minister of Public Security and also the Shanghai Party Secretary. I
00:18:08think the secretary laid out, um, in Beijing, his primary agenda was to
00:18:13follow up from the summit meeting between President Biden and President
00:18:17Xi in Woodside, California, both in terms of pursuing, uh, some of the
00:18:23cooperative areas that we agreed to work on, particularly fentanyl, uh,
00:18:26ensuring that our mill mill channels stay open, um, launching a dialogue
00:18:30on AI and promoting our people to people ties. And I think that on
00:18:34fentanyl, Secretary's message was we're grateful for this significant
00:18:37cooperation that's taken place thus far, but we need even more. Um,
00:18:41secondly, I think it's fair to say, perhaps even more importantly, the
00:18:45secretary focused on the many areas of difference between the United States
00:18:49and China. Um, certainly the issue across the straight was a key feature
00:18:55of his discussions. The secretary made clear our one China policy has not
00:18:59changed. Our fundamental national interest is in preserving peace and
00:19:02stability across the Taiwan Strait. We oppose unilateral efforts by either
00:19:08side to undermine that status quo, and neither China nor anyone else should
00:19:12take advantage of this period in the run up to the May 20 inauguration to
00:19:17take steps that would undermine that peace and stability. Um, the secretary
00:19:21was also very candid about our concerns for China's support in
00:19:24reconstituting the Russian defense industrial base. That candid exchange
00:19:28on the South China Sea as well. Um, uh, and also the secretary was quite clear
00:19:33about our concerns about the distortionary impacts of the Chinese,
00:19:38um, uh, mercantilistic economic model and our concerns about what those
00:19:44unfair trade practices may mean for the U. S. Economy. They also had an
00:19:48exchange on some other foreign policy issues. But, uh, squarely on on the
00:19:52cross straight situation, the secretary was quite candid, as I said, about our
00:19:57interest in our, um, commitment to meeting our our commitments under the
00:20:03Taiwan Relations Act, particularly to assist Taiwan in maintaining a
00:20:07sufficient self defense. I appreciate that you and your opening state
00:20:11mentioned it. Both Senator Romney and I mentioned it, but that fundamental
00:20:15architecture from 45 years ago, the Taiwan Relations Act. As you know,
00:20:20there's been a lot of debate, uh, around the country and certainly in
00:20:24Congress, both the House and the Senate about whether or not that remains the
00:20:30right framework for approaching our policies with respect to China and
00:20:37Taiwan. There are some who have said that it's time to move to greater
00:20:42strategic clarity, um, and to be very precise about the circumstances under
00:20:48which the United States may itself act to defend Taiwan. Others have pointed
00:20:53out the risks in that any change there. In your testimony, you said that this
00:20:58is not only stood the test of time, but you believe that, um, this
00:21:02architecture remains sound. Could you could you expand on that and maybe
00:21:06respond a little to those who have recommended that we change course? Yes,
00:21:12Mr Chairman, I fully agree. We have the framework that we need. We think that
00:21:16the T. R. A. And the other elements of our one China policy have given us the
00:21:21tools that we need. Uh, that framework has stood the test of time. For the
00:21:25last 45 years, we have preserved peace and stability across the Taiwan
00:21:29Strait. We believe that changing that framework, uh, changing the T. R. A. Or
00:21:35our the core elements of the U. S. One China policy would be unwise and
00:21:40rather than contributing to stability, we believe would undermine it. I think
00:21:45it's important that the United States and our allies and partners continue to
00:21:48be the parties that stand for the status quo that stand for the
00:21:52responsible maintenance of the status quo and it stand against coercion and
00:21:58upending that framework. I will also say is a practical matter, Mr Chairman. Um,
00:22:03on a daily basis, we think it is much more productive to focus on concrete,
00:22:09tangible means to build Taiwan's deterrent capability to focus on
00:22:14tangibly expanding the number of countries who recognize the importance
00:22:18of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and are willing to
00:22:21contribute to its maintenance. That's the kind of work, uh, that we think is
00:22:24most important. We think it would be again unwise to change the framework
00:22:29that we have, which again, in our view, has stood the test of time. Thank you,
00:22:33Senator Romney.
00:22:35Thank you, Mr Chairman. Um, Assistant Secretary. Um, it's I think apparent to
00:22:41everyone that China goes to great lengths to try and convince other
00:22:45countries to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Why, in your
00:22:50view, do they do that? What's there? What's the intent? What's the purpose?
00:22:55What's the what objective are they trying to reach?
00:22:59Well, uh, Mr Ranking Member, very candidly speaking, I think their
00:23:03objective is to try to pressure and coerce, intimidate and isolate Taiwan.
00:23:10And I think they believe that by picking off, so to speak, Taiwan's
00:23:14diplomatic allies, they can further, uh, those objectives. Um, in response
00:23:19to that, um, we we do a number of things. We we do support, uh, Taiwan
00:23:26and its relationship with its remaining diplomatic partners. And we can talk a
00:23:30bit more about that if you like. But we also think it's just as important, um,
00:23:35to assist Taiwan in having productive relationships with with its unofficial
00:23:40partners, including the United States.
00:23:42Uh, there have been a number of countries over the years that have
00:23:45severed relations with with Taiwan. I'm some of the Pacific in Latin America
00:23:51as well. Yes, sir. Are there any that have gone the other way? I'm meeting
00:23:56nations that did not have relations with Taiwan, but have now established
00:24:00those relations. I don't have those names at my fingertips, but I know some
00:24:04of the countries, including in the Pacific, have flip flopped over the
00:24:06years. And it's one of the things, Mr Ranking Member, that we tried to
00:24:10caution countries, tried to caution them about getting caught up in this,
00:24:15um, this larger game, so to speak. We've also caution countries that many
00:24:20times the promises that the PRC makes when it's trying to convince a country
00:24:26to flip many times China does not carry out those promises. And also we also
00:24:31try to highlight Taiwan is a very capable, uh, invaluable partner for
00:24:36countries to have. Yeah, my assessment is that there have been nations that
00:24:41have several relations with Taiwan but haven't gone the other way. It would
00:24:44seem that they're succeeding in that effort, and we're probably not being
00:24:48quite as effective. Am I wrong in that assessment?
00:24:52Well, I think it's a fact, Mr Ranking Member, that the number over time, the
00:24:56number of Taiwan's formal diplomatic partners has decreased. That's a fact.
00:25:01Yeah. Um, but one thing that we've underscored to our Taiwan partners as
00:25:06well, as important as those diplomatic relations are, I'll just reiterate the
00:25:10point I made a moment ago. Many of Taiwan's unofficial partners, including
00:25:13the United States, are at least as important as those former, uh, diplomatic
00:25:19of those formal diplomatic allies. And I've been gratified that even just over
00:25:24the last three years, we've seen a pretty significant increase in the
00:25:27number of countries who are willing to stand up and say that they recognize
00:25:31peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is a matter of international
00:25:35concern. It's fundamentally important that they to oppose unilateral changes
00:25:39to change the status quo and that they too are increasing their interactions
00:25:45with Taiwan, which we fully support. Yeah, I would anticipate that if we
00:25:50were to look at what China's strategy is with regards to Taiwan, that one
00:25:54small element would be trying to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. This is
00:25:58not a major, perhaps thrust of their strategy vis a vis Taiwan, but part of
00:26:03it and the fact that they've been successful in doing that gives me some
00:26:06concern that we don't have a a strategy as effective as theirs in moving things
00:26:11in the other direction on having more nations establish relations with Taiwan
00:26:16and and insisting on them being involved in international bodies and so forth.
00:26:21So is to increase the ties that Taiwan would enjoy globally and and also make
00:26:26it more likely that that were China to be tempted to carry out some kind of
00:26:30military effort that they'd recognize the number of nations that would find
00:26:35that offensive and would be likely to respond in an aggressive way, not
00:26:40necessarily militarily, but economically or diplomatically. So I would think it's
00:26:44it would be an important part of our nation's strategy vis-a-vis Taiwan. Can
00:26:50you give me a sense what are the key parameters do you believe of what China
00:26:54is doing to try and pull Taiwan into its orbit or ultimately, as Xi Jinping
00:27:00has indicated, to actually create a single nation with Taiwan as part of the
00:27:07PRC? Well, Mr. Ranking Member, I do think that the diplomatic piece is just one
00:27:12element of that strategy. I think I would tend to agree with you. It's not the most
00:27:15important part, but it is an element and in response to that, as I mentioned, we
00:27:19try to be active in messaging countries and warning and cautioning them about
00:27:23what they may be getting themselves into, but also in a more proactive and
00:27:26affirmative way. We've partnered with Taiwan and other countries around the
00:27:30world to see that Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners receive tangible
00:27:36benefits for that partnership and understand its value. In terms of this,
00:27:40the the broader Chinese strategy, again, I'll reiterate what I said at the top. I
00:27:47think that, I mean, China's stated objective is to unify with Taiwan.
00:27:53President Xi Jinping has stated that the so-called Great Rejuvenation of the
00:27:57Chinese nation is incomplete without reunifying the so-called motherland. So
00:28:03that statement is out there. That's the objective. That's their objective. And
00:28:08one small element of the strategy, as we've indicated, is diplomatic
00:28:12isolation. Right. But what are the other dimensions, do you think, of that key
00:28:15strategy? I think it's clear that they're they're building other means to
00:28:20try to coerce and intimidate Taiwan, including their military capabilities,
00:28:24the exercise of those capabilities, their attempts to, as the chairman pointed out,
00:28:30to undermine long-standing norms like the center line. And I think if if they
00:28:35were successful, they would like to, through disinformation and these other
00:28:40intimidation tactics and gray zone tactics, they would like to discourage
00:28:44the people of Taiwan into somehow thinking, right, that unification is
00:28:50inevitable. I think that's as candid as I can be about how we see their strategy.
00:28:54Our strategies, I've tried to lay out, is on the opposite side of that. We stand
00:28:58peace. I'll come back. I'll come back for that. My time is up. So I'll come back.
00:29:01I'll come back for that. And I want to just elaborate more on theirs and
00:29:04then come back to ours. Yes, sir. Thank you. Thank you. And I, that's a
00:29:08good segue to my question relating to some of these gray zone tactics, because
00:29:13as you stated in your testimony and just repeated now, right, part of China's
00:29:19stated strategy is to, as they describe it, reunify with Taiwan, including by
00:29:26force, not, certainly not ruling out force. And a lot of time and effort has
00:29:31been, you know, spent trying to envision what would happen if there was invasion
00:29:38of Taiwan by China, and people have tried to game that out. But what we're
00:29:44seeing right now is something different. We're seeing these sort of gray zone
00:29:49tactics. And so my question to you, Mr. Assistant Secretary, is what, how should
00:29:56we think about our toolkit for expanding, for responding to gray zone tactics,
00:30:02right? We've seen the use of aircraft, drones, and balloons invading Taiwanese
00:30:08airspace. We've seen naval incursions into Taiwanese waters. We've seen cyber
00:30:12attacks on civilian infrastructure. As you know, there's some Taiwanese islands
00:30:19that are very close to the mainland PRC. How do, should we think about the
00:30:27potential salami tactics, gray zone tactics? And what is our toolkit for
00:30:35responding to those in a way that sends the right message, but also being
00:30:42wary of escalation? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Look, I fully agree with your
00:30:50description of the challenge and the description that the ranking member has
00:30:54provided as well. So in response to that, our focus is trying to build and
00:31:01increase in every way Taiwan's deterrent capability and Taiwan's
00:31:06resilience. Part of that is meeting our commitments under the Taiwan Relations
00:31:10Act to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense. That's 6.2
00:31:15billion dollars in arms sales notified by this administration and many other
00:31:19tools that we've been given by Congress from, from PDA and excess defense
00:31:23articles and the like. So part of that is the security side. Related to that is
00:31:26some of the work that we're doing with friends in Taiwan to help the Taiwan
00:31:32administration in promoting defense reform and building out an asymmetric
00:31:36resilient defense capability that we think provides greater deterrence.
00:31:41Another line of effort is related to our diplomatic work, as I've talked about. We
00:31:45talked about building out Taiwan's international space or an international
00:31:49coalition of partners that support Taiwan, support peace and stability
00:31:52across the Taiwan Strait, support Taiwan's meaningful participation in
00:31:56international organizations. Part of it is building Taiwan's economic resilience.
00:32:00Again, Taiwan's our eighth largest trading partner with 120 billion dollars
00:32:04in annual trade. Our friends from USTR are in Taipei right now working on the
00:32:10next advancement of the 21st century trade initiative. That's part of it as
00:32:15well. Part of it is working with officials in charge of cybersecurity in
00:32:20Taiwan, assisting Taiwan in building their whole-of-society resilience. So we
00:32:26see this as a multifaceted effort, but everything is is motivated by, again, a
00:32:30desire to build Taiwan's deterrent capability and their resilience all in
00:32:36support of maintaining the status quo and deterring China from being tempted
00:32:41to take precipitous action against Taiwan. I appreciate that. We spoke a
00:32:47little bit about, you know, efforts, diplomatic efforts with other countries.
00:32:50I just want to focus on the neighborhood where both sort of China and Taiwan
00:32:57reside. We recently had Japanese Prime Minister Kishida here in the United
00:33:03States for a state visit, addressed a joint session of Congress, and I know
00:33:09that we've been working closely with Japan and other partners with respect to
00:33:15efforts to deter China's aggression in the area, including with respect to
00:33:22Taiwan. Can you talk a little bit about the Biden administration's efforts to
00:33:29create sort of a common purpose, both with respect to Japan, with respect to
00:33:37South Korea, and the Philippines, and other countries where we're
00:33:44working to try to achieve that goal of deterrence? Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, the
00:33:51way I would describe our efforts is first, fundamentally, it's working with a
00:33:55range of partners around the world to first explain and hopefully increase
00:34:01understanding of the importance of Taiwan and the importance of maintaining
00:34:05peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. There are many elements to that,
00:34:08but some of the most fundamental and obvious in my mind include the fact that
00:34:1450% of the world's global container traffic goes through the Taiwan Strait.
00:34:1990% of the world's high-end chips are produced in Taiwan. It's very clear that
00:34:24if there were a crisis, let alone a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, this would
00:34:29have devastating impacts, I think, globally, including for the
00:34:33global economy. Then, once countries recognize that reality and understand
00:34:39the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, we then try to
00:34:44work with partners to determine ways in which they can help contribute to the
00:34:50maintenance of that peace and stability. I think that's the most
00:34:53important work that we can do. I've been gratified to see, for example, the
00:34:58increasingly large number of countries that have, in joint statements with us,
00:35:02spoken out in support of the importance of maintaining peace and stability in
00:35:07the Taiwan Strait. I believe there were more than 20 countries that spoke out
00:35:10after the Taiwan presidential election to congratulate Taiwan and the
00:35:15Taiwan people. I think you see a pretty significant increase in the number of
00:35:21countries who recognize the importance of this issue. The other point that I
00:35:25would make, Mr. Chairman, that I think is really important, this is another reason
00:35:28why I think it's vitally important that the United States continue to be the
00:35:33party working towards the status quo, maintaining the status quo, not being the
00:35:38party that is somehow changing our approach or our framework or our actions.
00:35:42Because I think when partners view this situation and they understand the
00:35:46importance of Taiwan and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and
00:35:49when they understand that we stand for status quo and peace and stability, not
00:35:52for coercion and intimidation, I think it increases partners' willingness and
00:35:56comfort to stand up with us to advance those efforts. I agree that's an
00:36:02important point. Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We were speaking about
00:36:07some of the tactics or tools that China uses in their strategy vis-a-vis
00:36:14Taiwan, and I would have thought that their relationship with major
00:36:22powers in their region would be high on their priority list, that they'd want to
00:36:28see a weakening relationship, for instance, between the United States and
00:36:32places like South Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines. But it's been the
00:36:37opposite. They've done a number of things which have weakened, from my perspective,
00:36:42their ties with those nations. We've seen one of the great accomplishments
00:36:45diplomatically is seeing Japan and South Korea be able to come together in some
00:36:51important respects. Why have they failed so badly in terms of – I mean, at India,
00:36:57that list, that's not quite the same neighborhood, but the next door. Just one
00:37:03after the other, they seem to have done pretty well with some of the islands in
00:37:08the Pacific and perhaps in Latin America, but they seem to have gone backwards
00:37:12with some of the major powers that are in their neighborhood. I'm sure part of
00:37:19that is our good work, but the part has to be some of the stumbles on their part.
00:37:22Have I mischaracterized that? And why do you believe that might be? No, Mr.
00:37:27Ranking Member, I think you've characterized it quite accurately. Maybe
00:37:32I'll leave to other observers to explain exactly why this has happened,
00:37:35but I guess I would make a couple of points. We're incredibly proud of our
00:37:39approach to the broader Indo-Pacific region. I would argue that our
00:37:42relationship with friends, partners, and allies across the region are stronger
00:37:46than they've ever been before. And also, increasingly, we've been able to network
00:37:51those relationships into what we call a latticework of overlapping
00:37:56relationships. It's the bilateral partnerships, it's the trilateral work
00:38:00with Tokyo and Seoul, with Tokyo and Manila, with Canberra, it's the Quad, it's
00:38:06AUKUS, it's other partnerships. And what we find, Mr. Ranking Member, I mean the
00:38:11Chinese would complain that somehow this is a containment strategy. It absolutely
00:38:16is not. What we find is we are promoting our affirmative agenda, the things that
00:38:20we stand for. Peace and stability, international law, the fact that all
00:38:24countries, large and small, ought to follow and play by the same rules. Large
00:38:28countries shouldn't bully the weak. And what we find is that is a vision that is
00:38:32very popular in the region. Countries around the region, they don't like to be
00:38:37intimidated, they don't like to be bullied, they don't like to be coerced.
00:38:40And I hope that that makes clear perhaps why China has not succeeded in certain
00:38:45areas and where we believe we have. And furthermore, I'd say, Mr. Ranking Member,
00:38:49we always talk about the three pillars of our China strategy, invest, align,
00:38:53compete. I would argue probably the align piece with allies and partners is
00:38:56probably the most important and the most effective. I, for one, was surprised to
00:39:01see their treatment of Australia, for instance, and wondered how that
00:39:06could possibly be in their interest to offend a nation in their region as they
00:39:10did. Obviously a nation with which we have a close relationship, but a number
00:39:15of actions they've taken, including the way they've treated the people in Hong
00:39:18Kong, have obviously had an impact in in their neighborhood. One dimension of
00:39:23their strategy has to be economic with regards to Taiwan. What are they
00:39:27doing on the economic front? And is it alarming Taiwan? Are they building
00:39:32closer relations with Taiwan, particularly in the area of
00:39:35semiconductors or others? Are there, I mean, they've made a massive
00:39:38investment. We're talking about right now our CHIPS Act and what we're finally
00:39:41doing, but China's been basically has had a CHIPS Act in place for almost a
00:39:45decade, spending over $50 billion to establish a competitive semiconductor
00:39:51capacity, which has not yet yielded the result they'd looked for. What is China
00:39:56doing on the economic front to try and either grow ties with Taiwan or to
00:40:01isolate it economically? Well, more broadly, Mr. Ranking Member, I agree that
00:40:05they've stated explicitly through, you know, made-in-China strategies
00:40:11and other documents that they would like to dominate the key sectors,
00:40:15especially the high-tech sectors of the 21st century economy. So that I think
00:40:18that's their broader goal. When it comes to Taiwan, I think it's it's been a
00:40:23complex approach and somewhat of a mixed message. I think on the one hand, the
00:40:28economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland actually remain quite robust.
00:40:33But I think that, like many partners around the region, around the world, Taiwan
00:40:37has been working to diversify those economic relationships so that they're
00:40:43not as subject to the temptation of coercion, the risk of coercion and
00:40:48intimidation. But here too, I think China has used the coercive tool as well. They
00:40:55took some steps in the run-up to the election to curtail some of the economic
00:41:00and trade relationships. There were certain instances where it seemed they
00:41:03were picking sectors that they hoped would have the the most positive impact
00:41:09politically in Taiwan from their perspective. And they've also threatened
00:41:12to curtail some of the previous trade agreements with Taiwan. So I think it's
00:41:16it's a it's a mixed picture. It's it's partly engagement and it's partly
00:41:22threatening consequences for for not doing Beijing's bidding in certain areas.
00:41:29Thank you. I'm pleased we've been joined by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign
00:41:34Relations Committee and Senator Cardin.
00:41:38Chairman, thank you very much for convening this hearing. Thank you, Senator
00:41:44Romney, for participating in this. This is an important area, our relationship with
00:41:48Taiwan. I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, your comments about the importance of this
00:41:54supplemental appropriation bill. I'm curious as to whether you have any
00:41:59reaction from PRC in regards to the adoption of the of the supplemental as
00:42:06related to America's commitment to Taiwan. Well, Mr. Chairman, honored to see
00:42:12you. Thank you for having me here today and for joining us here today. Yes, Mr.
00:42:16Chairman, I think it's fair to say that the Chinese have noticed and they have
00:42:19complained. They have complained in general about our strategy and our
00:42:25approach to the Indo-Pacific, which they have termed a containment strategy of
00:42:31China, which I hope I've stated here. Categorically, it absolutely is not.
00:42:36They've also complained about elements of the supplemental as they relate to
00:42:40Taiwan. We have made clear that the supplemental is just how fundamental
00:42:47passage of the supplemental is. Uh, and we've made clear that it is consistent
00:42:51with our longstanding one China policy, and it will help us meet our
00:42:55commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan maintaining self
00:42:58defense. And we've also made clear the reason we're doing this is we're
00:43:02committed to maintaining that self defense capacity commensurate with the
00:43:05threat that Taiwan faces. And that threat, as we've said here today, is
00:43:09only increasing. So I understand that you are suggesting this is not
00:43:14necessarily the right time for us to legislate any changes in the officials
00:43:19relationship between Taiwan and the United States. But I think we all agree
00:43:24that PRC has misinterpreted the U. N. Resolution of 1971 to make it
00:43:31difficult for Taiwan to participate, particularly in multilateral
00:43:35organizations. We have an opportunity coming up later in May, later at the end
00:43:43of May, beginning of June, with the World Health Organization and its
00:43:46affiliates. And Taiwan's participation in membership is one of the agenda
00:43:51items. Is the United States prepared to support Taiwan's efforts to
00:43:57participate in multilateral organizations that there's no logical
00:44:02reason why they should not be permitted? And certainly the U. N. Resolution does
00:44:07not speak to that.
00:44:09Well, Mr Chairman, I agree with everything you've said. First of all,
00:44:11we do believe that China's misusing, um, UNGA Resolution 27 58. They try
00:44:17to somehow say, uh, that the U. N. Adopted China's so called one China
00:44:23principle, and our position is categorically 27 58 didn't constitute a
00:44:27U. N. Institutional position on the ultimate political status of Taiwan has
00:44:32no bearing on country's sovereign decisions about their relationships with
00:44:35Taiwan, and it doesn't preclude Taiwan's meaningful participation in
00:44:39UN bodies. So as you know, Mr Chairman, our position has always been we
00:44:42support Taiwan's participation in international bodies where statehood is
00:44:45not a requirement. We support their meaningful participation in those
00:44:50entities that do require statehood. Taiwan is a very capable health
00:44:54partner. They have been observers in the W. H. A. Before they deserve to
00:44:57be so again, you will see us speak out again very soon, as we have
00:45:01consistently every year in support of Taiwan's observership W. H. A. I think
00:45:06last year we had 22 countries supporting us. I expected that number
00:45:09will grow this year, but it's the same for their, um, meaningful participation
00:45:14in ICAO and Interpol again. From our perspective, Taiwan is a democracy. It
00:45:18is a force for good. It is a capable partner that has a lot to offer the
00:45:22international community. It seems to me the PRC's position is more punitive
00:45:26than it is even political right now, as it relates to Taiwan's participation.
00:45:31Uh, clearly, ah, health organization Taiwan could be a major contributor and
00:45:38certainly has a lot in common with the purpose of these organizations. There
00:45:43are not being full membership diminishes their ability to help the
00:45:48World Health Organization help all of us in regards to health issues,
00:45:52because, as we know, pandemics, no, no country border. So fully agree with
00:45:57you, Mr Chairman. Do we have a strategy for the June meeting for the May
00:46:00June meeting? Uh, the strategy is, Mr Chairman, I think you'll see in coming
00:46:05days, um, that we will again state categorically publicly our support for
00:46:11Taiwan's meaningful participation and observership at the W. H. A. Uh, and we
00:46:16will engage diplomatically around the world, uh, to get partner support for
00:46:21that effort. I also agree with your assessment that I think it's not a
00:46:24coincidence that essentially, since President Tsai Ing-wen's election, China
00:46:28has become more aggressive in opposing Taiwan's participation in the W. H. A.
00:46:33And elsewhere. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
00:46:39Um,
00:46:41I wanted to turn just to the concept of deterrence. We anticipate when we think
00:46:47about Taiwan that that one of the keys to keeping China from getting ambitious
00:46:53militarily is to have Taiwan able to defend itself and ourselves potentially
00:46:58in a strategic ambiguity sense to be unclear about what involvement we might
00:47:03have. But I would think that China's calculation about action of a hostile
00:47:10nature against Taiwan would encompass not just military might, but also the
00:47:15response diplomatically of nations around the world, but also economic
00:47:19impact. And I wonder if you could speak to the economic peril that would be
00:47:28visited upon the P. R. C. If they were to invade Taiwan, if there were to be
00:47:36conflict of some kind and destruction of some kind, what the what the impact
00:47:41would be on China itself?
00:47:44Well, Mr Rankin member, we're always reluctant to engage in detail on a
00:47:52hypothetical scenario, but I think I could say with confidence that if China
00:47:57were to take precipitous action against Taiwan, obviously that would be a deeply
00:48:04destabilizing, um, and unacceptable move on their part. And I think it's it's
00:48:12fair to say that I think many, many members of the international community
00:48:16obviously would would oppose that step. I'm reluctant to go into detail about
00:48:23again what may or may not happen in such a scenario. I would say two things.
00:48:27One, we're doing everything possible to, uh, hello, ma'am, everything possible
00:48:32to build our deterrent capacity in every way. Um, and I hope that, um,
00:48:41friends not just in Beijing but elsewhere around the world would see
00:48:44how the international community has stood up in the last few years against
00:48:49efforts to coerce, uh, other countries or to use violence, uh, to to achieve
00:48:56their their means. And obviously we would hope that that would provide a
00:49:00deterrent effect. I'm actually thinking about some of the more direct economic
00:49:06impact, for instance, uh, anticipating that that China relies on Taiwan, for
00:49:11instance, for semiconductor needs of various kinds, particularly the high
00:49:15end semiconductors. Um, and that that were there to be a conflict or across
00:49:22Taiwan straight, uh, challenge of some kind that this could have an enormous
00:49:27impact on China's own economy, not to mention our own. Uh, but but that the
00:49:31global impact of of disruption in Taiwan military disruption that China
00:49:37might be tempted to undertake could have the potential of throwing China
00:49:41itself into major economic distress as well as ourselves and others around the
00:49:47world. We are an interconnected world, like it or not, and nations are racing
00:49:52in some respects ourselves included to try and sever the ties, particularly
00:49:56when it relates to strategic and national security assets. But but we're
00:50:01far from that, uh, condition today here in the U. S. And I presume China is as
00:50:07well. Is that a fair assessment that that that, uh, conflict in in Taiwan
00:50:12would have a massive economic impact on China as well as potentially ourselves
00:50:18and others in the world? Mr. Ranking member, I think it's absolutely spot
00:50:22on. No one would win from such a scenario. There would be devastating
00:50:26impacts on the global economy that I think would impact all of us, including
00:50:31as you pointed out the PRC. I would just underscore, um, we do not see a
00:50:38conflict is being either imminent or inevitable, and we're doing everything
00:50:43possible, uh, using all the tools at our disposal to contribute to maintaining
00:50:49that peace and stability excuse me and maintaining deterrence so that Beijing
00:50:55is never tempted to take precipitous action. But I do fully agree with you.
00:50:58This would be a devastating event. And I just note that I it's hard to be
00:51:05prescient on things of this nature, but I concur with you that that it would
00:51:08not be in China's interest. And I think Xi Jinping is an intelligent person
00:51:12that that military action is not the right path for him to consider for a
00:51:17lot of reasons. But but one being the economic impact this would have on his
00:51:21own country on nations around the world on China's status geopolitically, it
00:51:29would also have to consider the sanctions that might apply that and
00:51:33that there are alternatives and they're pursuing the other alternatives very
00:51:36aggressively. I don't know what this is not the setting to talk about their
00:51:40military efforts for military invasion, but it does seem that they have a very
00:51:46comprehensive strategy with regards to Taiwan that they're pursuing and
00:51:49succeeding in some areas and not so well in some other areas. But that
00:51:53they're that they would have ambition to be able to achieve Xi Jinping's
00:51:58objective with regards to Taiwan without having to take military action.
00:52:01It's our hope they're not able to do that. But but like you, I don't think
00:52:06military action, uh, well, would be wise in any way. And I think Xi Jinping
00:52:12is smart enough to recognize that, at least at this stage. Mr. Chairman.
00:52:17Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, Assistant
00:52:22Secretary Krittenbrink. We're so glad to have you back here again. The PRC goes
00:52:27around the world claiming that the United States wants to be a hegemon. They
00:52:31frame us as a bully when it's clear that no matter where you look that the only
00:52:34party interested in changing that status quo in the Taiwan Strait is the CCP. I've
00:52:39consistently pushed back against that narrative by passing legislation fully
00:52:42in line with a longstanding policy towards Taiwan, like the Taiwan
00:52:46Partnership Act, which requires that the National Guard, our National Guard, to
00:52:50explore more cooperation with counterparts in Taiwan. In your view, are
00:52:55we doing enough to show the people, the policymakers, and the men and women in
00:52:58uniform in Taiwan of the extent of our support in the face of increasing PRC
00:53:03aggression? Senator, thank you. Nice to see you. I appreciate the question. I do
00:53:10agree with you, first of all. As I noted at the outset, we have not changed our
00:53:16one China policy. We will not do so. We stand for the maintenance of peace and
00:53:20stability in the status quo. And I think, as we've talked about here today, many of
00:53:25the steps that China is taking, unfortunately, are undermining that
00:53:28status quo, designed to intimidate and threaten and coerce Taiwan. I'm confident
00:53:34through the range of interactions with Taiwan counterparts that they
00:53:43understand the strength of our commitment to meeting our obligations
00:53:48under the Taiwan Relations Act, to assist them in maintaining a self-defense
00:53:51capability that is sufficient, and also building out our
00:53:59and robust relationship in terms of
00:54:06the security of Taiwan and the like. And certainly, we're supportive of the defense reforms, the whole-of-society
00:54:15defense initiatives that Taiwan authorities have carried out as well. So
00:54:20yes, I can say with confidence that I think our unofficial partnership with
00:54:28Taiwan is stronger than it's ever been. I understand many people in Taiwan have
00:54:34heard of the administration's push to invest in domestic semiconductor
00:54:38manufacturing capability here in the United States, and I'm hearing that some
00:54:44people in Taiwan fear that enhanced U.S. capacity from this initiative will
00:54:48lessen the importance of Taiwan's own domestic industry. I'd like to ask you to
00:54:53speak to that. First, is there any way that the United States' investments in
00:54:58our own semiconductor manufacturing somehow weakens the silicon shield for
00:55:03Taiwan? And second, are we doing a good enough job of explaining to our allies
00:55:07and partners, especially Taiwan, that the building up of our own manufacturing
00:55:13semiconductor manufacturing is not a zero-sum equation with the silicon
00:55:19shield in Taiwan? Senator, what I would say is this. We've demonstrated for 45
00:55:28years that we stand for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and
00:55:34we're committed to doing so, and we view that as fundamentally being in our
00:55:37national interest, and that we will act accordingly to maintain that stability
00:55:42and deter the risk of precipitous PRC action. I would argue quite vociferously
00:55:49that that is not going to change, and that is not going to change despite the
00:55:52developments that we've seen in the semiconductor industry. I think our
00:55:55interests in peace and stability extend far beyond just our economic ties
00:56:02or the importance of the semiconductor industry. And secondly, on your
00:56:09additional question, I'm confident through our really robust engagement, not
00:56:15just with friends in Taiwan, but with like-minded partners around the world, I
00:56:21think they are increasingly clear about why Taiwan matters, about why
00:56:28peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait matters, and why it's in
00:56:32everyone's interest to ensure that there's no action to upset that. Thank
00:56:36you. You know, the China challenge is enormously complicated. It
00:56:41requires nuance, it requires all the expertise and excellence in study,
00:56:45strategy, and skill that the United States can produce. I'm confident that we
00:56:50have more than enough resources and more than enough talent, human resource talent,
00:56:54to meet this challenge, and yet the current travel warning on state.gov
00:56:58warns Americans to reconsider travel to the PRC for good reason, out of concern
00:57:02for potential harassment, kidnapping, and worse by the authorities there.
00:57:06Meanwhile, we still need Americans with experience in the region, Americans who
00:57:11speak fluent Mandarin and have a deep knowledge of Chinese cultures, and I
00:57:14believe that Taiwan is an obvious partner in achieving that. So I want to
00:57:19invite you to speak to the U.S.-Taiwan education partnership. Is the progress
00:57:23we've been making there really making a difference? Is it enough? And what more
00:57:26can Congress be doing to support American scholars, who the Secretary
00:57:29calls the ballast for a competitive and confrontational relationship?
00:57:36Well, Senator, a couple of comments. We certainly are strongly supportive of
00:57:43building our people-to-people ties across the region, certainly with with
00:57:47the people of Taiwan. I think you've seen a pretty dramatic
00:57:51through this for contribution to training in Mandarin, and we'd like to
00:58:00see that continue. I think it's vitally important. We've supported the expansion
00:58:05of that training, and we hope it continues. And again, support and
00:58:11leadership on those. And maybe to add one more comment to your previous question
00:58:16as well. We definitely don't see our support for building our own capacity,
00:58:26investing in our own capacities here domestically as being a zero-sum game.
00:58:30I think you look at our economic integration with Taiwan, you look at
00:58:35TSMC's $65 billion investment as well. We're
00:58:43a partner. You know, we talked about trying to build Taiwan's resilience in
00:58:52every way, and I think building our people-to-people ties is a key part of
00:58:56that. It's a two-way street. We benefit, for example, from the language training
00:59:01that many friends of Taiwan have offered and many Americans have studied in
00:59:05Taiwan. But I would like to think that Taiwan friends have benefited well,
00:59:10including the United States.
00:59:13Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:59:15Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Assistant Secretary Creighton Brink, I don't know
00:59:21if this came up. I assume it did during your recent visit with Secretary
00:59:25Blinken to China. But obviously, we've expressed concerns about China's
00:59:31supporting Vladimir Putin and Russia in their war against Ukraine. We've been
00:59:36quite clear that we would strongly oppose any direct military support, and
00:59:43we've indicated that that would draw a response, including economic sanctions.
00:59:50There are some of us who believe that in order to make that deterrent more
00:59:57real, we should be working with our allies in advance to spell out more
01:00:02clearly what those consequences would be. We're focused on Taiwan now, and
01:00:06I agree with you and all your statements you made about the Taiwan
01:00:11Relations Act being a critical part of our approach.
01:00:17But I think that there's a lot of these issues that we need to address, and I'm
01:00:24not sure if that's what you were talking about.
01:00:25I think that the answer in part is that we have to be clear about what the
01:00:31economic consequences of the sanctions should be, and that's why I think it's
01:00:36important that we should advance what the economic consequences of the sanctions
01:00:41should be about certain actions against Taiwan. Obviously, if there were an all-out
01:00:52reaction, I agree with Senator Romney, the economic consequences would be
01:00:57terrible for all. But is it worth trying to spell out in advance the United
01:01:04States with some of our key economic partners, both the EU, Japan, South Korea?
01:01:13What would trigger a situation in which the conduct of the sanctions would be more
01:01:22long-term and more deterrent? In other words, a framework that has a long-term
01:01:30impact and teaches us that we have to be clear about what the economic consequences
01:01:36of the sanctions should be.
01:01:46It's probably the clear point that even in the very beginning, it points out that
01:01:50the United States would view any attempt, both through that
01:02:06clear state or state counterparts in all of our countries, and they know they have
01:02:15to be clear about what the economic consequences should be. I think I would say we are
01:02:32normally reluctant to indicate in advance, particularly for a scenario that is not
01:02:39upon us but that is still hypothetical, we're normally reluctant to engage in too
01:02:46specific communications or signaling about what we may or may not do and is in all of
01:02:52these matters of such great consequence and would not want to constrain the decision
01:02:58space.
01:03:00I'm
01:03:08concerned
01:03:11and interested
01:03:12in maintaining peace.
01:03:15I don't want to try to create an economic problem. We've encountered the same sort of questions
01:03:20and concerns, but it's I think a topic of
01:03:29continuing a strategy that goes beyond words. I was pleased to see the G7 statement, I think
01:03:44it was last year.
01:03:57A member of the EU was to be threatened again by China's economic coercion.
01:04:15We talked about Australia. New Zealand has been pressured. Lithuania, I was in South
01:04:34Korea years ago and they were deploying the THAAD defense system and China took a lot
01:04:43of measures to make it, to create pain on South Korea's economy. A lot of these countries
01:04:49understandably, they're in the region, they have very strong economic ties with China.
01:04:54We have strong economic ties with China. How do you create a mechanism that says to China,
01:05:01if you engage in economic coercion against one of these partners, we're really going
01:05:05to be there to help address whatever hit their economy takes. That does require planning
01:05:14and a clear mechanism where we will all come to the assistance of a country that's picked
01:05:22on by China.
01:05:26Mr. Chairman, I fully agree. My colleague, Jose Fernandez, the Undersecretary for Economic
01:05:34Affairs at State, he and his team have really been in the lead for us at the State Department
01:05:39in developing our counter-economic coercion toolkit. I think, forced by the examples as
01:05:47the ranking member of Australia, Lithuania and others, I think we've worked under duress
01:05:54and at great speed in an urgent situation to come up with various tools. Since learning
01:05:59the lesson of that experience, we've both expanded our toolkit that allows us, together
01:06:04with other partners and other international institutions, to respond to these instances
01:06:09of economic coercion, again, in collaboration with other like-minded parties. We've also,
01:06:16I think, increased our capacity to analyze our own vulnerabilities and partners' vulnerabilities
01:06:23to such coercion. I think we've found, through such engagements, we can assist partners to
01:06:30assess their own vulnerabilities and then take steps to address those vulnerabilities.
01:06:36We've also, through development of this toolkit, I think, developed some measures we can deploy
01:06:42on short notice. I think it's absolutely important, and I think it's important to deterrence as
01:06:46well.
01:06:48Very good. Senator Romney.
01:06:52We're often confused.
01:06:58I appreciate the fact that you've given me a heads-up on this already today, privately,
01:07:03that we're going to make progress on the demonstration of the U.S. strategy vis-à-vis
01:07:10China. And again, its intent is to not confront but to help China be dissuaded from a dangerous
01:07:20course and instead be a competitor on the global stage, not an enemy. But as you know,
01:07:27the former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and myself developed legislation,
01:07:37had it passed, that calls upon the State Department to provide to Congress an outline
01:07:43of our China strategy. And some of that would be for Congress as a whole and in public.
01:07:49Some would probably be classified. You've indicated we're about to get that. Is that right?
01:07:54Yes, Senator. I was informed that, again, consistent with Section 6511 of the FY22 NDAA,
01:08:04the administration has made available for in-camera review the administration's China
01:08:09strategy. My understanding is we're in touch with your team to arrange an opportunity for
01:08:16you to review the strategy at your convenience. We're grateful for your leadership and support
01:08:22on this issue and, I think, as an entire whole of government, we look forward to continuing
01:08:28to partner with you on our strategy vis-à-vis the PRC.
01:08:32I would note that the law that was passed called for this to be presented to Congress,
01:08:37some in public and then some classified, as opposed to just an in-camera review. So I
01:08:44would expect that the State Department would follow the law as opposed to a different course.
01:08:52Separately, it is the impression of a number of people – and I don't know if it's
01:08:57accurate or not, but I mean this in your sense – that if you go around Africa, everywhere
01:09:01you turn, there's China. If you go around Latin America, there's China. If you go
01:09:06even in the Caribbean, there's China, that they're everywhere. Part of that is Belt
01:09:12and Road. Part of it has been to secure the raw materials for the economy of the future.
01:09:19And they seem to have done that as we've been asleep at the switch. Is that a fair
01:09:23assessment, that they really are in prominent positions? And I know through loans – and
01:09:29we take great pride in saying some people are unhappy that there are loans, but nonetheless
01:09:34China has – I mean, when you get a loan from the bank, you nonetheless have a relationship
01:09:38with the banker. When they're getting a loan from China, they have a relationship
01:09:41with China. Have they made inroads in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean? And are
01:09:47we woefully behind in those areas?
01:09:51Well, the first part of your statement, does China have a global presence in many of these
01:09:56regions? Absolutely, especially economically. Are we woefully behind? No, I would absolutely
01:10:02say we are not. I would say, Mr. Ranking Member, again, our approach, whether it's in the
01:10:08Indo-Pacific or Africa or Latin America or elsewhere, we're focused first and foremost
01:10:12on what we stand for, our affirmative strategy in each of these regions. We always tell our
01:10:19partners we're not asking them to choose between the United States and China, and partners
01:10:23tell us they don't want to choose. But what they do want is they want to make sure they
01:10:28can make their own decisions free from coercion, they can protect their sovereignty, they can
01:10:32have the final say over matters that are important to their security and prosperity, and that's
01:10:40what we stand for. So I remain confident in our standing in these regions and what we
01:10:45offer. We do have to offer something, and partners around the world oftentimes say that
01:10:51that's what they most look for from the United States and from others is an offer. But again,
01:10:59our fundamental focus is on what we stand for. Now, there are instances, as we've talked
01:11:06about here today, Mr. Ranking Member, where there are some downsides to interaction with
01:11:13the PRC in many cases, and we try to be clear with countries to be careful to ensure that
01:11:18they're not making themselves vulnerable to coercion. We also try to make sure that partners
01:11:23understand what they're getting into regarding a project. What's the long-term potential
01:11:29implication for a country's sovereignty of engaging in one of these projects, especially
01:11:34if it involves a huge debt burden? What are the labor or the environmental or other implications
01:11:39of some of these projects? That's what we try to stand for, and then we try to stand
01:11:42by what we and our partners offer. So I'm confident in that. But does China have a presence
01:11:49in many regions around the world? Absolutely.
01:11:51I would say, based on my own limited travels, but also in sounding the opinion of diplomats
01:11:58here and others, that China has established a much stronger presence in those nations
01:12:04than they had just a few years ago, and in many cases eclipsing our own. I would note
01:12:09that we spend billions of dollars, if you will, helping people with charitable endeavors,
01:12:15development opportunities, showing them what we stand for. China tends to do what's in
01:12:20their self-interest, and establishing mines and rail lines and ports that will strengthen
01:12:26their economy, strengthen their position on the global stage. I think we need to go from
01:12:32just doing things that are humanitarian and showing what we stand for to instead doing
01:12:37things that are actually in our best interest and promote our national security and the
01:12:43strength of our own economy, and that we're pretending like we're in a world where we
01:12:48don't have a competitor, and we do. With that, Mr. Chairman, I'll turn back to you, sir.
01:12:54Mr. Rehnquist, could I make just one comment on that? I mean, I'm most familiar with the
01:12:58East Asia-Pacific region, obviously, for which my team and I are responsible, but I would
01:13:03say with the support and leadership of Congress, we've been given the tools, I think, to compete
01:13:08in the ways that you're talking about. And certainly in Asia, partners say all the time,
01:13:12we don't want to choose. We have important trading relationships with China, like most
01:13:17of us do. But every country in the region that I talk to says they don't want to be
01:13:21pushed around, they don't want to be coerced, they want to have options, they want to have
01:13:24balance in their approach. And I think our being able to make an offer, hopefully a better
01:13:30offer, to partners is really the key. And I think especially in the economic side and
01:13:37the infrastructure side, that's where I think the Development Finance Corporation, the tools,
01:13:42the authorities, the finances that Congress has provided have been really transformational.
01:13:47Increased support for our economic assistance programs across the region, in addition to
01:13:52all the other tools that we bring on the security front, the people-to-people front, health
01:13:56development and the like. But I do agree with you, I certainly feel like in the Indo-Pacific,
01:14:00we've been quite successful, I think partners have noticed.
01:14:03And I'm thinking about the Development Finance Corp, and I know it's designed to deal with
01:14:08the development needs of poor countries and other countries that have humanitarian crises
01:14:13and so forth, but I would note China invests in things that are going to help China down
01:14:18the road. They try and do good in many respects, but more importantly, they try and do what's
01:14:22in China's interest and would suggest that we do the same with the DFC. Thank you.
01:14:27Senator Merkley.
01:14:29Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Assistant Secretary. I'm pleased to have you here.
01:14:35Senator Rubio and I have conspired together on a number of pieces of legislation related
01:14:40to Taiwan to increase our connections to Taiwan and try to create a path for Taiwan to be
01:14:46able to participate in more international organizations.
01:14:50But the question I wanted to start with is over the issue of transnational repression.
01:14:56We have seen China be much more active internationally in terms of how they try to silence dissidents
01:15:06who are abroad, the diaspora who are abroad, not just Chinese citizens, but also other
01:15:13critics of China, and of course they would view folks from Taiwan and Hong Kong to be
01:15:19citizens. And so can you give us a sense of how much of these repressive tactics, things
01:15:31like going up to a person who has been protesting China's policy and whatever, and saying,
01:15:38we know who you are and we know your family back in China, or things of that nature, different
01:15:42strategies of essentially pressure or blackmail, threatening family members who are back in
01:15:50China at times. How much of that occurs against Taiwanese citizens who are in the U.S. and
01:15:58how much occurs for Taiwanese in Taiwan?
01:16:04Senator, it's nice to see you again. Thank you for your important question. I would say
01:16:07first, on the issue of transnational repression at large, we're deeply concerned by the various
01:16:13actions that we've seen China carry out around the world and even on the ground here in the
01:16:17United States. I think you saw last year there were instances where we discovered that China
01:16:22was operating these so-called overseas police stations, these supposedly informal bodies
01:16:28that clearly had official direction. And as you've seen, we've taken aggressive law enforcement
01:16:33action against those entities, and you've seen over the last several years taken aggressive
01:16:38law enforcement action, including the arrest and imprisonment of certain Chinese nationals
01:16:43who were here carrying out such activities. I'm less clear, candidly speaking, whether
01:16:53residents of Taiwan or Taiwan friends resident in the United States have been subject to
01:16:58such intimidation or whether we've seen such activities in Taiwan. I'm not as familiar.
01:17:05What I can say, what's been most concerning to us I think inside Taiwan has been the use
01:17:12of misinformation and disinformation to influence the domestic media market and debate
01:17:21within Taiwan. But I'm happy to take that back and ask that further. I'm not as familiar
01:17:27given the cases that I've worked on, but I will take that back. But certainly China
01:17:32has a strategy to intimidate and coerce Taiwan.
01:17:36I know of some incidents that occurred in which they harassed and pressured folks in
01:17:43Taiwan, Taiwanese in Taiwan, who were outspoken over Hong Kong democracy. And I imagine that's
01:17:49just the tip of the iceberg, but I'd be interested in what else we know. Is there any sort of
01:17:55dialogue between U.S. and the Taiwanese government in regard to how to try to counter either
01:18:02that form of TNR, transnational repression, or economic retaliation?
01:18:15Certainly we have a robust set of dialogues with Taiwan counterparts on a range of issues.
01:18:20On the economic side, we have the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, again led
01:18:24by the Economic Bureau and the State Department that's focused primarily on economic resilience,
01:18:30resilient supply chains countering economic coercion. I would say perhaps the closest
01:18:36thing that I'm aware of and involved in, I was recently involved in the fourth high-level
01:18:43dialogue in promoting people-to-people and educational ties between the United States
01:18:47and Taiwan, and we devoted a significant amount of time for how you counter disinformation
01:18:53and misinformation, and I thought that was quite valuable. But again, on the issue of
01:18:59transnational repression, less clear, but I'm happy to take that back.
01:19:03Well, I'll close with this question, which is, a few of us have been very involved in
01:19:09the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
01:19:12Yes, sir.
01:19:13And there's been a fairly robust response for the United States intercepting shipments
01:19:19and saying, sorry, these don't qualify, these can't come here. We're hoping for more cooperation
01:19:24from Europe and Canada and Mexico in that regard. But I have wondered whether we are
01:19:32seeing companies in China where it's very hard for them to certify in any method that
01:19:41has integrity whether or not Uyghur forced labor is involved. We're seeing some of those
01:19:47companies move their operations to Taiwan. We know that many companies are looking at
01:19:53other locations, Vietnam and so forth. Are we seeing a significant amount of flow of
01:19:59factories from China to Taiwan?
01:20:04Factories from China to Taiwan that are still engaged in forced labor?
01:20:09No.
01:20:10Because of our Forced Labor Prevention Act, yeah.
01:20:14Because the challenge is that the surveys that are done to certify that you have no
01:20:19forced labor, the problem is the people who answer the surveys are oppressed. And so we
01:20:25just had a hearing today in the Congressional Executive Commission on China about how difficult,
01:20:31near impossible it is to operate in Uyghur territory and get any sort of honest clarification,
01:20:39reliable clarification, whether forced labor is involved. So it's almost a given that if
01:20:44you're going to counter forced labor, you have to move out of Uyghur-controlled territories.
01:20:47But then also teams of Uyghur workers are also brought to other locations in China.
01:20:54It's one of the factors that U.S. companies have been looking at as they're starting to
01:20:58see the risks of operating in China, in addition to other risks such as, for example, the theft
01:21:03of intellectual property and partnerships that are turned into a way to steal control
01:21:08of a company, that is encouraging companies to move operations elsewhere. And I'm wondering
01:21:13to what degree those operations are being moved to Taiwan.
01:21:20A couple of comments, Senator. We've certainly seen movement and shifts in supply chains
01:21:29out of China around the region. Certainly when I was in Vietnam, you saw that phenomenon
01:21:34really accelerate. I think in which many countries, many companies as well, were looking to diversify
01:21:39their supply chains for, I think, pretty clear reasons. Again, less clear how much of that
01:21:44has happened from China to Taiwan. I'm happy to take that back.
01:21:48I would also say, though, on the issues related to the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang or the
01:21:54issues of forced labor in Xinjiang and other Uyghur areas in China, certainly something
01:22:03we focus on very intently. We've worked to hold accountable Chinese officials involved
01:22:10in such acts. We've taken action against a total of 80 Chinese individuals and entities.
01:22:16We've certainly worked with Commerce and Customs and others on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention
01:22:23Act as well. So it's a deeply disturbing phenomenon. We take it very seriously. But
01:22:29I'll have to take back, Senator, and come back to you on how that might relate to the
01:22:34relocation of companies to Taiwan.
01:22:36Thank you.
01:22:37Thank you.
01:22:38Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
01:22:39Well, thank you, Senator Merkley, and thank you and Senator Rubio for your work on the
01:22:43Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and for raising it here today.
01:22:48So, Mr. Secretary, I just have a couple questions in closing. Senator Cardin raised the issue
01:22:56of the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which they used to claim establishes the PRC's
01:23:06One China principle as a matter of international law. You responded to that. Senator Romney
01:23:11I have introduced a legislation. It's a Bill S-2995 entitled the Taiwan International Solidarity
01:23:20Act, which would essentially make clear the U.S. position on this. I don't know if you
01:23:27and the administration have had a chance to review it, but if you have, I'd be interested
01:23:32in your support. If you haven't, we would ask you to take a look at it.
01:23:39Mr. Chairman, I've not taken a look at it. I'll be honored to do so. Tried to be very
01:23:44clear here that we are deeply concerned about China's misuse of 2758 on a regular basis.
01:23:50We think it's in our national interest to clarify that for friends around the world.
01:23:54I appreciate that. And the legislation is essentially a statement along those lines,
01:23:59but I appreciate your taking a look at it. The other effort I mentioned in my opening
01:24:04remarks that we've been working on on Capitol Hill is a tax agreement to prevent double
01:24:10taxation between U.S. businesses and businesses in Taiwan as part of strengthening our commercial
01:24:17relationships. Is the administration in support of that effort?
01:24:22Yes, we are. We think that the double taxation that both American and Taiwan companies have
01:24:29come under, we think hinders our natural and very important trading relationship, and
01:24:35we are supportive of efforts to resolve that.
01:24:38Great. I just wanted to get that on the record. I appreciate it. And let me close. Senator
01:24:42Romney, I apologize he had to leave a little bit earlier, but we both really thank you
01:24:47and your team for your service. Thank you for your testimony here today, but really
01:24:53for your long service to our country and for putting your expertise and knowledge
01:24:59to work at this moment with respect to our relationships with countries in East Asia
01:25:05and the Pacific, and specifically related to today's hearing, reinforcing as you have
01:25:13the importance of the fundamentals of the Taiwan Relations Act, making it clear what
01:25:18our position is, which is preserving the status quo, not trying to upset the status
01:25:26quo, but making clear we will use all the tools at our disposal to ensure that Taiwan
01:25:32has the ability to defend itself, and that we look forward to continuing strong relations
01:25:40between the people of the United States and the people in Taiwan.
01:25:45So, thank you, and thank your team. I want to say that for the information of our fellow
01:25:52members, the record will be open until close of business Wednesday, May 1st. This hearing
01:25:59is now adjourned.
01:26:00Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
01:26:01Thank you.

Recommended