- 2 days ago
Category
📺
TVTranscript
00:00.
00:07Down below is one of the most radioactive places on Earth.
00:13A site so secret that it has never appeared on any map.
00:23Even now it is a tightly restricted area under the direct control of a Red Army General.
00:30For 40 years, this empty land was codenamed Semi-Palatinsk-21.
00:36It was the main test site in the Soviet nuclear program.
00:40The lake down there marks the spot of their first atom bomb.
00:44It is the bleak epicenter of an extraordinary story.
00:48Of how the Soviet bomb was built, with secrets stolen from the West.
01:00To the Pacific area, there were many NPR persons in a world that was found.
01:04The
01:14United States of America has been the NPR Society of FPS.
01:16When it was Oasis-Palatinsk-21, the U-S-Palatinsk-00.
01:19This tattered manuscript tells many of the secrets of Russia's bomb.
01:40It is an unpublished account of a hidden world,
01:43written by a scientist at its very heart.
01:45In it are revealed for the first time the names and faces of people the public never saw.
01:53The scientists and military men who built the Russian bomb.
01:59We have traced many of the key figures
02:02and uncovered the part they played in the most closely guarded operation of the Cold War.
02:08Men like Yuli Hariton, a reclusive figure who for 50 years
02:13was in charge of constructing the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal.
02:18Today he's an old man of 90,
02:21still living incognito and behind barbed wire
02:24in the remote and secret city which he himself founded 50 years ago.
02:30Or Yakov Terletsky, the KGB mathematician
02:33who was sent secretly to meet a top Western scientist
02:36who wanted the Soviet Union to know what the West already knew.
02:41Or Anatoly Yatskov, who ran the Soviet spy network in New York
02:45which smuggled a blueprint of America's first bomb
02:48back to the KGB's headquarters in Moscow.
02:53And this is the end product of the story they have to tell.
02:58Both sides armed to this day with weapons
03:00which in a few minutes could kill more people
03:03than all the wars in history put together.
03:19It all started in a quite different key.
03:22The medieval university city of Cambridge, England
03:30was where man first split the atom.
03:38In 1919, a scientist called Ernest Rutherford
03:41started the process that led inexorably to the age of the bomb.
03:46The 1920s were a fantastically exciting time in physics
03:51throughout Europe
03:52because you had the development of a new physics
03:56dealing with subatomic matter.
03:59It's very much an international community,
04:01quite a small community.
04:03What drove them was the sheer intellectual excitement
04:06of the discoveries that were being made.
04:11Some of those involved, like Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein,
04:15were already big names in contemporary science.
04:18But beneath them, a whole new generation
04:21of brilliant young physicists was emerging.
04:25There was a sort of feeling of community among scientists.
04:29They formed almost like one family from all over the world.
04:33And all the science is open in those days.
04:36So everybody knew what other people are doing.
04:38So in this sense, scientists formed at that stage,
04:42this family, they're almost citizens of the world, if you like.
04:47No boundaries.
04:50Two people who visited Cambridge in the 20s
04:52were to play crucial roles on opposite sides
04:55in the race to build a bomb.
04:57One of them was a brilliant 26-year-old American physicist
05:03called Robert Oppenheimer,
05:04who arrived in the summer of 1926
05:06and who would later become famous
05:08as the man who led the American atomic bomb project.
05:13The man who became his bomb-building opponent
05:16is still virtually unknown.
05:19Yuli Hariton.
05:20But he's an explosives designer
05:23so important to the Soviet Union
05:24that he still commands his own private carriage
05:27when he travels on Russian railways.
05:29It was a gift from Joseph Stalin.
05:32He is a hero of socialist labor three times over,
05:36the unsung scientist who built the red bomb.
05:44Communism was fashionable among students at Cambridge
05:47in those days, and Hariton spent two carefree years there,
05:51openly sponsored by the Bolshevik government in Moscow.
05:55For Hariton and the rest of them,
05:57physics was a matter of detached inquiry,
06:00not of engineering that could destroy mankind.
06:05They used to meet at conferences
06:07and their main concern was about science itself.
06:11And the idea that science,
06:13how it affects society, the overall community,
06:16entered very little.
06:16One might put it briefly,
06:19one and many of them lived in an ivory tower.
06:22And they felt that because they're only investigating nature,
06:25and nature has no connections with human feelings,
06:30therefore scientists should not be concerned
06:32with the way how science affects society as a whole.
06:37Rutherford's lecture hall
06:39was a central room in their ivory tower.
06:42Few seemed to realize the dangerous potential
06:44of the work they were doing.
06:45Rutherford himself did not believe
06:50that we should be able to use,
06:53to utilize the energy contained in the nucleus.
06:55He thought it would be impossible.
06:58In fact, at one of the meetings in Cambridge,
07:01he said, anybody who speaks about
07:03the utilization of nuclear energy
07:05is talking moonshine.
07:06Hariton was a romantic and friendly young man.
07:11But his carefree days were almost over.
07:21When the time came to go home,
07:23Hariton decided to break his journey in Germany.
07:26There he found a different atmosphere,
07:31particularly for Jews like himself.
07:39I bought newspapers at the kiosks and read them.
07:45And I discovered all sorts of fascist leaflets,
07:49which I found thoroughly unpleasant.
07:51For the time being, fascism was still weak.
07:56But if it started to flourish,
07:59then that could cause serious unpleasantness
08:01for the Soviet Union.
08:07Soon, his worst fears were realized.
08:14Hitler came to power in Germany,
08:16pledged to drive out communists and Jews.
08:21Some of those who fled the Nazis
08:23were among Europe's brightest scientists.
08:26Some, like Einstein and Teller, went to America.
08:29Others, like Rudolf Piles, fled to England.
08:33So I found myself in Cambridge
08:35when Hitler came into power and stayed there.
08:40We didn't exactly predict what was coming,
08:43but we knew it was not good.
08:47In 1938, Hitler's army swarmed into Czechoslovakia.
08:51The period of international cooperation in science had ended.
08:56But not all Hitler scientists had fled,
08:58and those that remained were about to make a breakthrough
09:01that would change the world.
09:04What they discovered was that if you split the uranium atom,
09:08you released enormous explosive power.
09:10The news spread like wildfire through the scientific world.
09:14In Russia, Yuli Hariton read with fascination
09:21what the Germans had done.
09:25It was obvious to people like us,
09:28who'd been working with explosives for years,
09:31that something terrible like an atomic explosion
09:34could not be discounted.
09:36But Hariton found that no one in authority
09:42was interested in nuclear theory.
09:45He was told to stick to work on conventional armaments.
09:53But in Cambridge, refugees like Rudolf Piles
09:56immediately saw the military implications.
09:59When we decided that an atom bomb was possible
10:03and not excessive in size,
10:07we immediately thought that the Germans
10:10might have realized the same thing
10:12and might be ahead of us.
10:15And an atom bomb in the hands of Hitler
10:17would have been frightening.
10:20In America, too, the scientists were worried.
10:23But no one else seemed to take it seriously.
10:25In April 1939, the New York Times ran this report
10:30on a meeting of distinguished physicists.
10:33Tempers and temperatures increase visibly today
10:36among members of the American Physical Society
10:38as they closed their spring meeting
10:39with arguments over the probability of some scientists
10:42blowing up a sizable portion of the Earth
10:44with a tiny amount of uranium.
10:48It was left to a scientist still working in Germany
10:51to spell out the threat.
10:53He smuggled a message to old friends
10:55who had fled to America.
10:57We got a message
11:01through a refugee physicist
11:05that...
11:08which said, essentially,
11:12we know how to make nuclear explosions.
11:17Hurry up!
11:17But time was already running out.
11:31In September 1939, the Second World War began.
11:36This posed to the scientists a great dilemma,
11:39I suppose, the greatest dilemma
11:40that they ever had to face.
11:42The job of a scientist is to try to do something
11:47which will help humanity.
11:49And therefore, to try to make an atom bomb,
11:51a weapon mass destruction,
11:52was completely abhorrent.
11:54But people began to realize
11:56that if Hitler goes ahead,
12:00if he acquires the bomb,
12:01this will help him to win the war.
12:03In which case,
12:05all the humanitarian principles
12:06of which we stand
12:07would have been abolished.
12:09So it was a race to build a bomb,
12:13and a race in which the winner
12:15would take all.
12:30The early days of the war
12:31saw a deceptive peace
12:33in the Soviet Union.
12:34But it was a highly dangerous, volatile time,
12:38in which this man
12:39was to play a crucial role.
12:47Lavrenti Beria
12:48was the ruthless head of the NKVD,
12:50the secret organization
12:51which later became the KGB.
12:54He was the man in charge of Stalin's purges
12:56when millions had been killed
12:58or sent to the Gulag.
12:59Now, after Stalin,
13:04he was the most feared man
13:05in the Soviet Union.
13:09Beria had huge authority.
13:12His word was law,
13:13and people lived in fear.
13:15They used to say,
13:16who's going to be next
13:17against the wall?
13:18They lived in fear
13:19whatever they did.
13:24Vladimir Barkovsky
13:25was then one of Beria's young agents.
13:27He was sent by sea
13:29from a Russia at peace
13:30to an England at war.
13:32His first night was a shock.
13:39That evening,
13:40we came down to supper,
13:42and an air raid began on Liverpool.
13:45That's where we had docked.
13:47I can't say it was a pleasant feeling.
13:49To be honest,
13:50I got a bit panicky.
13:53After so many years
13:54of peaceful life,
13:56it was pretty frightening.
14:00His first job
14:01was to report to a man named Gorsky,
14:03who ran the intelligence operation
14:04in the Soviet embassy in London.
14:07Gorsky had just received
14:08some secret British government papers
14:10about atomic research.
14:13When I was going through
14:16that material for my report to Moscow,
14:18I didn't know who it had come from,
14:20because the boss, Gorsky,
14:22didn't tell me.
14:23He just said,
14:24here, take this
14:25and prepare a report
14:26for Moscow's center.
14:30What Barkovsky didn't realize
14:32was that a few miles away,
14:33the British war cabinet
14:35was discussing
14:35that very same material.
14:37The Soviets had acquired
14:40a copy of the Maud report,
14:41a top-secret summary
14:43of Britain's plans
14:43to build an atom bomb
14:45and of parallel steps
14:46just starting in America.
14:48It was an espionage coup,
14:50but Moscow ignored it.
14:51Beria was very suspicious
14:57of the material.
15:00It's the Germans
15:02trying to divert our attention
15:04and our resources
15:05from proper military purposes,
15:07he said.
15:08So no one acted
15:10on the information.
15:12It just lay around unused.
15:14It was not realized.
15:16It stopped.
15:19In fact,
15:20the papers had come
15:21from one of Beria's
15:21top spies in Britain.
15:23But in those days,
15:24none of his agents
15:25knew enough
15:26about atomic physics
15:27to assess them.
15:28What they needed
15:29was a specialist,
15:30and that was what
15:31they were about to get.
15:34Klaus Fuchs
15:34was a German scientist
15:35who'd fled from Germany
15:37because he was a communist
15:38rather than a Jew.
15:40But because of his brilliance
15:41and his opposition
15:42to the Nazis,
15:43he was soon co-opted
15:44into Britain's
15:45atomic bomb program.
15:46There he came into contact
15:48with fellow refugee
15:49Rudolf Piles.
15:50Fuchs was,
15:51well, I had not known him
15:53in Germany.
15:54I met him in this country
15:56and I knew
15:58that he was a good physicist.
16:01It tended to be
16:02rather silent,
16:03but when you talk to him
16:05and ask questions,
16:06we would discuss things.
16:10Many years later,
16:12Fuchs broke his silence
16:13to give a rare interview.
16:15In it, he described
16:16his early work
16:17on the bomb.
16:21To begin with,
16:22I was in Birmingham
16:24with Piles.
16:26We were working
16:27on initial assessments
16:28of how big
16:29the bomb would be.
16:31But we soon focused
16:32on the problem
16:33of separating isotopes.
16:35You see,
16:36the uranium-235
16:37had to be separated
16:39from the uranium-238.
16:42That was one of the roads
16:44to the atom bomb.
16:52At the same time,
16:54Fuchs made contact
16:55with a communist agent
16:56living in Oxford.
16:57Nicknamed Red Sonja,
17:00her real name
17:01was Ruth Werner
17:02and she would bicycle
17:03to meet Fuchs
17:04in the countryside.
17:07I picked out
17:08the crossroads
17:09where we would meet
17:10and I loved to bike
17:12and thought
17:12of the least suspicious.
17:14We had a culture
17:16to talk
17:16and a political talk
17:18as comrades have.
17:19And we both
17:21enjoyed it greatly.
17:22He was
17:23very sensitive,
17:25intelligent.
17:27He looked very kind.
17:30He carried
17:31a big blue book
17:33and I opened
17:35the book at home
17:36and it was to me
17:39like Egyptian writing.
17:41I mean,
17:42there were so many
17:42chemical or physical forms
17:45but I could see
17:47that it was
17:48a military thing.
17:49let's say
17:49of importance
17:50and I thought
17:52if he hands over
17:53300 pages
17:54it must be very important.
17:59All the inefficiency
18:00of the MI5
18:05stinks to heaven.
18:07I mean,
18:07that they didn't
18:08find us out.
18:12The information
18:13Fuchs passed her
18:14went straight back
18:15to Moscow
18:16but again
18:17it was put
18:17on one side.
18:19the Soviet government
18:20had more immediate
18:21problems on its mind.
18:22On Soviet Russian soil,
18:48in spite of the careful
18:49preparations of the defenders,
18:50the German Wehrmacht
18:52has captured
18:52vast stretches
18:53of territory.
18:57Under such severe
18:58bombardment,
18:59complex papers
19:00about a theoretical weapon
19:01didn't come high
19:02on the list of priorities.
19:05Take these unknown souls
19:07to your heart,
19:07native soil.
19:08They fought till death
19:09for your sake.
19:13So priceless information
19:14from Fuchs
19:15and other spies
19:16and other spies
19:16and other spies
19:16was left on one side.
19:21It would take
19:22a chance encounter
19:23of battle
19:24to make the leadership
19:25understand that
19:25atomic research
19:26actually mattered.
19:33The catalyst
19:34was this man,
19:35Ilya Starinov,
19:37known in those days
19:38as king of the saboteurs.
19:42Early in 1942,
19:44he took part
19:45in a daring raid
19:46on a German garrison
19:47in which a great number
19:48of documents
19:49were captured.
19:51One in particular
19:52caught his attention.
19:53A large number
19:56of documents
19:56were seized.
19:58Among these documents
19:59there was a notebook
20:00and I forwarded it
20:01to headquarters.
20:02They returned it to me.
20:03They said the notebook
20:04wasn't important to them.
20:06It contained some formulas,
20:08so to speak,
20:08but no troop deployments.
20:10Try to figure it out
20:11for yourself,
20:12they said.
20:13You are the engineering troops.
20:15It must be
20:15of some interest to you.
20:17I took the notebook,
20:18sent it off
20:19for translation in Rostov.
20:21It turned out
20:22that in the notebook
20:23the author was suggesting
20:25the use of an atomic system
20:27to produce explosions.
20:32Despite the army's indifference,
20:34Starinov thought
20:34it was worth
20:35sending on to Moscow.
20:36Eventually,
20:37the captured document
20:38landed on the desk
20:39of Lavrenti Beria,
20:40who this time
20:40did not dismiss it
20:41as German disinformation.
20:45But decisive action
20:47still depended on Stalin
20:48and his overwhelming priority
20:50was rallying
20:51his stricken army.
20:52comrade soldiers
20:54of the Red Army,
20:56sailors,
20:57commanders of the
20:58political sections,
21:00men and women partisans.
21:02The whole world
21:03is watching to see
21:04if you are capable
21:05of destroying
21:06the invading marauders.
21:08But Beria
21:09now had enough
21:10on his desk
21:11about atomic weapons
21:12to convince him
21:13that there was
21:13an even greater danger
21:14in doing nothing.
21:16He went to see Stalin.
21:17One of the few men
21:20to have seen
21:21the full story
21:21of what happened next
21:22is a KGB colonel
21:24called Vladimir Chikov.
21:26He was recently given
21:27unique access
21:28to Russia's nuclear archive,
21:30still listed top secret
21:31despite the end
21:32of the Cold War.
21:33The archive is kept
21:38in the Lubyanka,
21:39then headquarters
21:39of Beria's NKVD.
21:45Inside the Lubyanka,
21:47Chikov unearthed
21:48a succession of documents
21:50showing how critical
21:51spies were
21:52in persuading Stalin
21:53that the Russians
21:54must do something
21:55immediately
21:56to match research
21:57going on
21:58in other countries.
22:02And so,
22:02when enough material
22:03had piled up
22:04on Beria's desk,
22:06the data on heavy water
22:07from the German officer,
22:09the first two
22:10intelligence reports
22:11from London,
22:12and then a third report,
22:14Beria went
22:15to see Stalin
22:15once again.
22:18And this time,
22:19Stalin paid
22:20more careful attention.
22:23Stalin authorized
22:24a cable
22:25to be sent
22:26to Beria's
22:26station chiefs
22:27in London
22:27and New York.
22:29Please take
22:30whatever steps
22:30you think fit
22:31to obtain information
22:32on the theoretical
22:33and practical aspects
22:35of the atomic bomb projects,
22:37on the design
22:37of the atom bomb,
22:39nuclear fuel components,
22:40and the trigger mechanism.
22:42Stop.
22:43Which government departments
22:44have been made responsible?
22:46Stop.
22:46Where this work
22:47is being done
22:48and under whose leadership?
22:50Message ends.
22:52The cable back
22:53from their man
22:53in New York
22:54was forthright
22:55and,
22:55to the Russians,
22:56shocking.
22:57All the research laboratories
23:00studying uranium fission
23:02sited in New York,
23:03Berkeley,
23:03Princeton,
23:04and Chicago
23:04have begun to work
23:05to a coordinated plan
23:07which has been given
23:08the codename
23:09Manhattan Project.
23:10We have unsubstantiated information
23:12that an offer
23:13has been made
23:14to Robert Oppenheimer
23:15to head the most powerful
23:16super laboratory
23:17in America.
23:18The first pieces of information
23:24started coming from New York
23:25which said that a laboratory
23:27had been set up
23:28at Los Alamos
23:29and it was involved
23:31in the development
23:31of atomic weapons.
23:35That the Los Alamos laboratory
23:36was in the remote state
23:37of New Mexico
23:38in a desert locality
23:42that was nearly inaccessible.
23:43I mean,
23:46not only to our
23:47intelligence agents
23:48but for all outsiders
23:50in general.
23:58Stalin realized
23:59he could wait no longer.
24:01He appointed
24:01a brilliant scientist
24:02called Igor Kuchatov
24:04to be head of a project
24:05to build a Russian bomb.
24:08Later,
24:09Kuchatov would become
24:10so famous
24:11they'd make records
24:12of his voice.
24:27The first thing
24:28Kuchatov did
24:29was to put a call
24:30through to one
24:31of the few Russian scientists
24:32still working
24:33on atomic theory.
24:35Yuli Hariton,
24:37the man who'd studied
24:38under Rutherford
24:39at Cambridge,
24:39all those years before.
24:47I heard Kuchatov's voice
24:49saying,
24:50you stay at home.
24:52I'm on my way around.
24:56I've got something
24:57very important
24:58to tell you.
25:03You are to get started
25:05immediately
25:05on the design
25:06of an atom bomb.
25:09From that point
25:12onwards,
25:13Kuchatov became
25:14the public face
25:15of the Soviet bomb,
25:17while Hariton
25:19disappeared
25:19into a hidden world
25:21from which few names emerged.
25:27Out here,
25:28on the Kazakh steppes,
25:29is the secret city
25:30named after Kuchatov,
25:32which grew up
25:33around the atomic project
25:34in the years
25:35which followed.
25:35in due course,
25:38thousands of scientists
25:38and soldiers
25:39would flood into the city
25:40and turn it into
25:41the testing ground
25:42of the most destructive
25:43arsenal in the history
25:45of mankind.
25:47But at that moment,
25:48the great push forward
25:49was on the other side
25:50of the world.
25:55In the high mesas
25:57of New Mexico
25:58is the place
25:58where America's bomb
25:59was being built.
26:08This was the top-secret complex
26:09which housed
26:10what was called
26:11the Manhattan Project.
26:20The team that was assembled
26:22was made up largely
26:23of top European scientists
26:25who'd fled fascism
26:26just before the war.
26:28After what they'd been through,
26:30many were uneasy
26:31about putting science
26:32to military use,
26:33but recognized
26:34the supreme need
26:35to beat Hitler.
26:37Men like Teller,
26:39Fermi,
26:40and Beta,
26:42and the man known
26:42as the godfather
26:43of the Manhattan Project,
26:45the distinguished Dane,
26:46Niels Bohr.
26:48As the Soviet spies
26:49had predicted
26:49and may be wanted,
26:51they were led
26:51by Robert Oppenheimer
26:52who'd also studied
26:53at Cambridge
26:54before the war.
26:55Oppenheimer was known
26:56by the American authorities
26:57to have sympathized
26:58with communism
26:59but seemed to offer
27:00the right combination
27:01of energy and brilliance.
27:03Because people
27:04have respected him,
27:06he managed
27:06to keep them all together.
27:07There are many
27:08prima donnas
27:08in Los Alamos
27:09and they want to go
27:10in different ways,
27:12but somehow
27:12he managed to do this
27:13by the way
27:14his organizational skill.
27:18Joseph Rotblatt
27:19was one of those
27:19who came from Europe
27:20to join Oppenheimer
27:21in Los Alamos.
27:24They all came
27:25under the ultimate control
27:26of a soldier,
27:27General Leslie Groves.
27:29He was uneasy
27:30with the way
27:30the scientists
27:31approached the job.
27:33In the first instance,
27:34he wanted to put
27:34all scientists in uniform
27:36and give them ranks
27:37and so on.
27:38Secondly,
27:38he wanted to keep
27:39each scientist
27:40in a separate compartment
27:41because they wouldn't
27:42at all communicate
27:43with each other.
27:44He was very concerned
27:45about security
27:46and secrecy.
27:47Of course,
27:47science doesn't work.
27:48The only way
27:49scientists work
27:50is by talking
27:50to each other,
27:51trying to get new ideas
27:52coming out
27:53from such conversations.
27:55And so it didn't work.
27:56In fact,
27:57it was Oppenheimer
27:57who convinced him
27:58it wouldn't work.
28:04Nevertheless,
28:05security was tight.
28:07Everyone knew
28:08that this was a race
28:09which America
28:09and its allies
28:10could not afford to lose.
28:13And in this context,
28:14Groves was quite clear.
28:16The term allies
28:16did not include
28:17the Russians.
28:21It was a cue
28:22for Beria's espionage war
28:24to switch its focus
28:25to America.
28:29At the Soviet consulate
28:31on Manhattan Island
28:32worked a man
28:33for whom Los Alamos
28:34was a prime target.
28:37His real name
28:38was Anatoly Yatskov,
28:40though in his FBI file
28:42he appeared for many years
28:43as Anatoly Yakovlev.
28:46On the surface,
28:47he was a middle-ranked diplomat.
28:49In fact,
28:50he was the Soviet
28:50master spy
28:51working for Beria.
28:55Robert Lamphere
28:56was an FBI agent
28:58assigned to what was then
28:59a tiny squad
29:00watching out
29:00for Soviet spies.
29:02The new unit
29:05had little experience
29:06at that stage,
29:08but he soon picked out
29:09Yakovlev
29:09as someone to watch.
29:11One of the reasons
29:12for our interest
29:13in Yakovlev
29:14was that he could come
29:15and go
29:16almost at will
29:17as other employees
29:19had to stay
29:20to their consulate duties
29:22and he was frequently
29:24out of the consulate.
29:26Furthermore,
29:27he was treated
29:28with, we thought,
29:29a little undue respect
29:31by the other members
29:32of the consulate.
29:34Behind his front
29:35as a family man,
29:37Yatskov had no qualms
29:38about spying
29:39on a wartime ally.
29:41Years later,
29:43he wrote an article
29:43in Pravda
29:44justifying his action.
29:47In those years,
29:48the fatal 40s,
29:50we were allies
29:51in the war
29:51against fascist Germany
29:52and subsequently
29:53against Japan.
29:55Allies with the USA.
29:57As an ally,
29:58the American authorities
29:59should have shared
30:00the information
30:01on the bomb with us.
30:03We had a full
30:04moral right to it.
30:06But they meticulously
30:07concealed even
30:08the very existence
30:09of some work from us.
30:11So there.
30:12Shouldn't the actions
30:13of our intelligence network
30:15be regarded
30:16not as spying activities,
30:18but rather
30:19as a positive attempt
30:20to help
30:21the American authorities
30:22correct their oversight.
30:23The contrast
30:37between the resources
30:39available at Los Alamos
30:40and what the Russians
30:41could afford
30:42on atomic research
30:43could not have been greater.
30:45This cluttered
30:46little laboratory
30:47in Moscow
30:48housed the entire
30:49Soviet atom bomb program
30:51at that stage
30:52in the war.
30:54Compared with Oppenheimer,
30:56the Soviet team leader
30:57Igor Kurchatov
30:59lacked money,
31:00manpower,
31:01and expertise.
31:05Kurchatov managed
31:06to bring together
31:07a small group of people
31:08at laboratory number two,
31:10which literally
31:11started up with five people,
31:13just five people.
31:14The team considered
31:17it a great step forward
31:18when they were given
31:19a large tent
31:20on the outskirts
31:21of Moscow
31:21to work in.
31:24This is thought
31:25to be the only picture
31:26in existence
31:26of their Canvas HQ.
31:31Their main problem,
31:33scientifically,
31:34was how to move forward
31:35without a supply
31:36of uranium
31:36for their experiments.
31:39In practical terms,
31:40their problem was mud.
31:41It was an open field
31:45and part of the grounds
31:47around the building
31:48were marked off
31:49by a barbed wire
31:50perimeter fence
31:51a little distance away.
31:56There were guards
31:57standing at the checkpoint
31:58with a barrier
31:59and so much mud
32:00all around
32:01it was almost impossible
32:03to get through.
32:07The official Soviet legend
32:09is that Igor Kurchatov
32:10was the genius
32:11who matched Oppenheimer
32:12talent for talent.
32:14But the full story
32:15is more complicated.
32:17Kurchatov was brilliant,
32:19but he was leading
32:20a double life.
32:23By night,
32:23he would study
32:24an ever-increasing flow
32:25of intelligence reports
32:26being brought in
32:27by barrier spies.
32:29Next day,
32:29he would appear
32:30in the labs
32:31and issue his instructions.
32:33No one knew
32:33many of them
32:34were based on ideas
32:35stolen from the West.
32:36Most of the information
32:42was delivered
32:43by courier.
32:46Because the information
32:48ran into hundreds
32:49of pages,
32:50it was impossible
32:52to code
32:52or transmit it
32:53all over the radio
32:55for fear of interception.
32:59There were two possible
33:00delivery options
33:01over to the center,
33:03to Moscow,
33:06by courier
33:06and by diplomatic mail,
33:11though it was
33:11in violation
33:12of the rules.
33:15And when there was
33:16a need to send
33:17classified data fast,
33:20the diplomatic mail
33:24was used.
33:25When Kurchatov
33:31hit a problem,
33:32he'd sometimes
33:33send a specific question
33:34out to the network
33:35of spies.
33:37March 22nd,
33:381943.
33:40Give instructions
33:41to the intelligence
33:42services
33:42to find out
33:43what work
33:44has been done
33:45on using
33:46Echorhenium-239
33:47for a bomb.
33:49He even suggested
33:50a list of
33:50experimental research sites
33:52where they might
33:52find answers.
33:53Berkeley,
33:56Yale,
33:58Ann Arbor,
33:59Columbia,
34:00Rochester,
34:02Princeton,
34:03and Swarthmore,
34:04Pennsylvania.
34:06But what he got back
34:08was more than
34:09one man could handle.
34:11Thousands of documents
34:12lay untouched
34:13in the Lubyanka vaults.
34:15The secretive barrier
34:16was determined
34:17that no one else
34:18should know
34:18just how dependent
34:19Soviet science
34:21was on the West.
34:23barrier band
34:25showing the materials
34:26to anyone
34:27but Kurchatov
34:28at this early stage.
34:32Just imagine,
34:33a 600-page volume
34:35comes in.
34:38How could he find
34:40the time
34:40to compute
34:41something in his head?
34:42Problems
34:47suffer
34:48new ideas
34:50and thoughts
34:50and Kurchatov
34:53had to process
34:54them
34:54in his mind.
34:58The Soviets
34:59had good reason
35:00to be suspicious
35:00of their allies.
35:03In 1943,
35:04President Roosevelt
35:05met the arch-anti-communist
35:07Winston Churchill
35:08in Quebec.
35:09At Churchill's suggestion,
35:10the Russians
35:11weren't invited.
35:15After the public
35:16greetings
35:17and behind
35:18closed doors,
35:19an agreement
35:19was reached
35:20under which
35:21the signatories
35:21would pool
35:22their atomic secrets
35:23and their atomic
35:24scientists.
35:28But though
35:29they had been excluded,
35:30there was an unexpected
35:31bonus for the Russians.
35:33The deal
35:34meant that
35:34Klaus Fuchs,
35:35who had been
35:36steadily supplying material
35:37through Red Sonja
35:38in London,
35:39got orders
35:40to move
35:40to the United States.
35:50Fuchs' first stop
35:52was New York.
35:56There he made contact
35:57with Yakovlev
35:58through an intermediary
36:00known in the spy business
36:01as a cutout.
36:04One of the early meetings
36:05took place
36:06here in Manhattan,
36:09just at the entrance
36:10back of us here
36:12of the Queensboro Bridge.
36:14As I remembered,
36:15I think there were
36:16a total of seven meetings
36:18took place
36:18between the two men
36:19in the boroughs
36:20of New York City,
36:23Queens, Brooklyn,
36:24Manhattan,
36:25most of them
36:25in Manhattan.
36:27The key developments
36:28taking place
36:29on the Manhattan Project
36:30were known
36:31to the KGB
36:32about as fast
36:35as they were known
36:36to the American scientists.
36:38The KGB was right
36:39inside the project.
36:44Once Fuchs got
36:45to Los Alamos,
36:46the life of the spy
36:48was comparatively easy.
36:51Not least
36:52because of Oppenheimer's
36:53insistence
36:54that everything
36:55between scientists
36:56should be open.
36:57We had complete
36:59freedom to converse
37:02with any
37:04scientist
37:06who had a white badge.
37:10This was partly
37:12due to Oppenheim.
37:14He insisted on that.
37:21Hans Bethe
37:22was head of theoretical physics
37:24at Los Alamos.
37:26A fellow refugee
37:27from Hitler's Germany,
37:29he was Fuchs'
37:30direct boss.
37:34Klaus Fuchs
37:35was very
37:35reticent.
37:40He
37:40wouldn't give anything
37:44by himself
37:46except science.
37:49he wouldn't talk
37:52about personal things.
37:55My friend
37:56Jenya Pyers,
37:58Mrs. Pyers,
38:00said,
38:01you have to
38:02drop a penny
38:03into the slot
38:05to make him talk.
38:10Scientifically,
38:11however,
38:12he was very good.
38:14He worked,
38:15I think,
38:1612 hours a day,
38:17seven days a week
38:18and
38:20he produced
38:22an awful lot
38:23of results.
38:27He was a
38:28very good
38:29scientist
38:30and
38:30very silent.
38:37But the more
38:38the actual bomb
38:39took shape,
38:40the more doubt
38:41some of the scientists
38:42had about their work.
38:44The threat from Hitler
38:45was fading fast,
38:46so why was the bomb needed?
38:50One night
38:51in 1944
38:52at a dinner party
38:53for senior scientists,
38:55their boss,
38:56General Groves,
38:57let the cat
38:58out of the bag.
38:59Groves said
39:00to us,
39:01you realize,
39:02of course,
39:04that the whole
39:04purpose of the project
39:06is to subdue
39:07the Russians.
39:09Now,
39:10I remember
39:10these words
39:11almost as they were
39:12spoken yesterday
39:13because they came
39:14to me
39:14with such a shock
39:15I couldn't believe
39:17my own ears.
39:19The shock
39:19came to me
39:20because,
39:21first of all,
39:22this was not the purpose
39:23of the bomb at all,
39:24this would be used
39:25against another nation,
39:26and secondly,
39:26because at that time
39:27the Russians
39:28were our allies.
39:29We had a mortal enemy
39:31and they were carrying
39:32the main burden
39:33of the war
39:34against Germany
39:35and here I'm told,
39:37ah,
39:37what we are doing now
39:38is to subdue
39:38these people.
39:39The godfather
39:42of the American
39:43bomb project,
39:44the Dane Niels Bohr,
39:46was particularly concerned.
39:48Although Groves' view
39:50was not official,
39:51Bohr felt it was
39:51essential to share
39:52atomic information
39:54with the Russians
39:54to stop what he thought
39:56would inevitably turn
39:57into a nuclear arms race.
40:02Bohr and Fuchs
40:03were obviously
40:04in agreement on this
40:05and later Fuchs
40:06explained how
40:07the protest grew.
40:09The first statement
40:13and probably the firmest
40:15came from Niels Bohr
40:17in a memo to Roosevelt.
40:22He had evidently
40:23been thinking
40:23much more intensely
40:24about this
40:25than anyone else.
40:29And this memo
40:30to the president
40:31also expressed
40:32very clearly
40:33the need
40:34for the United States
40:35and the Soviet Union
40:36to work together
40:37in harmony.
40:40And he argues
40:42that in order
40:42to establish
40:43the confidence required,
40:45America
40:46should inform
40:49the Soviet Union
40:50before using
40:51the atom bomb.
40:54Roosevelt
40:55raised the matter
40:56with Churchill.
40:57But Churchill
40:58was completely
40:59opposed to the idea
41:00and in his first
41:01outburst
41:02went so far
41:03as to comment
41:04that Niels Bohr
41:05ought to be arrested
41:06on suspicion.
41:12Bohr was invited
41:13to the White House
41:14to put his case
41:15to the president.
41:16He didn't get far.
41:19Roosevelt
41:19didn't even
41:21let him speak
41:22for the half hour
41:24that had been
41:25allotted to him
41:26and told him,
41:28well,
41:29Mr Bohr,
41:31you are a great scientist.
41:33When you want
41:34to talk to me
41:35about science,
41:37I am terribly interested.
41:40But these political matters
41:42are our business.
41:47The war, meanwhile,
41:49was reaching
41:49a bloody crescendo.
41:53The Russians,
41:54who'd already lost
41:55over 20 million people
41:56in the long years
41:57of fighting,
41:58were now pounding
41:59their way
41:59into Berlin.
42:02Victory in Europe
42:03was virtually won.
42:05Hitler was beaten.
42:06And the need
42:07for the atomic bomb,
42:08as originally defined,
42:09was over.
42:11But everyone knew
42:12it wouldn't end there.
42:22Niels Bohr
42:23returned to Denmark
42:27disillusioned
42:28and worried.
42:31He foresaw
42:31that if the Americans
42:33go on by themselves
42:34together with the British,
42:36and then the Russians
42:37will go on
42:38on their own,
42:39they make their own bomb,
42:40there will be
42:40an arms race,
42:42which will have
42:42enormous consequences,
42:44dire consequences
42:45for the whole
42:45of our civilization.
42:48And he tried
42:48to prevent this.
42:49He and some
42:53of his fellow scientists
42:54now believed
42:55that building the bomb
42:56had opened
42:56a Pandora's box.
43:02I don't know
43:03whether it's apocryphal
43:04or not,
43:04I can't remember,
43:05but I'm supposed
43:07to have said
43:07at the time
43:08it's too late now.
43:09The military men
43:10have got their hands
43:11on the bomb.
43:12They had indeed.
43:16The following month,
43:17the first atom bomb,
43:18codenamed Trinity,
43:20was wheeled out
43:20for testing.
43:21For the scientists
43:47involved,
43:48it was a time
43:48of great tension.
43:49Very nervous.
43:53Would it work?
43:55We wanted to see
43:56the actual explosion
44:00very accurately
44:02because we wanted
44:04to measure
44:05the development
44:07of the fireball.
44:14Eight,
44:15seven,
44:16six,
44:17five,
44:18four,
44:19three,
44:20two,
44:21one,
44:22now.
44:26Even the experts
44:28were astonished
44:29by the result.
44:31It was just tremendous.
44:35And first,
44:37it was brilliant white.
44:41And then,
44:43as it rose
44:44in the atmosphere,
44:46it became dominantly purple.
44:52The gamma rays give you
44:54then this purple light
44:57that's radiation from the air.
45:06So it was a tremendous spectacle.
45:08and we all were aware
45:12what kind of weapon it was.
45:16When they actually saw the result
45:22at the Trinity test,
45:24they were really flattened.
45:26I mean, it's one thing to do a calculation
45:28on a piece of paper,
45:29it's another thing to actually see it.
45:30They were really flattened by it
45:32when it hit them what they had done.
45:35The very next day,
45:38Harry Truman,
45:39newly made president
45:40after the death of Roosevelt,
45:41was able to tell his allies
45:43he had a new super weapon
45:45ready to beat the Japanese.
45:48Stalin, of course,
45:49already knew about the bomb
45:51from his spies,
45:52and he made no sign
45:53of being impressed.
45:54A few days later,
46:02he was.
46:07Once the dust had settled,
46:09everyone knew
46:09the rules of war
46:10had changed forever.
46:13Los Alamos
46:13was a very depressed place
46:14after Hiroshima
46:15because it suddenly sank in
46:17fully what it was
46:18they had been working on.
46:24What motivated them initially
46:26was the fear
46:27that the Germans
46:27were going to get the bomb.
46:29And so they were building
46:29this thing,
46:30and they weren't really
46:30building it to use it,
46:31they were building it
46:32so that they could have,
46:33you know,
46:34in case Germany did get the bomb,
46:36we would have our own bomb,
46:37and it would be a stalemate
46:39with regard to nuclear weapons.
46:43So I don't think many of them
46:45seriously considered
46:46that it was going to be used,
46:49and there was all this
46:50euphemistic language.
46:51I mean,
46:51they weren't building a bomb.
46:53They were building a gadget.
46:58Among the first foreigners
47:00to pick their way
47:01through the ruins of the city
47:02was a man from
47:03Russian military intelligence
47:04called Mikhail Ivanov.
47:10We made our way
47:12through the streets,
47:13those devastated streets.
47:15All the maps
47:16were terribly confused.
47:18There was rubble everywhere,
47:19and the rubble
47:20was covered in a strange dust.
47:22It was an awful sight.
47:24When we said
47:25we had come to look
47:26at the city,
47:27one man smiled and said,
47:28what city?
47:29There is no city.
47:31There is a dreadful sickness here,
47:33he said.
47:33A dreadful sickness.
47:35People who have survived
47:37are dying
47:37from just being here.
47:39Ivanov's report
47:55was sent straight back
47:56to the Kremlin,
47:57where Stalin summoned
47:58his Politburo
47:59to a crisis meeting.
48:00Despite all the information
48:02from his spies,
48:03he was shocked
48:04by the news from Japan.
48:05He was enraged.
48:10He banged his fist
48:11and stamped his feet.
48:12He clearly hadn't reckoned
48:14that they would really
48:15drop the bomb
48:16or that it would cause
48:17such destruction.
48:21The news couldn't
48:23have been worse time.
48:24After a long
48:35and bitter war,
48:36the Russians were celebrating.
48:38And not just victory.
48:39They were celebrating
48:40the future as well.
48:45It's obvious
48:46why Stalin was enraged.
48:48We had won the war.
48:50The stage was set
48:51for making Europe socialist,
48:53making it red.
48:54Nearly everything
48:55was in place
48:56and all of a sudden
48:57this obstacle appeared
48:58and everything
48:59was going to the dogs.
49:05Stalin was in no mood
49:07to leave anything to chance.
49:10Instead of leaving
49:11the building of a bomb
49:12to his scientists,
49:13he put his secret police
49:14in charge.
49:17The boss of the Lubyanka,
49:19Lavrenti Beria,
49:20was told he must deliver
49:21a working atomic bomb
49:23within five years.
49:26He knew that the vaults
49:28of the Lubyanka
49:28were filled with
49:29wartime intelligence.
49:31But much of it
49:32was still waiting
49:33to be read.
49:34And the volume alone
49:35told Beria one thing.
49:37The Soviets had a long way
49:38to go before they could
49:39match the United States.
49:43But within months,
49:44he was to get a message
49:45from the West
49:46that could dramatically
49:47cut down the Americans' lead.
49:49one of the top men
49:53in the Los Alamos team
49:54was willing to talk.
49:56a little bit more.
49:58So I'll see you then.
49:59So I'll see you then.
Recommended
51:11
|
Up next
50:53
29:15
29:08
29:16
1:23:24
40:40
1:08:58
42:04
1:22:18
1:26:25
51:48
48:58
49:22
48:27
1:54:53
54:50
49:02
1:54:41
1:33:42