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TV트랜스크립트
00:00우리는 어쩌다가 여기까지 왔을까요?
00:30로버트 퍼트넘은 분열된 사회 속에서 통합의 해법을 모색하는 정치 사회 분야의 권위자입니다.
00:46그의 기억 속 참 좋았던 시절.
00:50그리고 지금은 뭐가 달라진 걸까요?
00:54무너져가는 세상에 갈 길 잃은 이들을 위해 그가 나섰습니다.
01:09전 세계에 흩어져 있는 위대한 생각들을 모았습니다.
01:16어떤 생각은 우리를 저 먼 곳으로 데려갑니다.
01:24처음에 있는 건가?
01:29우리의 상처에 흩어져 있는 거고
01:40오늘의 시작은 우리의 상처에 대한 이야기입니다.
01:42안녕하세요.
01:44그건 우리의 상처에 대한 이야기입니다.
01:46저는 봄을 전국의 상처에 대한 이야기입니다.
01:49west end and I'd like to welcome you to my home on fros pond in Jaffrey New Hampshire
01:55on this bright Spring morning
02:07modern democracy works best when it is in implanted in an environment of civil
02:17일반적인 민족을 통해서
02:21여전히 서로의 동의하여
02:23productive, trusting, thoughtful ways.
02:27이 소화의 소화의 소화는
02:30소화의 소화가 있었습니다.
02:34소화의 소화가 있었습니다.
02:37그 차지만 소화의 소화가 있었습니다.
02:43사회적 기술을 통해
02:45전해서도
02:47regional government in Italy
02:49I returned to an America
02:51that seemed to be
02:53in some difficulty
02:55our own democracy seemed not to be
02:57functioning so well
02:59I'm now talking about
03:01the 1990s
03:13And
03:17gradually I began
03:19to wonder whether
03:21what I was worried about in America
03:23as a citizen of America, namely
03:25the poor performance of our
03:27democracy, might
03:29be related to what I'd been studying
03:31in Italy, namely social capital
03:33and that led me gradually
03:35to begin to think about, well
03:37could I measure social capital in
03:39America? And one of the most
03:41important things I quickly discovered
03:43was that there was a
03:45had been a decline also
03:47in America in
03:49exactly these organizations
03:51of civil society
03:53the clubs and so on
03:55that have been characteristic of American society
03:57for centuries or more
03:59and it happened actually
04:01in a very unusual homey
04:03way, I was sitting at my living
04:05I was sitting at breakfast
04:07in our home in Lexington, Massachusetts
04:09and my wife came in with the local newspaper
04:11that reported that there had been a decline
04:13in parent-teacher
04:15organizations
04:17Could this just be possibly
04:19here in Lexington, our town, where there happens
04:21to be this fading of interest
04:23in the PTA, the parent-teacher association?
04:25So we began to look
04:27and it turned out, no
04:29there had been declines in PTA membership
04:31across America
04:33What does that mean? Then I began to wonder
04:35well could that be true of other organizations?
04:37So we began, first of all
04:39to look at
04:41long-run trends
04:43in membership rates
04:45in clubs
04:47in national
04:49chapter-based voluntary associations
04:51associations, in other words, that have local
04:53affiliates all across America
04:55and so on, and then we
04:57added all these trends together
04:59and they formed a quite
05:01coherent, intelligible
05:03pattern
05:07Over the course of the 20th century
05:09for much of that period
05:11America was
05:13increasing
05:15in its involvement
05:17in membership organizations
05:19up until about 1920s
05:21and then there was a dip
05:23during the Great Depression of the 1930s
05:25in America at least
05:27as people began to get out of work
05:29they pulled in and they hunkered down
05:31and stopped becoming so involved
05:33in their organizations
05:37Organizations
05:39in the middle 60s began to experience
05:41leveling membership
05:43and then slumping membership
05:45and then plunging membership
05:49and in 1975
05:53you can see here
05:55the average American
05:57attended 12 club meetings
05:59that means on average once a month
06:01since Tocqueville
06:05a French observer came to America
06:07in the 1830s
06:09he said
06:10Americas are joiners
06:11so that was a characteristic of America
06:13we were a joining society
06:15and yet in 20 years
06:16between
06:17the middle 70s
06:18and the end of the
06:1920th century
06:20half of all that
06:21civic infrastructure
06:23simply disappeared
06:25the same thing was true
06:26of trends
06:27trends in
06:28church attendance
06:31and you can see that
06:33in the
06:35in the
06:36around 1940
06:37about
06:3840%
06:41actually
06:42almost 40%
06:43of all
06:44Americans
06:45attended church every week
06:48I mean think about that
06:4940% of all
06:50everybody in America
06:53that number
06:54which reached its peak
06:56in the
06:57in the 1950s
06:58at about
06:59nearly half
07:00is now down to about
07:0120%
07:02or less
07:03of Americans attending church
07:04every week
07:09and
07:10so
07:11think of this trend
07:12as the trend
07:13in dinner parties
07:14in America
07:15in
07:16in the 1970s
07:21the average American
07:23entertained people
07:24in their home
07:25that is they held a dinner party
07:26about 14 times
07:28that is roughly speaking
07:30the average American family
07:31invited other people in to have dinner
07:33with them
07:34about once a month
07:35but again you can see that by the end of the 20th century
07:40that had fallen
07:41to
07:42to about
07:44five
07:45times a year
07:47much less
07:48about half
07:52or
07:53less than half
07:54of what it had been
07:5525 years earlier
07:58so you begin to see the pattern
08:01doesn't matter what we're measuring
08:02whether measuring church attendance
08:03or going to public meetings
08:04or just having people come over to the house
08:06for a dinner party
08:07half of all that
08:08civic activity
08:09social activity
08:10disappeared
08:11during the last
08:13decade
08:14the last two decades
08:15of the 20th century
08:16actually that was kind of
08:17comforting to
08:18my wife
08:19Rosemary and me
08:20because in the
08:21in you know
08:22around the year 2000
08:23nobody was ever inviting us to dinner parties
08:25and we thought that was because
08:26maybe we were boring people
08:27that they didn't want to have us
08:29come
08:30come to
08:31dinner parties
08:32but no
08:33we discovered here
08:34nobody was going to dinner parties
08:35so at least it wasn't our fault
08:37it was
08:38it was a broader social trend
08:40and
08:41even having dinner with your own family
08:43declined rapidly
08:45during this same period
08:47so again
08:48the
08:50the
08:51so again
08:53it's not just
08:54do-gooding
08:55it's not just
08:56interacting with people out there
08:57in
08:58parent groups
08:59or bowling leagues
09:00it's also
09:01in our own intimate life
09:03that we've become
09:04less
09:05civically involved
09:06and we've become
09:07less
09:08generous
09:09and
09:10this shows long-run trends
09:12in our
09:13philanthropic
09:14generosity
09:15that is
09:16what fraction of our income
09:17do we give away to other people
09:19and you can see that
09:20that was rising steadily from
09:22about
09:231930
09:241929
09:251930
09:26we gave away
09:27in that year
09:28the average American gave away
09:30about
09:3112% of their income
09:33it rose to nearly
09:3424%
09:35of their income
09:36at its peak
09:37in about
09:381965
09:39that same peak
09:41and then
09:42after that
09:43declined
09:44dramatically
09:45dramatically
09:47so Americans
09:48were not just
09:49joining
09:50less
09:51they were giving less
09:52all of these
09:53many measures
09:54of the degree
09:55to which we feel
09:56connected to
09:57and
09:58not just connected to
10:00but obligated to
10:01other people
10:03began to collapse
10:04we were moving from becoming
10:09a we society
10:10in which we were focused on
10:12our connections with other
10:13people and our
10:14obligations to other people
10:16moving toward a society that was
10:20an I society
10:21a society in which we only
10:22worried about me
10:23me
10:24and nobody else
10:25that's
10:30a
10:31simple way of summarizing
10:32these
10:33dramatically
10:35changing
10:37charts
10:38of
10:39the ways in which we have
10:41connected with one another
10:43that rise and fall of
10:45of
10:46social capital
10:47and finally
10:48we trust each other less
10:50we trust each other less
10:53so you can see
10:55that
10:56there were
10:57many changes
10:59in American society
11:01over
11:03the
11:04roughly half century
11:06from 19
11:07roughly speaking
11:081960
11:09until the end of the 20th century
11:11many declines
11:13in
11:14social
11:15capital
11:16and that
11:18then
11:20leads to the question
11:22well
11:24why
11:25why did that happen
11:26we thought
11:28well
11:29maybe it could be
11:31during this period
11:33women started going to work
11:35outside the home
11:36and were
11:37were less often
11:39stay-at-home moms
11:41that is they were
11:42they were the ones who
11:43had
11:44held the dinner parties
11:45and went to the parent
11:46teacher organizations
11:47and
11:48and were building
11:49a sense of trust
11:50and a sense of community
11:51and then when they went off to work
11:53there was nobody left
11:54um
11:55it turned out
11:56when we looked at the data
11:57that that
11:58that was basically
11:59not the case
12:00that
12:01even though women
12:02had started to
12:03go to work
12:04increasingly in that period
12:05the women were still
12:06they were still the ones
12:07having the dinner parties
12:08and
12:09and so it wasn't
12:10it was
12:11true among both men and women
12:14not just distinctly among women
12:15that they were
12:16all Americans
12:17men and women
12:18were pulling out of
12:20organization
12:21organizational and social life
12:23we thought
12:24well
12:25could it be that
12:26we've moved to suburbs
12:31and that
12:32in going to suburbs
12:33you have to commute far
12:35and you have less time
12:36uh
12:37you know
12:38for
12:39having dinner parties
12:40or
12:41or going to bowling leagues
12:42um
12:43and
12:44um
12:45we looked carefully
12:46at that hypothesis
12:49there had been an increase
12:50in
12:51in commuting
12:52but the
12:53trend was the same
12:54the trend down was the same
12:55among commuters
12:56and non-commuters
12:57so that couldn't possibly
12:58be the explanation
12:59or was a minor part
13:00of the explanation
13:01um
13:02there were two factors
13:04that
13:05in that period
13:07seemed to us
13:09plausible
13:10stories
13:11the first
13:13we thought
13:14was television
13:16because
13:17television
13:18as a matter of fact
13:19had come in
13:20to American society
13:22like a lightning bolt
13:34in 1950
13:36less than
13:38ten percent
13:39I think
13:40about two or three percent
13:41virtually
13:42no homes in America
13:43had television
13:44just a tiny
13:46number of homes
13:47and by 1960
13:48in ten years
13:49um
13:50virtually every home
13:51had a television
13:52so
13:53this what you might think of
13:54as the cause
13:58we stopped going out bowling
13:59and we stopped going to
14:00meetings
14:01and we stopped having dinner parties
14:02and we said
14:03instead we just sat in front of the television
14:04and
14:05and we're glued to the television
14:07we stopped having friends
14:09and started watching friends
14:10that is
14:11watching the movie
14:12friend
14:13or the television program friends
14:14that was the theory
14:15uh
14:16and there was a lot of evidence
14:17that that might be
14:18that that theory might be true
14:19the more television watching someone did
14:21it was true
14:22that the more television watching someone did
14:24uh
14:25the more
14:26uh
14:27the less they were involved in their community
14:29then the next most interesting finding
14:31I think
14:32was that that
14:33um
14:34that
14:35decline
14:36seemed to be
14:37generationally
14:39uh
14:40concentrated
14:41among
14:42younger people
14:43when we did this study
14:44in 2000
14:45we could look and we could see
14:46well
14:47young people are
14:49much less likely to be involved
14:52than older people
14:53young people
14:54trust
14:55others less than older people
14:57young people are more likely to
14:59are less likely to go to church
15:00than older people
15:01but the question was
15:02are those life cycle phenomena
15:04or are those
15:05generational phenomena
15:06that's a crucially big important question
15:08that's what it would be
15:09if it were a life cycle
15:11young not religious
15:13old religious
15:14or young not trusting
15:15religious
15:16old people trusting
15:17or young people not going to clubs
15:19but old people going to clubs
15:21and in that case
15:23if that's the interpretation
15:25then America is not going to be changing
15:27in fact
15:28it turns out
15:29that the generational
15:30that the changes that we
15:31the age related changes
15:32the big changes
15:33between the level of
15:35church involvement
15:36or the level of
15:37trust in other people
15:38or the level of
15:40of um
15:41involvement in
15:42in clubs and organizations
15:43or the
15:44number of dinner parties
15:45those turned out to be
15:47not at all life cycle
15:49entirely generational
15:50when they were
15:51twenty years old
15:52twenty years old
15:53they didn't trust anybody
15:54and they still don't trust anybody
15:56and when they were
15:57twenty years old
15:58they didn't go to clubs
15:59and they still don't go to clubs
16:00now
16:01the bottom line
16:02therefore is
16:03that the
16:04big age related changes
16:06that we were discovering
16:07reflected
16:09generational change
16:11reflected
16:12that long decline
16:14in trust
16:16or in church going
16:17or in club going
16:18or in dinner parties
16:19those long declines
16:21represented
16:22the dying out
16:24of one generation
16:25of people
16:26who had all their lives
16:27been trusters and joiners
16:29but they were no longer
16:30part of the population
16:31now remember
16:32this is the final conclusion
16:34this long run
16:36trend in social capital
16:38was going to continue
16:40when I come back
16:42and go we move to the next
16:43part of the story
16:44we'll see what the implications
16:46of that continued
16:48decline in social capital
16:49has been for American society
16:51and American democracy
16:52and American democracy
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