LBJ and Vietnam War in the Eye of the Storm (History Channel Documentary)

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00:00:00The wounds are yet to heal.

00:00:18Distant now, the memories refuse to fade.

00:00:21The lessons, ignored at America's peril.

00:00:33Vietnam, that third-rate war that brought the world's greatest power to its knees.

00:00:40What do you think about this Vietnam thing?

00:00:43It's the damn worst mess I ever saw.

00:00:45And I knew we were going to get in this sort of mess, but I went in there and I don't see how we're going to ever get out.

00:00:51Images and sounds that still cast a shadow across a nation's soul.

00:01:00I don't see what we can ever hope to get out of there with once we're committed.

00:01:04I don't think it's worth fighting for and I don't think we can get out.

00:01:09A policy orphaned in defeat that had seemed, 15 years earlier, to capture the spirit of America.

00:01:16Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price,

00:01:28bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe,

00:01:38to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

00:01:41And what a price.

00:01:4758,000 American lives, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese.

00:01:51It was a course charted by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy,

00:01:55but it quickly became known as Lyndon Johnson's War.

00:01:58But this was a reluctant warrior.

00:02:01From the outset, riddled with doubts over the wisdom of his campaign to contain communist expansion.

00:02:06Now, 35 years later, we can join the President's deliberations.

00:02:11Johnson left behind an unprecedented record of his private discussions with senior staff.

00:02:17Intimate and revealing telephone conversations,

00:02:19secretly recorded on a Dictabelt machine, now released.

00:02:23We have recreated some of the scenes that follow,

00:02:26but the voices you hear are those of Lyndon Johnson and his closest advisors,

00:02:30as they debated the wisdom of a policy that would take them into war.

00:02:35I just stayed awake last night thinking about this thing.

00:02:37The more I think of it, I don't know what in the hell,

00:02:42it looks like me, we're getting into another Korea.

00:02:44It just worries the hell out of me.

00:02:46I don't see what we can ever hope to get out of there with once we're committed.

00:02:50And it's just the biggest damn mess I've ever saw.

00:02:51It is. It's an awful mess.

00:02:52Given those doubts, why did Lyndon Johnson take America into a full-scale ground war in July 1965?

00:03:00Did he have a choice?

00:03:01And what did the best and brightest tell the President about the threat America faced in Southeast Asia?

00:03:07Only LBJ knew the whole story.

00:03:10But now, for the first time, we can judge for ourselves, eavesdrop on history in the making.

00:03:15Listen to moments of candor and deception, anguish and bombast.

00:03:21Conversations recorded in the Eye of the Storm.

00:03:24November 1963.

00:03:34John F. Kennedy was gone.

00:03:36With him, the dreams of his new frontier.

00:03:39A President gunned down in Dallas.

00:03:42Killed just a year after America and the Soviet Union stood eyeball to eyeball over missiles in Cuba.

00:03:49To the new President, the sheer enormity of the crime suggested a connection.

00:03:53I thought the most important thing in the world was to decide who was President of this country at that moment.

00:04:05I was fearful that the companies were trying to take us over.

00:04:08What raised through my mind was that if they had shot our President driving down there, who would they shoot next?

00:04:21And what would they, what was going on in Washington?

00:04:24And when would the missiles be coming?

00:04:27And I thought that it was a conspiracy and I raised that question.

00:04:32The Vietnam War was fought against the backdrop of the Cold War, a time of superpower confrontation.

00:04:42A time when world peace was maintained by the threat that both the Soviet Union and the United States could destroy each other and wipe out human existence.

00:04:51Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States, Johnson masterfully guided the nation through the tragedy of Kennedy's death.

00:05:04He assured the country that his administration would be committed to continuing the fallen leader's journey.

00:05:10On the 20th day of January, in 1961, John F. Kennedy told his countrymen,

00:05:19Let us begin.

00:05:21Today, in this moment of new resolve, I would say to all my fellow Americans, let us continue.

00:05:42But what did that mean for Vietnam?

00:05:45As America mourned, South Vietnam was in an uproar.

00:05:48In Saigon, mobs had taken to the streets in the wake of the assassination of their own president just three weeks earlier.

00:05:55The death of President Diem resulted from a military coup instigated by the Kennedy administration.

00:06:01It had been an American hope that Diem's removal would turn the tide of the war against the Viet Cong.

00:06:07It was a tragic miscalculation.

00:06:09Instead of being energized to fight the communist enemy, South Vietnam had descended into anarchy.

00:06:18It was left to Lyndon Johnson to pick up the pieces.

00:06:24He'd opposed the coup, but had been ignored.

00:06:28What he knew for certain was that Vietnam was not the war he wanted to fight.

00:06:33In the early spring of 1964, the new president told his mentor, Senator Richard Russell,

00:06:38that he feared the commitment would lead to disaster.

00:06:41How are you, Mr. Berger?

00:06:44Oh, I've got lots of trouble.

00:06:47I want to see what you...

00:06:48We all have those.

00:06:50What do you think about this Vietnam thing?

00:06:53I'd like to hear you talk a little bit.

00:06:55It's the damn worst mess I ever saw, and I don't like to brag.

00:07:02I never have been right many times in my life,

00:07:04but I knew we were going to get in this sort of mess when we went in there,

00:07:07and I don't see how we were going to ever get out without fighting a major war with the Chinese

00:07:10and all of them down there in those rice paddies and jungles.

00:07:14I just don't know what to do.

00:07:16Our position is deteriorating,

00:07:18and it looked like the more we try to do for them,

00:07:23the less they're willing to do for themselves.

00:07:25It's a mess.

00:07:27I don't think the American people were quite ready

00:07:30but to send out troops in there to do the fighting.

00:07:33If it got down to that or just pulling out, I'd get out.

00:07:37How important is it to us?

00:07:39It isn't important a damn bit.

00:07:41We're just getting the quicksands up to our very neck.

00:07:43Well, it'd impeach the president, though, if it'd run out, wouldn't it?

00:07:46And I don't know how in the hell you're going to get out

00:07:50unless they tell you to get out.

00:07:52I'll tell you, it'll be the most expensive venture this country ever went into.

00:07:57I love you, and I'll be calling you. I'll see you soon.

00:08:03So Johnson feared impeachment,

00:08:05not as a result of getting into the fight,

00:08:08but rather as a consequence of getting out.

00:08:11He told friends the country would never condone weakness

00:08:13and that he felt trapped by both history and the political calendar.

00:08:251964 was an election year in America,

00:08:28and LBJ knew it would be political suicide

00:08:31to allow South Vietnam to fall to communism.

00:08:35He was also determined to keep the nation at peace

00:08:37to allow time for the Congress to pass his own ambitious social agenda.

00:08:41Johnson was betting his presidency

00:08:44on managing a crisis over which he had virtually no control.

00:08:51Mr. Bundy on line one.

00:08:53A master of the domestic scene,

00:08:55this president turned to men such as National Security Advisor

00:08:58McGeorge Bundy to guide him through treacherous waters abroad.

00:09:02What is your own internal thinking on this, Mr. President,

00:09:06that we've just got to stick on this middle course

00:09:08as long as there's any possible hope?

00:09:10I just can't believe that we can't take 15,000 advisors

00:09:14and maintain the status quo for six months.

00:09:18I just believe we can do that if we do it right.

00:09:21Now, I don't know enough about it to know.

00:09:24That's why I don't.

00:09:25I kind of had the impression that we hadn't been as active

00:09:29in guerrilla warfare on the ground as we were in the air.

00:09:32I think this is right, Mr. President.

00:09:34I just don't think we do have enough people

00:09:36with a guerrilla and counter-guerrilla mentality in that process,

00:09:39and that means special forces,

00:09:41and it means really saying to Westmoreland very loud and very clear

00:09:45that that's the kind of war it is,

00:09:47being in there stiffening the troops,

00:09:49and then at the same time the track for touching up on the north

00:09:52and as sensitive and careful a way as we can get it.

00:09:55That's right.

00:09:55Aye, aye.

00:09:56Okay.

00:09:56Right.

00:10:02Johnson was referring to the over 15,000 American soldiers

00:10:07already in Vietnam and the operations designed

00:10:10to carry the war into the north

00:10:12without leaving any traces that could lead back to Washington.

00:10:15The deception required because in the spring of 1964,

00:10:19these men were listed as advisors, not combatants.

00:10:22But under their new commanding general, William Westmoreland,

00:10:25the Americans were finding it hard to avoid being sucked into the battle.

00:10:30260 had already lost their lives,

00:10:32and the enemy was gaining every day.

00:10:34A continuation of the status quo seemed certain to bring defeat.

00:10:39It was an outcome that particularly troubled one member of the Johnson team.

00:10:43Bobby Kennedy had stayed on at the Justice Department,

00:10:46but the mutual contempt the two men felt was the worst-kept secret in Washington.

00:10:51Bobby felt that Vietnam threatened to tarnish not only the incumbent's legacy,

00:10:54but also his brothers.

00:10:56He felt Johnson was increasingly listening to the generals

00:10:59and was being pushed into a war

00:11:01that would have disastrous consequences for America.

00:11:05Correct me, I think you asked me.

00:11:06The Attorney General, I know.

00:11:08Loud, I can't hear you.

00:11:09The Attorney General, I know.

00:11:11All right.

00:11:12Take this, will you?

00:11:13Yes, sir.

00:11:15Hello?

00:11:16Oh, Mr. President,

00:11:17I have not been involved intimately on the Southeast Asia of Vietnam.

00:11:25Based on my two meetings at the National Security Council meeting,

00:11:29I thought that there was too much emphasis, really, on the military aspects of it.

00:11:34I would think that that war will never be won militarily,

00:11:39but where it's going to be won, really, is the political war.

00:11:43That they're dropping a bomb someplace,

00:11:46they're sending more planes there.

00:11:47if the people themselves aren't interested.

00:11:50I think that that's good thinking,

00:11:54and that's not any different from the way I have felt about it.

00:11:59We're not ready to have a declaration of war,

00:12:01or a war by executive order.

00:12:04If you're going to be here,

00:12:05I wish you'd get in with Bundy when he gets back here.

00:12:08I didn't want to, you know, put myself in there.

00:12:12You put yourself in everything that you've ever been doing.

00:12:15You're wanted and needed,

00:12:17and we care,

00:12:19and we must have all the capacity we have and all the experience.

00:12:23And I wouldn't say that if I didn't want to want that,

00:12:26and I don't need to say it,

00:12:28and I just say much obliged and thank you if I didn't want it.

00:12:32I sincerely want it and genuinely want it,

00:12:34and they're never going to separate us as far as I'm concerned.

00:12:37Thank you, Mr. President.

00:12:37All right, Bobby.

00:12:38Thanks, sir.

00:12:40Bobby called his closest friend in the cabinet, Robert McNamara,

00:12:44to try and reverse what he saw as a headlong rush into war.

00:12:47McNamara only confirmed Kennedy's suspicions.

00:12:50The Attorney General then wrote to Johnson with a startling offer.

00:12:54He was willing to go to Saigon as the ambassador,

00:12:57a move he hoped would fraught the generals.

00:12:59But Johnson was not about to hand the conduct of the war

00:13:02to a man he privately described,

00:13:04as an inexperienced little runt.

00:13:07Yes.

00:13:08And I know you so many times.

00:13:10This matter?

00:13:11Yes.

00:13:11The Attorney General on line O.

00:13:15I'm with some folks.

00:13:16I just wanted you to know

00:13:18that the nicest thing happened to me since I've been here is your note,

00:13:21and I appreciate you so very, very much,

00:13:23and I can't think of letting you do that,

00:13:25but you've got to help me with who we do get,

00:13:28and we've got to get him pretty soon.

00:13:29We'll talk about it in the next few hours,

00:13:31but I think we're in better shape than we've ever been

00:13:34when that letter come in,

00:13:35and I want you to know it.

00:13:36I'll sleep better tonight.

00:13:37Thank you very much, Mr. President.

00:13:38I appreciate it more than you'll ever know.

00:13:40Oh, that's very nice.

00:13:41You're a great, great guy.

00:13:42You wouldn't write that kind of letter.

00:13:43Thank you very much.

00:13:44I'll come back.

00:13:44Thanks, Bob.

00:13:45Instead of turning to doves, such as Bobby Kennedy,

00:13:48Johnson chose Maxwell Taylor,

00:13:50the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

00:13:52Johnson wanted a four-star general,

00:13:54not a diplomat, representing his interests in Saigon.

00:13:58He also felt the Pentagon should take the offensive.

00:14:02In April 1964,

00:14:04the President told his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara,

00:14:07that America was treaty-bound to defend South Vietnam,

00:14:10that her word was on the line

00:14:13that Americans would never accept defeat.

00:14:21Yes, Mr. President,

00:14:25Secretary McNamara on 9-0.

00:14:29Bob?

00:14:29Yes, Mr. President.

00:14:30I hate to bother you, but...

00:14:32No trouble at all.

00:14:33Tell me, have we got anybody that's got a military mind

00:14:36that can give us some military plans for winning that war?

00:14:39Let's get some more of something, my friend,

00:14:42because I'm going to have a hard attack

00:14:43if you don't get me something.

00:14:44What I want is somebody that can lay up some plans

00:14:49to trap these guys and whoop the hell out of them,

00:14:52kill some of them.

00:14:53That's what I want to do.

00:14:55If this Army Chief's staff's not going to do it,

00:14:57let's get somebody else that'll do it.

00:14:59I'll try and bring something back

00:15:01that will meet that objective.

00:15:02Don't give up.

00:15:03Right now.

00:15:03That was the Johnson style.

00:15:07He may not have wanted the fight,

00:15:09but he was used to winning

00:15:10and couldn't understand why America,

00:15:12for all its might,

00:15:13could be cowed by a peasant army.

00:15:18McNamara arrived in country

00:15:20in search of a winning strategy.

00:15:22He was told America and her ally were losing the war.

00:15:25A communist victory could come within weeks.

00:15:27He readily accepted a series of proposals

00:15:30that became known as Op Plan 34A,

00:15:33the use of South Vietnamese special forces

00:15:35under direct American control

00:15:37to launch counterattacks deep into North Vietnam.

00:15:44The operations would be funded by the U.S. military,

00:15:47the missions approved by President Johnson himself.

00:15:50They were described by McNamara as mere pinpricks.

00:15:54But as with so much of this war,

00:15:55it was these small, incremental steps

00:15:58that would have profound

00:15:59and disastrous results for America.

00:16:08July 31st, 1964.

00:16:12A PT boat left the South Vietnam harbor

00:16:14at Da Nang headed north.

00:16:17Its target, a North Vietnamese radar site

00:16:19on the island of Han Mi.

00:16:21The mission, controlled by the U.S.,

00:16:24but manned by South Vietnamese special forces.

00:16:28Out in the Gulf of Tonkin,

00:16:30the USS Maddox was steaming towards the same location

00:16:32on an intelligence-gathering mission.

00:16:35Both these operations,

00:16:36part of the Op Plan 34A strategy,

00:16:39developed to reverse the course of the conflict.

00:16:41Two of McNamara's small pinpricks

00:16:44in an undeclared war few Americans knew

00:16:46was even being fought.

00:16:49After firing 1,000 rounds into the radar site,

00:16:53the PT boat headed south,

00:16:54crossing the path of the Maddox.

00:16:57Behind it, two North Vietnamese boats

00:17:00in hot pursuit.

00:17:06The course of a war that had been simmering

00:17:09on America's back burner

00:17:10since the Eisenhower administration

00:17:12was about to turn red hot.

00:17:20The USS Maddox calibrated her guns

00:17:23and opened fire.

00:17:24The first naval battle

00:17:31between American and Communist forces

00:17:33was a one-sided affair.

00:17:35The Americans suffered no casualties.

00:17:38The Vietnamese boats were sunk.

00:17:40Lyndon Johnson decided against further escalation,

00:17:43but his patience was wearing thin.

00:17:45I want to leave an impression

00:17:48that we're going to be firm as hell

00:17:50without saying something as dangerous.

00:17:52The people that are calling me up,

00:17:54they all feel

00:17:55that the Navy responded wonderfully

00:17:57and that's good,

00:17:58but they want to be damn sure

00:17:59I don't pull them out and run,

00:18:00and they want to be damn sure

00:18:02that we're firm.

00:18:03We sure ought to always leave the impression

00:18:05that if you shoot at us,

00:18:07you're going to get hit.

00:18:08The USS Maddox repositioned itself

00:18:10for a return to the edge

00:18:11of North Vietnamese waters,

00:18:13a move specifically designed

00:18:15to provoke a second attack.

00:18:21McNamara hurried to the combat command center

00:18:23in the basement of the Pentagon.

00:18:25This was the hub

00:18:26that managed global crises

00:18:27involving the U.S. military.

00:18:30Closed to cameras,

00:18:31we have recreated the scene

00:18:32to bring the calls to life.

00:18:34It was here that McNamara huddled

00:18:36with senior military officers

00:18:37going over target folders,

00:18:40a list of assets America would destroy

00:18:42if the North Vietnamese

00:18:43came out looking for another fight.

00:18:46Yes.

00:18:47Secretary McNamara, I know.

00:18:49Yes.

00:18:50Mr. President,

00:18:51we have pictures, analyses,

00:18:53numbers of sorties,

00:18:54bomb loadings,

00:18:54everything prepared

00:18:55for all the target systems

00:18:57of North Vietnam.

00:18:5970% of the petroleum supply

00:19:01of North Vietnam,

00:19:02we believe,

00:19:02is concentrated in three dumps,

00:19:06and we can bomb those,

00:19:07bomb or strafe those dumps,

00:19:09destroy the petroleum system.

00:19:10In addition,

00:19:11there are certain prestige targets

00:19:13that we've been working on

00:19:14the last several months,

00:19:14and we have target folders

00:19:15prepared on those.

00:19:16For example,

00:19:17there is one bridge

00:19:18that is the key bridge

00:19:20on the rail line

00:19:21south out of Hanoi,

00:19:23and we could destroy that,

00:19:24and there are other

00:19:25prestige targets of that kind.

00:19:27Okay.

00:19:30Johnson and McNamara

00:19:31had initiated

00:19:32an unstoppable momentum

00:19:33for war.

00:19:34Out in the Gulf,

00:19:40a second destroyer,

00:19:42the Turner Joy,

00:19:43joined the Maddox,

00:19:44and a second carrier,

00:19:45the Constellation,

00:19:46was sent to reinforce

00:19:48the USS Ticonderoga,

00:19:49already on station.

00:19:52America now had ample force

00:19:53to execute the target folders

00:19:55prepared by McNamara.

00:19:57A full-scale engagement

00:19:58seemed inevitable.

00:19:59The next 24 hours

00:20:01would set the nation

00:20:02on a course

00:20:03that would lead it

00:20:03into the most divisive war

00:20:05in its history.

00:20:19It was a dirty night

00:20:20out in the Gulf.

00:20:24Air convent.

00:20:25One, two, five.

00:20:27Barry.

00:20:28The crew of the Maddox

00:20:29and Turner Joy

00:20:30had been at battle stations

00:20:31for over 18 hours.

00:20:33C-PAC fleet.

00:20:35At the Pentagon,

00:20:36the military command center

00:20:37was on high alert.

00:20:39The chiefs were gathering,

00:20:40and everyone

00:20:41was expecting trouble.

00:20:42The assumption was

00:20:43that the North Vietnamese

00:20:44would want revenge

00:20:45for the incident

00:20:46just two days earlier.

00:20:48The second attack,

00:20:49when it came,

00:20:50seemed inevitable,

00:20:51almost scripted.

00:20:54Alpha, Barry, one.

00:20:56Sonar operators

00:20:57reported torpedoes

00:20:59in the water.

00:21:00The Turner Joy

00:21:01and Maddox

00:21:01opened fire,

00:21:03shooting into

00:21:03the pitch-dark night

00:21:04towards an enemy

00:21:06that appeared to dart

00:21:07across the radar screen.

00:21:09Overhead,

00:21:10pilots from the carriers

00:21:11were dropping flares,

00:21:12searching for the

00:21:13incoming enemy.

00:21:14in the air.

00:21:15Hello?

00:21:17Secretary McNamara,

00:21:189-0.

00:21:19President,

00:21:20we just had

00:21:21word by telephone

00:21:22from Admiral Sharp

00:21:23that the destroyer

00:21:25is under torpedo attack.

00:21:26What are these planes

00:21:27that are going around

00:21:28while they're being attacked?

00:21:29The report is

00:21:30that they have observed,

00:21:32and we don't know

00:21:33by what means,

00:21:34whether this is radar

00:21:34or otherwise.

00:21:35I suspect it's radar,

00:21:37two unidentified vessels

00:21:38and three unidentified

00:21:40prop aircraft

00:21:41in the vicinity

00:21:42of the destroyers.

00:21:43Okay?

00:21:46It lasted two hours.

00:21:50Then, silence.

00:21:52Both destroyers reported

00:21:56no damage from the attack.

00:21:57At dawn,

00:21:58across the ocean,

00:21:59no debris,

00:22:01nothing to suggest

00:22:02there had ever even been

00:22:03an engagement.

00:22:04By now,

00:22:05the planes had returned

00:22:06to the carriers,

00:22:07and the pilots debriefed.

00:22:08No one reported

00:22:09actually seeing the enemy.

00:22:11The MADIC's captain,

00:22:13John Herrick,

00:22:13sent an urgent message

00:22:15that read,

00:22:16Review of action

00:22:17makes many reported contacts

00:22:18and torpedoes fired

00:22:19appear doubtful.

00:22:22Johnson was not shown

00:22:25the Herrick message.

00:22:26That afternoon,

00:22:27he had his own agenda.

00:22:29He had decided

00:22:29to address the nation

00:22:30to announce his decision

00:22:32to bomb

00:22:33North Vietnamese targets.

00:22:34He also wanted

00:22:35to notify the Congress

00:22:36that he was going

00:22:37to seek all necessary powers

00:22:39to deter future

00:22:40North Vietnamese aggression.

00:22:42He telephoned

00:22:42a congressman from Texas.

00:22:44We're going to retaliate

00:22:47and we'll make an announcement

00:22:48a little later in the evening,

00:22:49the next hour or so,

00:22:50and we'll probably ask

00:22:51the Congress for a resolution

00:22:52tomorrow or the next day

00:22:53to support us.

00:22:55Oh, yes.

00:22:56Well, as you know,

00:22:57you'll get whatever you want.

00:22:59But I don't know.

00:22:59I hope so.

00:23:00If you don't react

00:23:01when they shoot at your ships

00:23:03on the high seas

00:23:0460 miles from shore,

00:23:05you can't appear

00:23:06to be weak

00:23:08or appeasing

00:23:09on a thing

00:23:09when the issue

00:23:10is so clearly drawn.

00:23:11They attacked us yesterday

00:23:12and they attacked us

00:23:12again today.

00:23:13Yeah.

00:23:14You're on the right track,

00:23:15Mr. President.

00:23:16And thanks so much

00:23:17for calling.

00:23:18Bye.

00:23:22Meanwhile,

00:23:23out on the carriers,

00:23:24men were struggling

00:23:24to reconfigure their planes

00:23:26for a ground attack.

00:23:28The president

00:23:28was desperate

00:23:29to announce the bombing

00:23:30before the television audience

00:23:31was fast asleep

00:23:32and the final editions

00:23:34of the next day's papers

00:23:35had been put to bed.

00:23:38The TV networks

00:23:39were admitted

00:23:40to the White House

00:23:41soon after 10.

00:23:42To avoid warning Hanoi

00:23:44of retribution to come,

00:23:45Johnson had agreed

00:23:46to delay his broadcast

00:23:47until American planes

00:23:49were over their targets.

00:23:51At 11.25 p.m.,

00:23:53he put on his jacket,

00:23:54leaving McGeorge Bundy,

00:23:56his national security advisor,

00:23:58to take the long-awaited call

00:23:59from McNamara

00:24:00at the Pentagon.

00:24:03McNamara made the call

00:24:04while many of the planes

00:24:05were still standing

00:24:06on the flight deck

00:24:07of the U.S. carriers.

00:24:12Yes?

00:24:12Secretary McNamara,

00:24:13on 9-0.

00:24:15They launched

00:24:1640 minutes ago.

00:24:17Oh, that's good.

00:24:18Definite?

00:24:18Definite.

00:24:19Affirmative.

00:24:20Confirmed.

00:24:21Thank heaven.

00:24:22We're going in about 10 minutes.

00:24:23All right, that's sure.

00:24:24That's excellent.

00:24:25You're certain

00:24:26you're going in 10 minutes?

00:24:27In about 10.

00:24:27That's all right

00:24:28from your point of view, isn't it?

00:24:29I just want to plan it here.

00:24:30Definite.

00:24:31Confirmed launch 40 minutes ago.

00:24:33Thank you, Bob.

00:24:33Okay, thanks.

00:24:34It was after 11.30 p.m.

00:24:36on the East Coast

00:24:37before Johnson announced

00:24:38the retaliatory raids.

00:24:41Renewed hostile actions

00:24:43against United States ships

00:24:46on the high seas

00:24:47in the Gulf of Tonkin

00:24:49have today required me

00:24:52to order the military forces

00:24:54of the United States

00:24:55to take action in reply.

00:25:00Swift and sure has been

00:25:01U.S. retaliation

00:25:02for communist PT boat attacks

00:25:04on the high seas.

00:25:05The Americans would have been justified

00:25:07in responding

00:25:08if the attack

00:25:08had actually taken place.

00:25:10However, within days

00:25:11Johnson would be shown

00:25:12compelling evidence

00:25:13that there had been

00:25:14no North Vietnamese strike

00:25:16against either the Maddox

00:25:17or the Turner Joy

00:25:18on August 4, 1964.

00:25:21Still, the Congress

00:25:22was assured

00:25:22by senior administration officials

00:25:24that the evidence

00:25:25of an unprovoked attack

00:25:27in international waters

00:25:28was overwhelming.

00:25:29Among them, Robert McNamara

00:25:32who drove the two miles

00:25:34from the Pentagon

00:25:35to Capitol Hill

00:25:36to brief senators.

00:25:38Committee on Foreign Relations

00:25:40this morning

00:25:40will come to order.

00:25:41He assured members

00:25:42of the Foreign Relations Committee

00:25:43that the U.S. Navy

00:25:45played no part in

00:25:46nor had any knowledge of

00:25:48any covert operations

00:25:50underway from Da Nang.

00:25:51We are following

00:25:52a policy of restraint

00:25:53and I think it's a policy

00:25:56that each of us

00:25:57as citizens of this country

00:25:58should be proud of

00:25:59and it's a policy

00:26:00that the credit

00:26:01for which belongs

00:26:04to the President,

00:26:05the Commander-in-Chief.

00:26:06He failed to mention

00:26:07that the missions

00:26:08were actually run

00:26:09by the U.S. Navy SEALs.

00:26:11Senator J. William Fulbright,

00:26:12chairman of the powerful

00:26:13Foreign Relations Committee,

00:26:15would later accuse

00:26:16the Secretary of Defense

00:26:17of a calculated deception.

00:26:19Whatever the intent,

00:26:21the result at the time

00:26:22was a ringing endorsement

00:26:23from the United States Senate.

00:26:25On the whole,

00:26:25I think the hearings

00:26:26were very satisfactory.

00:26:28It was just

00:26:28near unanimous support

00:26:30for not only

00:26:31for everything you've done,

00:26:32it was unanimous support

00:26:33for that,

00:26:34but near unanimous support

00:26:35for everything you may do

00:26:36in the future.

00:26:37And generally,

00:26:38a blank check authorization

00:26:40for further action.

00:26:46Johnson wasn't interested

00:26:48in debating

00:26:49whether the North

00:26:49might have been acting

00:26:50in self-defense

00:26:51and was beside himself

00:26:53when the loquacious

00:26:54Senator Hubert Humphrey

00:26:55talked about the commando

00:26:57raids in public.

00:26:59Johnson,

00:26:59determined to protect

00:27:00the authorized version

00:27:01of events,

00:27:02called a mutual friend.

00:27:05Mr. Vaule.

00:27:06Hello.

00:27:07Jim.

00:27:08This boy,

00:27:11our friend Hubert,

00:27:12is just destroying himself

00:27:13with his big mouth.

00:27:15He went on the TV

00:27:16and every person in town

00:27:18that's handling war plans,

00:27:20it just scared them to death

00:27:23because he just blabbed

00:27:25everything that he had heard

00:27:26in a briefing.

00:27:28They said,

00:27:28for instance,

00:27:29how would you account

00:27:31for these PT-able attack

00:27:34on our destroyers

00:27:35when we innocently

00:27:36lay out there

00:27:36in the Gulf

00:27:3760 miles from shore?

00:27:39Humphrey said,

00:27:40well,

00:27:40we have been carrying on

00:27:42some operations

00:27:43in that area

00:27:43and we've been having

00:27:45some covert operations

00:27:47where we have been going in

00:27:48and knocking out roads

00:27:49and petroleum things

00:27:50and so forth

00:27:51and that's exactly

00:27:53what we have been doing.

00:27:55He just got to understand

00:27:56that you can't talk

00:27:57about war plans.

00:27:58You just can't talk about it.

00:27:59And he just ought to

00:28:00keep his goddamn

00:28:01big mouth shut

00:28:02on foreign affairs

00:28:04at least until

00:28:04the election's over.

00:28:06Humphrey's intervention

00:28:07failed to stop

00:28:08a congressional rush

00:28:09to judgment.

00:28:10The politicians wanted

00:28:12to reward the show

00:28:13of firmness

00:28:13and by an overwhelming

00:28:15vote of 502 to 2,

00:28:17the House and the Senate

00:28:18gave Lyndon Johnson

00:28:19a license

00:28:20that would haunt

00:28:21the institution

00:28:21for decades.

00:28:23The president still hoped

00:28:24he wouldn't have

00:28:25to cash that check

00:28:25but the overwhelming margin

00:28:27meant that Johnson felt

00:28:29he'd been given

00:28:30all the authority

00:28:31he'd ever need.

00:28:34And I pledge

00:28:35to all Americans

00:28:36to use those powers

00:28:38with all the wisdom

00:28:40and the judgment

00:28:42that God grants to me.

00:28:44On August 7, 1964,

00:28:46the president signed

00:28:47the Gulf of Tonkin resolution

00:28:48in the East Room

00:28:49of the White House.

00:28:50It would be one

00:28:51of the great ironies

00:28:52of the whole war.

00:28:54The president receiving

00:28:55a blank check

00:28:55for a war he never

00:28:57really wanted

00:28:57justified by an event

00:28:59that never happened.

00:29:01The Viet Cong

00:29:01was unmoved.

00:29:09Six hours later,

00:29:10they placed a bomb

00:29:11outside the Eden Theater

00:29:12on Flowers Street

00:29:14in Saigon.

00:29:15One American

00:29:16and six Vietnamese

00:29:17were killed.

00:29:18The American ambassador,

00:29:26Maxwell Taylor,

00:29:27cabled Washington.

00:29:29The U.S.

00:29:29should accelerate

00:29:30its plans

00:29:30to take the war

00:29:31to the north,

00:29:32he said.

00:29:33This was not

00:29:33what Johnson

00:29:34wanted to hear.

00:29:35This was an election

00:29:36year in America.

00:29:37Johnson was running

00:29:38as a peace candidate.

00:29:39Talk of a military escalation

00:29:41was just what

00:29:42his Republican opponent,

00:29:43Senator Barry Goldwater,

00:29:45was advocating.

00:29:46In the fall campaign,

00:29:56the Democrats

00:29:56latched onto

00:29:57an off-hand remark

00:29:58by the Republican nominee,

00:30:00Senator Barry Goldwater,

00:30:01that he wouldn't exclude

00:30:02the use of nuclear weapons

00:30:04in Vietnam.

00:30:05Eight, nine...

00:30:08Eight, seven, six, five,

00:30:12four, three, two, one...

00:30:16These are the stakes

00:30:21to make a world

00:30:24in which all

00:30:25of God's children

00:30:26can live

00:30:26or to go

00:30:28into the dark.

00:30:30We must either

00:30:31love each other

00:30:32or we must die.

00:30:36Vote for President Johnson

00:30:37on November 3rd.

00:30:39The stakes are too high

00:30:40for you to stay home.

00:30:41LBJ had to perform

00:30:48a balancing act.

00:30:49If he pulled out,

00:30:50he'd appear weak.

00:30:51If he escalated,

00:30:53he faced all-out war

00:30:54that he feared

00:30:55could quickly expand

00:30:56to include a million members

00:30:57of the Chinese Red Army.

00:30:59The commander-in-chief

00:31:00was all too aware

00:31:02of the 250 men

00:31:03already lost

00:31:04in this undeclared war

00:31:05and those

00:31:06who might follow.

00:31:08As your president,

00:31:09I deal every day

00:31:11with the problems

00:31:12that affect your freedom

00:31:13and affect the peace

00:31:15of the world.

00:31:16And there are those

00:31:17that say

00:31:17that you ought

00:31:18to go north

00:31:19and drop bombs

00:31:20to try to wipe out

00:31:22supply lines.

00:31:23And we think

00:31:24that would escalate

00:31:25the war.

00:31:26And we don't want

00:31:26our American boys

00:31:27to do the fighting

00:31:28for our Asian boys

00:31:29and we don't want

00:31:30to get involved

00:31:31in a nation

00:31:32with 700 million people

00:31:33and get tied down

00:31:34in a land war

00:31:36in Asia.

00:31:37But we are not about

00:31:39to start another war

00:31:40and we're not about

00:31:41to run away

00:31:42from where we are.

00:31:48The problem was

00:31:49that many American boys

00:31:51were already in battle.

00:31:55U.S. troops

00:31:56were increasingly involved

00:31:58in combat missions

00:31:59even if they were

00:32:00still listed as advisors.

00:32:03U.S. helicopters

00:32:06ferried the South

00:32:07Vietnamese to the front

00:32:08and instructors

00:32:09went in with the forward

00:32:10teams in search

00:32:11of the Viet Cong.

00:32:15Despite this,

00:32:17Johnson repeated

00:32:18his assurance

00:32:18that he had no plans

00:32:20to escalate the war,

00:32:22a pledge that was

00:32:22undermined by reports

00:32:23out of Saigon

00:32:24that the South

00:32:25was losing

00:32:26and losing badly.

00:32:28From his ranch

00:32:28in Johnson City, Texas,

00:32:30LBJ received

00:32:31a bleak assessment

00:32:32from his Secretary

00:32:33of Defense.

00:32:34Tell me,

00:32:35what's your evaluation

00:32:36of the stuff

00:32:39we get at night?

00:32:39I'm just reading it.

00:32:40It doesn't look very good.

00:32:41Oh, it doesn't look good,

00:32:42Mr. President.

00:32:43It's no different, though,

00:32:44than we've seen here

00:32:45and sensed here,

00:32:46you know,

00:32:46for some time.

00:32:48But I think

00:32:49the odds are

00:32:50we can squeeze through

00:32:54between now

00:32:55and the next several weeks.

00:32:56But it certainly

00:32:58is a weak situation.

00:33:00I really don't think

00:33:01there's much we can do

00:33:02in the next several weeks

00:33:04to change the outlook.

00:33:06But neither do I think

00:33:07it's going to completely

00:33:08collapse during that period.

00:33:11Afterwards,

00:33:11so,

00:33:12after the election,

00:33:14we've got a real

00:33:15problem on our hands.

00:33:17So the best

00:33:20the administration

00:33:21could hope for

00:33:22was to contain the enemy

00:33:23until election day,

00:33:24reject any request

00:33:25from the Joint Chiefs

00:33:26to strike back

00:33:27at the North Vietnamese

00:33:28for fear that

00:33:29would escalate the fight

00:33:30and validate

00:33:31Goldwater's strategy.

00:33:33It was a policy

00:33:35that came under threat

00:33:36on September the 15th

00:33:37when the Pentagon

00:33:38informed the president

00:33:39that in a repeat

00:33:40of the attack

00:33:41on the USS Maddox

00:33:42just five weeks earlier,

00:33:44an American destroyer

00:33:45had been fired upon

00:33:46by communist PT boats

00:33:47out in the Gulf of Tonkin.

00:33:50Again,

00:33:51we have recreated the scene.

00:33:54There's beginning

00:33:55to appear evidence

00:33:56that there is an attack

00:33:57underway

00:33:57and it was intentional.

00:33:59There appear to be

00:33:59four PT boats

00:34:01attacking our two destroyers.

00:34:03The two destroyers

00:34:03are firing all guns

00:34:05and they think

00:34:06they may have hit

00:34:07one PT boat.

00:34:09Now, the problem,

00:34:10it seems to me,

00:34:10is not to hit the PT boats

00:34:12or destroy them.

00:34:12The problem is,

00:34:13if it is an intentional attack,

00:34:15what additional action

00:34:16do we take?

00:34:16And I've got the chiefs

00:34:17thinking about that now.

00:34:18Okay.

00:34:23The chief's recommendation

00:34:24was unanimous,

00:34:26strike back

00:34:26with a massive

00:34:27retaliatory bombing raid

00:34:28into North Vietnam.

00:34:30This time, however,

00:34:32Johnson demanded restraint.

00:34:33the defense is a big deal.

00:34:34Now, Bob,

00:34:35I have found

00:34:36over the years

00:34:38that we see

00:34:39and we hear

00:34:40and we imagine

00:34:41a lot of things

00:34:42in the form of attacks.

00:34:45I sure want more

00:34:46caution

00:34:47on the part

00:34:48of these admirals

00:34:49about whether

00:34:50they're being fired

00:34:50on or not.

00:34:51I don't want them

00:34:52just to have

00:34:52some change-of-life woman

00:34:53running up

00:34:54and saying

00:34:54that, I got,

00:34:55she's being raped

00:34:56when they just got

00:34:57a man walks in the room.

00:34:59Because you just came in

00:34:59a few weeks ago

00:35:00and said,

00:35:00damn,

00:35:01they're launching

00:35:01an attack on us.

00:35:02They're firing on us.

00:35:03And we got through

00:35:04all the firing

00:35:04which included

00:35:05maybe they hadn't

00:35:05fired at all.

00:35:06As I say,

00:35:07there was either

00:35:07an intentional attack

00:35:09or a substantial engagement.

00:35:10I differentiate

00:35:11one from the other.

00:35:12What is a substantial engagement?

00:35:13It doesn't mean

00:35:14that we could have

00:35:15started it

00:35:15and they just responded.

00:35:16But they stayed there

00:35:17for an hour or so.

00:35:20The first...

00:35:20They'd be justified

00:35:21staying home

00:35:22if we start shooting at us.

00:35:24All night,

00:35:25the chiefs prepared

00:35:26their target folders

00:35:27while a cautious president

00:35:28demanded proof

00:35:29that the attack

00:35:30had actually taken place.

00:35:33I'll have to decide

00:35:34between now

00:35:35and sometime this evening.

00:35:37I'm going to do

00:35:38what ought to be done

00:35:39and I'm going to answer them

00:35:40in kind

00:35:41but I want to be damn sure

00:35:42I'm answering somebody.

00:35:43If a goddamn wheel

00:35:43jumps up out there

00:35:44and some lieutenant

00:35:46junior grade

00:35:46starts firing at him

00:35:48and he can't show me

00:35:49some results,

00:35:50I don't want to be over

00:35:51dropping bombs

00:35:52on somebody's capital.

00:35:54After 12 hours,

00:35:55the president ordered

00:35:56a standout.

00:35:57There would be

00:35:58no attacks on the north,

00:36:00at least until

00:36:00the election was over.

00:36:04Then,

00:36:04with just 48 hours left

00:36:06before election day,

00:36:07the Viet Cong

00:36:08struck again.

00:36:09This time,

00:36:10they launched

00:36:10a heavy mortar attack

00:36:11into a U.S. military compound

00:36:13at Binh Ho,

00:36:1412 miles north of Saigon.

00:36:16Five airmen were dead.

00:36:29A helicopter

00:36:30and six B-57 aircraft

00:36:32destroyed.

00:36:33Ambassador Maxwell Taylor

00:36:34joined General Westmoreland

00:36:36in assessing the damage.

00:36:37Both men recommended

00:36:48reprisal attacks

00:36:49against targets

00:36:50in the north.

00:36:51Johnson again

00:36:52turned them down.

00:36:53He did privately

00:36:54tell his senior military advisor,

00:36:56General Earl Wheeler,

00:36:58to be patient.

00:36:59Wait another 48 hours

00:37:00and then he'd be

00:37:01in a position to decide.

00:37:02Ladies and gentlemen,

00:37:05it's nice for you

00:37:06to introduce

00:37:06the President

00:37:07of the United States.

00:37:09Dawn on election day

00:37:10at the LBJ Ranch

00:37:11in Texas

00:37:12brought news

00:37:13of a pending landslide

00:37:14of historic proportions.

00:37:16Goldwater's policy

00:37:17of escalation

00:37:18in Vietnam

00:37:19had been soundly rejected.

00:37:22Mr. Bundy,

00:37:23I have the Secretary

00:37:24on the line.

00:37:26Happy election day,

00:37:27Mr. Bundy.

00:37:28How are you?

00:37:28Fine.

00:37:29Just a moment

00:37:29for the President.

00:37:31How's the thing going?

00:37:33Everything's fine up here.

00:37:34We feel good.

00:37:35And how have you been?

00:37:36It must have been

00:37:37a long day for you.

00:37:38I just fell apart.

00:37:39I just fell apart.

00:37:40I just so damn,

00:37:41my back is killing me.

00:37:43I got so sore today

00:37:44I didn't realize

00:37:45how much I'd been doing

00:37:46and how high up

00:37:49on the mountain I'd been.

00:37:50I've been keyed too high.

00:37:53What happens outside?

00:37:56What happened, sir?

00:37:58Vietnam.

00:37:59Nothing out there,

00:38:00but I think

00:38:01they're operating

00:38:02under the assumption

00:38:03that we're really

00:38:05getting ready

00:38:06and I feel in a way

00:38:09that nobody should ask you

00:38:11to make any decision

00:38:12until you're acting

00:38:13with today behind you.

00:38:19In Washington,

00:38:20even as the returns

00:38:21were coming in,

00:38:22the President's men

00:38:22were at work

00:38:23on a detailed plan

00:38:24to escalate the fight.

00:38:26Within three weeks,

00:38:27they would present

00:38:27their recommendations.

00:38:29A sustained U.S.-led bombing campaign

00:38:32against targets

00:38:33inside North Vietnam.

00:38:38On Christmas Eve,

00:38:39the Viet Cong struck

00:38:40in the heart of Saigon,

00:38:42destroying the U.S. officer's billet

00:38:44at the Brinks Hotel,

00:38:45killing two Americans

00:38:46and wounding 38 others.

00:38:48McGeorge Bundy sent a memo

00:38:54to the President

00:38:55suggesting that

00:38:56the current policy

00:38:57could only lead to defeat.

00:38:59America could no longer

00:39:00simply support

00:39:02the South Vietnamese

00:39:03and hope for the best.

00:39:04Vietnam wasn't about

00:39:06supporting an ally,

00:39:07it was about

00:39:08defeating communism.

00:39:09As 1964 came to an end,

00:39:12America had 23,000

00:39:14military advisors

00:39:15in Vietnam.

00:39:15140 Americans

00:39:24had died

00:39:25over the past year.

00:39:307,000 South Vietnamese

00:39:32and an estimated

00:39:3317,000 Viet Cong

00:39:35and North Vietnamese

00:39:35also perished,

00:39:37and there seemed

00:39:38no end to the fighting.

00:39:45and will to the best

00:39:54of my ability.

00:39:55Inauguration Day, 1965.

00:39:59Reserve, protect,

00:40:01and defend.

00:40:03The Constitution

00:40:04of the United States.

00:40:06The Constitution

00:40:06of the United States.

00:40:09So help you God.

00:40:11So help me God.

00:40:12Johnson had received

00:40:13a massive mandate

00:40:14to build his great society,

00:40:16a domestic agenda

00:40:17that overshadowed

00:40:18even the lofty dreams

00:40:19of Franklin Roosevelt.

00:40:22But the storm clouds

00:40:23were gathering.

00:40:24Johnson knew

00:40:25that Vietnam threatened

00:40:26and that his options

00:40:27were diminishing

00:40:28every day.

00:40:30If American lives

00:40:32must end

00:40:33and American treasure

00:40:35be spilled

00:40:36in countries

00:40:38that we barely know,

00:40:42then that is the price

00:40:45that change

00:40:46has demanded

00:40:47of conviction

00:40:49and of our enduring covenant.

00:40:55Two weeks later,

00:40:56that covenant would be tested

00:40:58and lives would be lost.

00:40:59This is Pleiku,

00:41:06250 miles north of Saigon,

00:41:08the airbase that was ripped

00:41:09by Vietnamese

00:41:10communist guerrillas.

00:41:12Eight Americans

00:41:12died in the attack

00:41:13that brought swift retaliation

00:41:15by U.S.

00:41:16and South Vietnamese forces.

00:41:23President Johnson's

00:41:24special assistant

00:41:25for security affairs,

00:41:26McGeorge Bundy,

00:41:27arrives at the scene

00:41:28of the Viet Cong raid.

00:41:30He was in Vietnam

00:41:30on a mission

00:41:31for the president

00:41:32when the attacks

00:41:33took place.

00:41:34Bundy had already decided

00:41:35it was time

00:41:36to launch an aerial assault

00:41:37deep into North Vietnam.

00:41:39The Pleiku attack

00:41:40confirmed that opinion.

00:41:42He cabled the White House

00:41:42imploring Johnson

00:41:44to accept the case

00:41:45for widening the war.

00:41:47Our best chance of success

00:41:48is a policy

00:41:49of sustained reprisal

00:41:50against North Vietnam.

00:41:52We believe the risks

00:41:53of such a policy

00:41:53are real but acceptable.

00:41:56Measured against

00:41:57the cost of defeat,

00:41:58this program seems cheap.

00:42:01Bundy's message

00:42:01reached the White House

00:42:03during the evening

00:42:03of February 6th.

00:42:05Johnson accepted

00:42:06the near-unanimous recommendation

00:42:07of his senior advisors

00:42:09that America

00:42:10should retaliate.

00:42:16Operation Flaming Dart

00:42:17was the American response.

00:42:1949 Navy aircraft

00:42:20took off from the USS Coral Sea

00:42:22and Hancock,

00:42:23the first American air strike

00:42:25since the Gulf of Tonkin incident

00:42:26six months earlier.

00:42:34The Pentagon Command Center

00:42:36was on full alert.

00:42:37Throughout the night,

00:42:38they monitored the planes

00:42:39as they approached

00:42:39their principal target,

00:42:41Dung Hoi,

00:42:41a guerrilla training ground

00:42:4340 miles north

00:42:44of the 17th parallel.

00:42:46Monitoring the crisis

00:42:46in the Pentagon

00:42:47was McNamara's

00:42:48principal deputy,

00:42:49Cyrus Vance.

00:42:51Mr. Bradshaw,

00:42:52we've got the first

00:42:53fragmentary report

00:42:54of after action

00:42:55on that Dung Hoi.

00:42:57It says,

00:42:57many fires started

00:42:58in buildings

00:42:59in northern sector

00:43:00Dung Hoi area,

00:43:01heavy damage

00:43:02to many buildings

00:43:03in the same area,

00:43:04heavy AA fire observed

00:43:05from two gunboats

00:43:06on river north

00:43:07of Complex.

00:43:07That's the only information

00:43:10so far,

00:43:11but apparently

00:43:11they did hit it

00:43:12pretty well.

00:43:15What is this heavy

00:43:16gunboot fire?

00:43:17That's AA fire

00:43:19against our planes

00:43:20from two gunboats

00:43:21on the river

00:43:22north of the complex

00:43:23they were hitting.

00:43:25On the pilot

00:43:26that's down,

00:43:27we know he ejected

00:43:29from his aircraft

00:43:30as it went down.

00:43:31We know no more

00:43:32than that.

00:43:33There is one other

00:43:34aircraft as yet

00:43:35unaccounted.

00:43:37That's the information

00:43:38up to date.

00:43:40That means he got

00:43:41two up and down

00:43:42and probably down.

00:43:43Probably two down,

00:43:44sir, I think.

00:43:45All right,

00:43:45well, you keep on cold

00:43:46and don't you get anything.

00:43:47I certainly will, sir.

00:43:53But for every

00:43:54American retaliation,

00:43:55the Viet Cong

00:43:56simply raised the stakes.

00:43:58Two days after

00:43:58authorizing the attack

00:43:59on Dung Hoi,

00:44:00the president received word

00:44:01that the Viet Cong

00:44:02had again responded in kind.

00:44:07Hello.

00:44:11Mr. President,

00:44:12we've had another bombing,

00:44:13as you may have heard.

00:44:14Nope.

00:44:15A barracks

00:44:16in a town called Bindia,

00:44:18and we don't yet have,

00:44:20no, Quien An is the town.

00:44:22We don't yet have

00:44:22casualty reports

00:44:23except 21 wounded,

00:44:25but the whole building

00:44:25collapsed,

00:44:26so the chances are

00:44:27there'll be something more.

00:44:29Where is Quien An located?

00:44:31It's up in the

00:44:33northern part

00:44:35of South Vietnam?

00:44:35Central part,

00:44:36northern part of South Vietnam,

00:44:38as I understand it.

00:44:39And it's strictly American?

00:44:40This particular building

00:44:42was requisitioned

00:44:43for an aircraft

00:44:43maintenance detachment.

00:44:45It was their billet.

00:44:47And what was it,

00:44:48mortar fire again?

00:44:49No,

00:44:49it seems to have been

00:44:50a sabotage bomb,

00:44:52but they don't say for sure.

00:44:54They just say

00:44:54an explosion bombed

00:44:56is what they say.

00:44:57Wheeler ought to tell

00:44:59what's more than right now.

00:45:01to start getting

00:45:03the Vietnamese cranked up.

00:45:04And he ought to tell

00:45:05his people

00:45:06and his carrier people,

00:45:07whoever he needs,

00:45:08to go on

00:45:09and start getting ready.

00:45:10The preliminary instructions

00:45:12have already been issued

00:45:13by SIGPAC,

00:45:13and they're on alert.

00:45:14All right,

00:45:15let's get them all ready

00:45:16and let's go

00:45:16if we can today.

00:45:18All right.

00:45:24For two days and nights,

00:45:26American jets punished

00:45:27the North Vietnamese

00:45:28for the Viet Cong's attacks

00:45:30on Pleiku,

00:45:30and Quinan.

00:45:32It also marked

00:45:32a turning point.

00:45:34Johnson was now ready

00:45:35to approve

00:45:35a significant escalation,

00:45:38an open-ended bombing campaign

00:45:39to undermine

00:45:40the communist leadership

00:45:42in Hanoi.

00:45:50The program was codenamed

00:45:52Rolling Thunder.

00:45:54The generals wanted it

00:45:55to last for months,

00:45:56only end following

00:45:57a communist capitulation.

00:46:00Johnson knew

00:46:00that this was

00:46:01a significant escalation,

00:46:02that it would cause problems

00:46:04on Capitol Hill.

00:46:05He needed political allies

00:46:07to join in the fight,

00:46:09men who would give

00:46:09the campaign

00:46:10a veneer

00:46:11of bipartisanship.

00:46:17Mr. President?

00:46:18Well, how are you?

00:46:19Just fine, sir.

00:46:21Let me get

00:46:21the president for you.

00:46:24Uh, yes?

00:46:25President Truman on 9-0.

00:46:27Hello?

00:46:28Hello?

00:46:29How are you feeling?

00:46:30I'm feeling pretty good.

00:46:31How are you?

00:46:32Oh, I'm having hell.

00:46:34What's the trouble?

00:46:36Well, I got a little bit

00:46:37in the Congress

00:46:38and a little bit

00:46:39with the Indochina,

00:46:42the Vietnamese,

00:46:43and a little bit

00:46:45all over the country,

00:46:46and I just thought

00:46:46I'd call you

00:46:47and try to get

00:46:48a little advice

00:46:49and a little inspiration.

00:46:51I've been reading history

00:46:52and saw how much hell

00:46:54you had,

00:46:54and you handled it

00:46:55pretty good.

00:46:55I just thought maybe

00:46:56I could learn something

00:46:57from you.

00:46:58Well, I think you're

00:46:58handling it pretty good, too.

00:46:59No.

00:47:00I think when they go in

00:47:02and kill your boys,

00:47:03you've got to head back,

00:47:04and I'm not trying

00:47:05to spread the war,

00:47:06and I'm not trying to...

00:47:07You bet you have.

00:47:08You butt them in the nose

00:47:09every time you get a chance,

00:47:11and they understand

00:47:11that language

00:47:12better than any other kind.

00:47:13Now, I don't want

00:47:14to tax you,

00:47:14but I always want you

00:47:16to know that I need

00:47:17your counsel,

00:47:18and I love you.

00:47:19Well, that's mutual,

00:47:21and I'm glad to give you

00:47:22whatever experience

00:47:23I've had,

00:47:24although you know it

00:47:24as well as I do.

00:47:26Give Ms. Best my glove.

00:47:29I'll sure do it.

00:47:30Okay.

00:47:30Good night.

00:47:31Good night.

00:47:32Good night.

00:47:34LBJ now reached out

00:47:35to former President

00:47:35Dwight Eisenhower.

00:47:37The two men met

00:47:37at the White House

00:47:38on February 17, 1965.

00:47:41We've recreated

00:47:42the Oval Office scene

00:47:43to illustrate

00:47:43that immediately

00:47:44after the meeting,

00:47:45the President called

00:47:46Senate Republican Leader

00:47:47Everett Dirksen.

00:47:50Hello.

00:47:50Hi, Everett, how are you?

00:47:51I'm okay.

00:47:52How are you?

00:47:53Pretty good.

00:47:53I wondered whether

00:47:54after your session

00:47:56with Ike,

00:47:56you had anything

00:47:57that I needed at home.

00:47:59He was in hearty agreement

00:48:01with what we were doing

00:48:03and what our policy is

00:48:07out there.

00:48:08Let me get his exact language.

00:48:09I took it down.

00:48:11He says that our purpose

00:48:13is to preserve

00:48:14Southeast Asia.

00:48:16That we know

00:48:17from Munich on

00:48:19that when you give

00:48:20the dictator's feed

00:48:21on raw meat

00:48:22and if they take

00:48:23South Vietnam,

00:48:24they take Thailand,

00:48:25they take Indonesia,

00:48:26they take Burma,

00:48:27they come right on

00:48:28back to the Philippines.

00:48:30He says that

00:48:32he would continue

00:48:33doing what we're doing,

00:48:35that he would make it clear

00:48:37that we're going to stay

00:48:38and the stamina

00:48:39of the American people

00:48:41is equal to this task

00:48:44and our continuing actions

00:48:48will be measured

00:48:49and fitting

00:48:51and adequate.

00:48:59The principal difficulty

00:49:00in drawing up plans

00:49:02for the defense

00:49:02of South Vietnam

00:49:03remained the problem

00:49:04of not knowing

00:49:05whether the country

00:49:06had a functioning government.

00:49:08For over a year,

00:49:09the nation had teetered

00:49:10on the verge of anarchy.

00:49:12Now, Saigon was again

00:49:19filled with students

00:49:20demanding that America

00:49:21withdraw.

00:49:23Faced with rioting

00:49:24on the streets,

00:49:25the Saigon government

00:49:26asked for a delay,

00:49:27time to control the mobs.

00:49:29It would be almost

00:49:30three weeks

00:49:30before Lyndon Johnson

00:49:31could finally approve

00:49:32the launch

00:49:33of Rolling Thunder.

00:49:35Give you the final sign-off

00:49:37from his side

00:49:38on Rolling Thunder.

00:49:39He said we'd go ahead,

00:49:40we could talk it over

00:49:41at one tomorrow

00:49:42and cancel it

00:49:43with this and that order.

00:49:45Very good.

00:49:46Well, I'll tell

00:49:46Ambassador Taylor then

00:49:47that it's all right

00:49:49for him to talk

00:49:50to the Vietnamese about it.

00:49:51Yeah, very good.

00:50:00Rolling Thunder began

00:50:01on March the 2nd, 1965.

00:50:04100 U.S. Air Force planes

00:50:06struck ammunition dumps

00:50:0710 miles inside

00:50:09North Vietnam.

00:50:10It became the most

00:50:11sustained bombing campaign

00:50:13in the history

00:50:13of warfare.

00:50:21The raids are designed

00:50:23to cut off supplies

00:50:24from the north

00:50:24to the Viet Cong rebels

00:50:25in the south.

00:50:27The U.S. is relying

00:50:27on its intelligence reports

00:50:29which estimate

00:50:30that 80 to 90 percent

00:50:31of the rebel supplies

00:50:32come from North Vietnam

00:50:34and Red China.

00:50:35One after another

00:50:44the planes take to the air

00:50:45for the red targets.

00:50:46This proved to be

00:50:47one of the most successful

00:50:48of the U.S. air raids.

00:50:49One plane was lost

00:50:50about 60 miles

00:50:51from its carrier

00:50:52on a return flight.

00:50:54Washington says

00:50:54the raids will continue

00:50:56until the Reds realize

00:50:57it is time

00:50:58to talk peace.

00:50:59Johnson became obsessed

00:51:04by the details

00:51:05of the war.

00:51:06He knew when the planes

00:51:07took off

00:51:07and when they were scheduled

00:51:08to reach their targets.

00:51:09and tell them

00:51:11anything at all

00:51:12happens,

00:51:13call me here.

00:51:14All right.

00:51:14Tell that situation room.

00:51:15I'll do that.

00:51:16All time of night.

00:51:17I don't give a damn.

00:51:18I want to keep

00:51:18just as close to it

00:51:19as if I was

00:51:20in the situation room.

00:51:21All right, Chief.

00:51:22Okay.

00:51:37Situation room?

00:51:38Yes, sir.

00:51:39We have a preliminary

00:51:40report in now.

00:51:42We believe at this time

00:51:44that there are

00:51:44two U.S. planes missing.

00:51:46There were 19 Vietnamese planes

00:51:48in this operation.

00:51:50Eighteen were recovered.

00:51:52One was down,

00:51:55of which the pilot

00:51:56was recovered.

00:51:58It's still too early.

00:51:59I don't have a report in yet

00:52:00on the target area,

00:52:03mission accomplished,

00:52:04or just what happened there

00:52:06over the target,

00:52:07but the weather was clear.

00:52:08The United States target

00:52:10was an ammo dump,

00:52:11and the Vietnamese

00:52:12was the ship guard.

00:52:13They look like

00:52:14our two pilots are lost.

00:52:16It looks like

00:52:17two U.S. pilots lost,

00:52:19and search and rescue

00:52:20is underway for them

00:52:21at this time, sir.

00:52:22Okay, opinion.

00:52:23Okay, sir, bye.

00:52:26Whitehouse logs show

00:52:27that the president

00:52:28was called three more times

00:52:29that night,

00:52:30at 2.53,

00:52:32at 5.10,

00:52:34and finally,

00:52:34after a sleepless night,

00:52:36a report from Cyrus Vance

00:52:37at 8.09 in the morning.

00:52:39It was a routine

00:52:41the president never broke.

00:52:42He told his staff

00:52:43that these were his boys.

00:52:45He had put them

00:52:46in harm's way.

00:52:47He wanted to know

00:52:48that they were safe.

00:52:49It also marked

00:52:50the beginning

00:52:50of a rapid series of events

00:52:52that sealed Johnson's fate.

00:52:54Unanticipated consequences

00:52:56that pulled him deeper

00:52:57into war.

00:52:58Rolling thunder involved

00:52:59the introduction

00:53:00of long-range bombers

00:53:01that required

00:53:02a fixed airstrip.

00:53:03That led to a decision

00:53:04to use the South Vietnamese base

00:53:06at Da Nang.

00:53:07That, in turn,

00:53:08forced Johnson

00:53:08to accept

00:53:09General Westmoreland's

00:53:10insistence

00:53:11that the planes

00:53:11needed the protection

00:53:12of the U.S. Marines.

00:53:15Commanders from the field

00:53:17are in with unanimous

00:53:18recommendations

00:53:18that we move

00:53:19a portion

00:53:20of a Marine

00:53:21Expeditionary Brigade

00:53:22into Da Nang

00:53:23to provide protection there.

00:53:26The buildup

00:53:26of Viet Cong forces

00:53:27in the surrounding area

00:53:29is fairly substantial

00:53:30and they're fearful

00:53:31that the huge number

00:53:32of aircraft

00:53:33we have in Da Nang

00:53:34and the personnel

00:53:35are subject

00:53:36to attack.

00:53:37This is a recommendation

00:53:39I would be very reluctant

00:53:41to accept

00:53:41but frankly

00:53:42I doubt

00:53:42we have any alternative.

00:53:44In effect,

00:53:45the alternative is

00:53:46to risk the loss

00:53:48of the personnel

00:53:49and the planes

00:53:50at Da Nang

00:53:51while I move Marines in.

00:53:53Yes, sir,

00:53:54that's the alternative.

00:53:55The psychological impact

00:53:57of the Marines

00:53:58are coming

00:53:59is going to be a bad one

00:54:01and I know

00:54:01that every mother

00:54:02is going to say,

00:54:02uh-oh,

00:54:03this is it

00:54:03because a Marine

00:54:04is a guy

00:54:05that's got a dagger

00:54:06in his hand

00:54:06and it's going

00:54:08to put the flag up.

00:54:10Well, we'll just go

00:54:11with it

00:54:12and we know

00:54:13what we're walking

00:54:13into

00:54:14and if rather

00:54:16than have it said

00:54:17well, we wanted

00:54:17protection for a plane

00:54:18he wouldn't give it to us

00:54:19and my answer is yes

00:54:20but my judgment's no.

00:54:22There's going to be

00:54:23a lot of headlines

00:54:24on it when it comes out

00:54:25when it comes out.

00:54:25Are you telling me?

00:54:27Okay.

00:54:28All right, then.

00:54:34Johnson had always feared

00:54:36that one day

00:54:36he would be asked

00:54:37to commit ground troops

00:54:38to Vietnam.

00:54:40Less than a week

00:54:40after firing

00:54:41the first salvos

00:54:42of Rolling Thunder

00:54:43he'd been cornered

00:54:44into making a decision

00:54:45that went against

00:54:46his best political judgment.

00:54:48Even Johnson's

00:55:01ambassador to Saigon

00:55:02Maxwell Taylor

00:55:03the former chairman

00:55:04of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

00:55:05warned the president

00:55:06that sending in the marines

00:55:07was a mistake

00:55:08that America

00:55:09was being dragged

00:55:10into a land war

00:55:11where it would be forced

00:55:13to confront an enemy

00:55:14on the enemy's terms.

00:55:16Johnson understood

00:55:16the risks

00:55:17but also knew

00:55:18that his congressional critics

00:55:19would hold him responsible

00:55:21if the Viet Cong

00:55:22killed American pilots

00:55:23stationed at an

00:55:24undefended airstrip.

00:55:26We're going to send

00:55:27the marines in

00:55:28to protect the battalion

00:55:30that are denying.

00:55:32What do you think?

00:55:34It scares the life

00:55:35out of me

00:55:35but I don't know

00:55:36how to back up now.

00:55:38It looks to me

00:55:39like we just

00:55:39got in this thing

00:55:40and there's no way out.

00:55:41We're just getting

00:55:42pushed forward

00:55:42and forward

00:55:43and forward

00:55:44and forward

00:55:44and forward.

00:55:45And we're losing

00:55:46more every day.

00:55:46That's right.

00:55:47Dick, the trouble is

00:55:48a man can fight

00:55:49if he can see daylight

00:55:51down the road somewhere.

00:55:52But there ain't

00:55:53no daylight in Vietnam.

00:55:54There's not a bit.

00:55:55There's no end

00:55:56to the road.

00:55:56There's just nothing

00:55:57that's right.

00:55:57The more bombs you drop,

00:55:59the more nations you scare,

00:56:00the more people you make mad,

00:56:01the more embassies

00:56:02you get painted.

00:56:03It's the biggest

00:56:03worst mess I ever saw

00:56:05of my life.

00:56:05You couldn't have inherited

00:56:06a worst mess.

00:56:07Well, if they'd say

00:56:08I inherited it,

00:56:09be lucky,

00:56:09but they'll all say

00:56:10I created it.

00:56:11Bye.

00:56:11Two days after that conversation,

00:56:173,500 men

00:56:18of the 9th Marine

00:56:19Expeditionary Brigade

00:56:21came ashore at Da Nang.

00:56:22They arrived

00:56:23in full battle dress

00:56:24to take up positions

00:56:25around the perimeter

00:56:26of the air base.

00:56:28Trained to hunt out

00:56:29the enemy,

00:56:29they were being ordered

00:56:30to wait for the Viet Cong

00:56:31to attack.

00:56:33It was a defensive deployment

00:56:34that went against

00:56:35the Marines'

00:56:35training and doctrine.

00:56:36But despite the Marines'

00:56:39landing,

00:56:40the picture across the south

00:56:41showed continued erosion.

00:56:43At the end of March,

00:56:44the Viet Cong

00:56:45couldn't have been

00:56:46more brazen.

00:56:52Red terror tactics

00:56:53in South Vietnam

00:56:54hit at the United States

00:56:55Embassy in Saigon.

00:56:57Minutes after the blast,

00:56:58the cameraman records

00:56:59the scene

00:57:00as rescue workers

00:57:01ignored danger

00:57:02to probe the wreckage

00:57:03for the wounded.

00:57:04Reaction to the outrage

00:57:05was one of dismay

00:57:07and shock

00:57:07in Washington.

00:57:08President Johnson

00:57:09said the attack

00:57:10would only reinforce

00:57:11the administration's

00:57:12determination

00:57:13to give more help

00:57:14to South Vietnam.

00:57:15Is this a situation room?

00:57:16Yes, sir.

00:57:17What do you got on

00:57:18our Saigon?

00:57:19Well, we have

00:57:20a total,

00:57:21we have some more

00:57:21casualty figures in now.

00:57:23The total of

00:57:23two U.S. killed.

00:57:26And they...

00:57:27Do you know who they are?

00:57:28Soldiers, women,

00:57:29and what?

00:57:29We have women listed

00:57:31so far, two women.

00:57:32Do you know who they are?

00:57:33Yes, sir,

00:57:34we do have the names.

00:57:35Who are they?

00:57:35The first one is

00:57:37Barbara Robin

00:57:38from Denver, Colorado.

00:57:40And the second one,

00:57:41first name is

00:57:41M-A-N-O-L-T-O,

00:57:44Castillo.

00:57:45Both American?

00:57:46Both American, yes, sir.

00:57:47How many Vietnamese

00:57:48would kill?

00:57:49We have a total

00:57:50of 15 Vietnamese killed

00:57:52with approximately

00:57:5240 injured.

00:57:54Okay, and what's that?

00:57:56Yes, sir.

00:58:00Two days later,

00:58:02on April the 2nd,

00:58:03the president agreed

00:58:04with Westmoreland's request

00:58:05that members of the

00:58:06173rd Airborne

00:58:08be assigned to undertake

00:58:09what became known

00:58:10as search-and-destroy missions.

00:58:12It was yet another

00:58:13significant incremental

00:58:14escalation along the road

00:58:16to war.

00:58:19The message was clear.

00:58:21U.S. troops

00:58:22were no longer willing

00:58:23to sit back

00:58:23and simply respond

00:58:25to communist attacks.

00:58:28But despite the green light

00:58:30to his field generals,

00:58:31Johnson was again

00:58:32having second thoughts.

00:58:34Five days after sending

00:58:35the Airborne into battle,

00:58:37he wanted to find

00:58:38a way out.

00:58:39He used a previously

00:58:40scheduled speech

00:58:41to Johns Hopkins University

00:58:42to offer Ho Chi Minh

00:58:43a deal.

00:58:45Abandon your dream

00:58:46of a unified socialist republic

00:58:47and America will reward you

00:58:49with a vast recovery program

00:58:51to benefit the whole

00:58:52of Southeast Asia.

00:58:55What do the people

00:58:57of North Vietnam want?

00:58:59What they want,

00:59:01their neighbors also desire.

00:59:04Food for their hunger,

00:59:06health for their bodies,

00:59:08a chance to learn,

00:59:10progress for their country,

00:59:12and an end

00:59:13to the bondage

00:59:14of material misery.

00:59:16On the flight back

00:59:17to Washington

00:59:17aboard Marine One,

00:59:19Johnson told his staff

00:59:20that he was prepared

00:59:20to submit a billion-dollar

00:59:22aid request to the Congress

00:59:23as soon as the North Vietnamese

00:59:25signed on.

00:59:26He told them he was sure

00:59:27the communist leader,

00:59:28Ho Chi Minh,

00:59:29would not be able to resist.

00:59:31Within 24 hours,

00:59:32Washington had its answer.

00:59:34No deal.

00:59:35The president now told

00:59:36his aide, Bill Moyers,

00:59:37that he felt like

00:59:38a hitchhiker caught in a storm

00:59:40on a Texas highway.

00:59:41He couldn't run,

00:59:43he couldn't hide,

00:59:44and he couldn't make it stop.

00:59:48Johnson felt he was

00:59:49running out of options.

00:59:51The Pentagon was increasing

00:59:52its demand for men,

00:59:54and the North was stepping up

00:59:55its campaign.

00:59:57LBJ made one final offer

00:59:59he hoped would tempt Ho Chi Minh

01:00:00to the negotiating table.

01:00:02He privately told the North Vietnamese

01:00:04that he would suspend

01:00:06Rolling Thunder.

01:00:07In return,

01:00:08he wanted some sign

01:00:09that Hanoi intended

01:00:10to withdraw its support

01:00:11for the Viet Cong.

01:00:12For a week,

01:00:19the planes stayed on the carriers.

01:00:22For a week,

01:00:22Johnson waited for a sign,

01:00:24any sign,

01:00:25that the North

01:00:25was willing to back down.

01:00:27For a week,

01:00:28there was silence.

01:00:29The response when it came

01:00:30was not from the leadership

01:00:32in Hanoi.

01:00:33It was from the fighters

01:00:34in the field.

01:00:35This is our recreation

01:00:36of the scene

01:00:37at 4.30 in the morning

01:00:38of April 24, 1965

01:00:41in the Pentagon's

01:00:42Combat Control Center.

01:00:44We do have a piece of press,

01:00:45which I think

01:00:46you'll be interested in.

01:00:47It involves

01:00:48Viet Cong guerrillas

01:00:50ending a prolonged low

01:00:52on the fighting

01:00:53in the Mekong Delta

01:00:54yesterday

01:00:54with two successful attacks

01:00:56on government troops

01:00:57as little as

01:00:58eight miles from Saigon.

01:01:00American military spokesman

01:01:02said the Reds

01:01:02overran a militia outpost

01:01:04eight miles south of the city,

01:01:06killing and wounding

01:01:07all but two

01:01:07of the 33-man garrison.

01:01:10In another clash reported,

01:01:11Congress forces

01:01:12surrounded an 80-man

01:01:13government unit

01:01:14along a river

01:01:1555 miles south of the capital

01:01:17and half the government force

01:01:18was killed,

01:01:20missing or wounded

01:01:20before survivors

01:01:21managed to escape.

01:01:22That is about,

01:01:24I think,

01:01:24the highlights

01:01:25that we had

01:01:26last evening, sir.

01:01:27Okay.

01:01:28Yes, sir.

01:01:30Every report

01:01:30from the Pentagon

01:01:31told the president

01:01:32the South Vietnamese

01:01:33were incapable

01:01:34of holding the line.

01:01:36Even the 30,000

01:01:37Americans he had sent

01:01:38were at best

01:01:39a holding action.

01:01:40Johnson told friends

01:01:41that the presidency

01:01:43was the loneliest job

01:01:44in the world.

01:01:45He told McGeorge Bundy

01:01:46that his gut told him

01:01:47the day was fast approaching

01:01:49when he'd have to make

01:01:50the ultimate decision,

01:01:51get in or get out.

01:01:53I looked at this sergeant

01:01:55of mine this morning,

01:01:56got six little old kids

01:01:57over there,

01:01:58and I just thought

01:01:58about ordering

01:01:59those kids in there,

01:02:01and what in the hell

01:02:01am I ordering him

01:02:02out there for?

01:02:03One thing that is

01:02:04correct to me.

01:02:04What is Vietnam worth

01:02:05to me?

01:02:05What is Laos worth

01:02:07to me?

01:02:07What is it worth

01:02:08to this country?

01:02:09Yeah.

01:02:10Now, of course,

01:02:11if you start running

01:02:11the communists,

01:02:13they may just chase you

01:02:13right into your own kitchen.

01:02:16In Johnson's mind,

01:02:17the issue was far wider

01:02:19than the future

01:02:19of Indochina.

01:02:20He'd always seen

01:02:21the Vietnamese conflict

01:02:22not as a civil war,

01:02:24but rather as a part

01:02:25of a coordinated

01:02:26communist effort.

01:02:28America also faced

01:02:29that threat in Berlin,

01:02:31the Congo,

01:02:31and now,

01:02:32in late April 1965,

01:02:34communism was on the march

01:02:36in America's own backyard.

01:02:51What began as a revolution

01:03:00by followers of exiled

01:03:01Dominican President

01:03:02Juan Bosch

01:03:03quickly deteriorated

01:03:04into outright anarchy

01:03:06when the leadership

01:03:07was taken over

01:03:08by communist agents.

01:03:09They exhorted civilians

01:03:10to take to the streets,

01:03:12replace their wooden clubs

01:03:13with rifles,

01:03:14and instituted

01:03:15a reign of terror.

01:03:16They are moving

01:03:18other places

01:03:19in the hemisphere.

01:03:20It may be a part

01:03:20of the whole

01:03:21communistic pattern

01:03:23tied in with Vietnam.

01:03:27Our CIA says

01:03:28this is a completely

01:03:29led, operated,

01:03:31dominated,

01:03:32they've got men

01:03:33on the inside of it,

01:03:34Castro operations.

01:03:36They're firing consistently

01:03:37every hour

01:03:38on our embassy.

01:03:40Now here's what I think

01:03:41we ought to do.

01:03:42We ought to have

01:03:43our military forces

01:03:44in sufficient quantity,

01:03:46adequate number,

01:03:47appropriate,

01:03:48they're ready

01:03:48to take that island

01:03:50to see that Castro

01:03:51doesn't take it.

01:03:53Overnight,

01:03:53with the Marines

01:03:54poised for action,

01:03:55the fighting

01:03:56in the Dominican capital

01:03:57of Santo Domingo

01:03:58intensified.

01:04:00Trapped in the middle,

01:04:013,000 American citizens

01:04:02faced with the real possibility

01:04:04of being caught up

01:04:05in the escalating violence.

01:04:07Johnson felt the country

01:04:08needed to know

01:04:09what he knew,

01:04:10that it wasn't

01:04:11a regional dispute,

01:04:12but actually a fight

01:04:13against international communism.

01:04:15Only Secretary of Defense

01:04:17Robert McNamara

01:04:18was willing to challenge

01:04:19the presidential assertion

01:04:20that this was

01:04:20an international

01:04:21communist conspiracy.

01:04:23Why don't you think

01:04:24I should say

01:04:25that the powers

01:04:25outside the Republic

01:04:26are trying to gain control?

01:04:28We all know they are.

01:04:30What's wrong with my saying?

01:04:31Well, I think you've got

01:04:32a pretty tough job

01:04:33to prove that,

01:04:34Mr. President.

01:04:35As president,

01:04:36the rest of us

01:04:37can say things like that

01:04:39and we don't have

01:04:39to prove it

01:04:40and I think

01:04:41put your own status

01:04:42and prestige

01:04:42too much on the line.

01:04:44To say that

01:04:45you as president

01:04:47personally say

01:04:48that of your knowledge

01:04:49that powers

01:04:49outside the hemisphere

01:04:50are trying to

01:04:51subvert this government

01:04:53or subvert those people,

01:04:54I don't think

01:04:55you're in a very strong

01:04:57position to say that.

01:04:58But the president

01:04:59continued to insist

01:05:00that the Dominican fight

01:05:01was being orchestrated

01:05:02from Havana.

01:05:04On April the 30th,

01:05:05Johnson decided to act.

01:05:07He ordered the Marines

01:05:08aboard the USS Boxer

01:05:09to move into

01:05:10the Dominican Republic.

01:05:11For the commander-in-chief,

01:05:13having sent his boys

01:05:14into battle,

01:05:15there was now nothing

01:05:16he could do

01:05:16but wade into

01:05:17the early hours

01:05:17of the morning

01:05:18for news from the front.

01:05:20Is this the Pentagon

01:05:21situation room?

01:05:22Yes, Mr. President.

01:05:24General Smith is on.

01:05:25This is General Smith,

01:05:26Mr. President.

01:05:27What do we have

01:05:27this morning

01:05:28from Dominican?

01:05:30We've just gotten

01:05:30information

01:05:32from the embassy

01:05:33down there, sir,

01:05:34that we have a total

01:05:36of 20 Marines wounded,

01:05:39two dead,

01:05:40and we have

01:05:41one Army dead,

01:05:43one possible dead,

01:05:46and 16 others wounded.

01:05:48The rebels are

01:05:49planning to make

01:05:52some kind of an assault

01:05:53against the police station

01:05:56and possibly the embassy

01:05:58with some rebel forces

01:06:01armed with machine guns.

01:06:03Okay, thank you.

01:06:06On the morning of May 3rd,

01:06:08there was more bad news.

01:06:09The Joint Chiefs

01:06:10wanted 48,000

01:06:11additional troops,

01:06:12not for the Dominican Republic,

01:06:14but for Vietnam.

01:06:15It would more than

01:06:16double the commitment,

01:06:18but Johnson wanted

01:06:18no debate,

01:06:20no national discussion

01:06:21of where the policy

01:06:21might lead.

01:06:31Instead, he traveled

01:06:32the two miles

01:06:32from the White House

01:06:33to the Pentagon

01:06:34to boost the morale

01:06:35of the generals

01:06:36to assure them

01:06:37that the boys

01:06:38in the field

01:06:38would get whatever

01:06:39they needed.

01:06:40He authorized

01:06:41sending the 1st Infantry Division

01:06:42to Vietnam

01:06:43and up to 30,000 Marines

01:06:45to the Dominican Republic.

01:06:48Establishing

01:06:49what was thought

01:06:49to be a secure line

01:06:50to Santo Domingo,

01:06:52Johnson was able

01:06:52to reach Ambassador

01:06:53Tapp Bennett

01:06:54for an update.

01:06:57Just a minute.

01:06:58All right, sir.

01:06:59Just a moment,

01:07:00Mr. Ambassador.

01:07:00Just a moment,

01:07:05Ambassador Bennett.

01:07:07Hello?

01:07:08Yes, Tapp.

01:07:09Mr. President?

01:07:10Yes.

01:07:11Well, we've still got

01:07:12raging disorders downtown,

01:07:14congregations of mobs

01:07:17being incited

01:07:17to violent action,

01:07:19the most violent

01:07:21anti-American

01:07:22Castro-type

01:07:23oratory

01:07:24being spouted at them.

01:07:26We have some reports

01:07:27that churches

01:07:27are being attacked

01:07:29to real

01:07:30holocaust.

01:07:32and while I've got you,

01:07:35be sure that every time

01:07:36you load somebody

01:07:37on a ship

01:07:38they get a picture of it

01:07:39because we're not

01:07:40getting any of that

01:07:41up here.

01:07:41We're just getting

01:07:41that we're making

01:07:42everybody in Latin America

01:07:43mad,

01:07:44that we intervene ours,

01:07:45that we're just going

01:07:46back to the gunboat policy

01:07:48and the stuff coming out

01:07:49is awful bad.

01:07:50on the military side

01:07:52of casualties,

01:07:55so we are now

01:07:55up to five dead.

01:07:57Five dead?

01:07:58Five dead

01:07:58and 41 wounded.

01:08:0041 wounded.

01:08:01All right.

01:08:01Anything else?

01:08:02Yes?

01:08:03Hello?

01:08:04Who's on here?

01:08:05Hello?

01:08:05Get off.

01:08:06Who's on here?

01:08:07Hello?

01:08:08Hello?

01:08:09Hello?

01:08:10Who are you?

01:08:11Hello?

01:08:12Who is that on?

01:08:12Somebody on your phone?

01:08:15LBJ suspected

01:08:16the rebels were tapping

01:08:17the embassy line.

01:08:19He then turned

01:08:19to the one man

01:08:20who knew about

01:08:21taps and communists.

01:08:23Although the law

01:08:23prohibited the FBI

01:08:25from intervening

01:08:26in foreign disputes,

01:08:27the Bureau's director,

01:08:28J. Edgar Hoover,

01:08:29told the president

01:08:30he would secretly

01:08:31dispatch agents

01:08:32into the Dominican Republic

01:08:33to hunt out communists.

01:08:35Let's get an

01:08:36anti-communist government

01:08:37or certainly not

01:08:38a pro-communist.

01:08:39Yes.

01:08:40We'd want any

01:08:40that are card carriers.

01:08:43Yes.

01:08:43Because we'd want them

01:08:44taking orders

01:08:44from higher up.

01:08:45Right.

01:08:46We'll have that

01:08:48information for you

01:08:48if possible

01:08:49by this evening.

01:08:50I don't want to work

01:08:50a month and make a deal

01:08:51and send in 30,000 soldiers

01:08:53and then piss it off

01:08:54to the communists.

01:08:54That's right.

01:08:55And you're the man

01:08:56I'm depending on

01:08:57to keep me from

01:08:57pissing it off.

01:08:58Now that's ugly language,

01:08:59but that is expressive

01:09:01and you know what I want.

01:09:02We won't let you down.

01:09:03Okay.

01:09:04Bye.

01:09:04The FBI came up with a list

01:09:15of 48 suspected communists

01:09:16who were believed

01:09:17to have arrived

01:09:18in the Dominican Republic

01:09:19to foment revolution.

01:09:21Many of these foreigners

01:09:22were later found

01:09:22to be either dead

01:09:24or nowhere near

01:09:24the Dominican Republic

01:09:25in the spring of 1965.

01:09:28But by the end of May,

01:09:30with over 31,000

01:09:31American troops

01:09:32on the island,

01:09:33the threat

01:09:33had been contained.

01:09:43May Day 1965

01:09:44had brought a reminder

01:09:45of Johnson's other crisis.

01:09:48Vietnam was once again

01:09:50front and center

01:09:51in the national debate

01:09:52that had spilled out

01:09:53onto the streets

01:09:53of Washington.

01:09:58Thousands had descended

01:09:59upon the Capitol

01:09:59to protest the escalation

01:10:01in the bombing campaign

01:10:02and demand that the troops

01:10:04be returned home.

01:10:07The protest movement

01:10:08feared Johnson

01:10:09was about to charge

01:10:10across the Rubicon.

01:10:12A phrase was first heard

01:10:14that would echo

01:10:15around the White House grounds

01:10:16for the next four years.

01:10:18Hey, hey, LBJ,

01:10:20how many kids

01:10:21did you kill today?

01:10:22Hey, hey, LBJ,

01:10:24how many kids did you kill today?

01:10:26Hey, hey, LBJ,

01:10:28I'm against you kill today!

01:10:29Hey, hey, LBJ,

01:10:31I'm against you kill today!

01:10:37Johnson's response

01:10:38to his national security advisor,

01:10:40McGeorge Bundy,

01:10:40was that he had no intention

01:10:42of debating Vietnam

01:10:43with individuals

01:10:44he referred to

01:10:45as beatniks.

01:10:46I'm just against

01:10:48the White House debating

01:10:49and I'm against us

01:10:50inciting them

01:10:51and I'm against us

01:10:52inviting them

01:10:52and I'm against us

01:10:53encouraging it

01:10:54and I'm against us

01:10:55applauding it.

01:10:58I don't think

01:10:58that the President

01:10:59of the United States

01:11:00ought to be debating

01:11:01ever with crackpots,

01:11:02but I think

01:11:02when you get out there,

01:11:03you lift it up

01:11:04where it becomes

01:11:05a national invitation

01:11:07for a revolution.

01:11:08For months,

01:11:15the FBI

01:11:16had been tracking

01:11:17the birth

01:11:17of the anti-war movement.

01:11:19After a series

01:11:19of briefings

01:11:20from J. Edgar Hoover,

01:11:21Johnson became convinced

01:11:22Soviet agents

01:11:23working inside America

01:11:25were behind the protests.

01:11:27The President

01:11:27called a sympathetic Senator,

01:11:29a fellow Democrat.

01:11:30Senator?

01:11:31Yes?

01:11:31One moment for the President.

01:11:35Senator Gail McGee

01:11:37on 9-0.

01:11:37Mr. Gail?

01:11:40Yes?

01:11:41I thought you ought to know

01:11:42that we are deeply distressed

01:11:46and disturbed.

01:11:47Every facility

01:11:49that the Communist world

01:11:50has at its disposal

01:11:52is being used

01:11:53to divide us.

01:11:56One of the boys

01:11:57in this youth organization,

01:12:00his mother really

01:12:01is one of the leaders

01:12:02in the Communist Party

01:12:03in this country.

01:12:04Edgar Hoover

01:12:05was very upset about it.

01:12:07and they're going

01:12:08into the colleges

01:12:08and the faculties

01:12:09and the student bodies

01:12:10and trying to get them

01:12:12to send blank wires

01:12:13they're giving them

01:12:14that come right out

01:12:15of Communist headquarters.

01:12:17And the President

01:12:18wasn't just concerned

01:12:19with opposition

01:12:19outside the gates

01:12:20of the White House.

01:12:21On Capitol Hill,

01:12:22voices of dissent

01:12:23were being heard as well.

01:12:25Men who'd backed

01:12:26the President

01:12:26at the time

01:12:27of the Gulf of Tonkin

01:12:28resolution

01:12:28were now fearful

01:12:29that he was abusing

01:12:30that authority.

01:12:31Johnson told his staff

01:12:32he wasn't about

01:12:33to be cowed

01:12:34by weak-kneed critics.

01:12:37The thing that hurts

01:12:38us most

01:12:39is not the

01:12:41hitting our compound

01:12:42of going up

01:12:43our hotels,

01:12:43these goddamn speeches

01:12:44that the communists

01:12:45blow up

01:12:46and let them know

01:12:47that there's no greater

01:12:49disservice

01:12:49they can render.

01:12:50Just say now,

01:12:51the President wants peace

01:12:52more than you do.

01:12:53He wants to negotiate

01:12:54more than you do.

01:12:55He's the poor bastard

01:12:56that stays awake

01:12:57every night

01:12:58on these things.

01:12:59He's the guy

01:12:59that sends these men

01:13:00to die.

01:13:01But he doesn't know

01:13:02how he can negotiate

01:13:05when the fellow

01:13:05doesn't want to negotiate.

01:13:06Okay.

01:13:07Right.

01:13:09For months,

01:13:10Captured Viet Cong

01:13:10had been telling

01:13:11the Americans

01:13:12that the North Vietnamese

01:13:13intended to launch

01:13:14a major offensive

01:13:15before the monsoon season

01:13:16restricted troop movement.

01:13:18By the end of May,

01:13:19Westmoreland was telling

01:13:20the Pentagon

01:13:21that deployment of U.S. troops

01:13:22had not turned

01:13:23the tide of the war.

01:13:25All the battle reports

01:13:26arriving on Johnson's desk

01:13:27pointed to defeat.

01:13:29What do you hear

01:13:30from Vietnam?

01:13:32Well, we've had

01:13:33a very unhappy week.

01:13:37Everything we thought

01:13:38might happen

01:13:38appears to be happening.

01:13:40Extensive action

01:13:41all over the country.

01:13:42Losses have been

01:13:43extremely high.

01:13:44I would guess

01:13:45that in terms

01:13:46of killed,

01:13:47wounded,

01:13:48and missing in action,

01:13:49the total will be

01:13:50substantially in excess

01:13:50of 1,000.

01:13:52We've had several

01:13:53serious setbacks,

01:13:55including an attack

01:13:58on a district town

01:13:59by a Viet Cong battalion-sized force

01:14:02only 10 miles from Saigon.

01:14:04I think we're beginning

01:14:05to see the use

01:14:06of that Viet Cong reserve

01:14:08that we've all known

01:14:10was there

01:14:10but hadn't been utilized

01:14:11up to the present time.

01:14:14The next month

01:14:15was no better.

01:14:16In early June,

01:14:17South Vietnam

01:14:18lost 800 of its best troops

01:14:19in a battle

01:14:20with the Viet Cong

01:14:21just 20 miles

01:14:22from Saigon.

01:14:24Johnson knew

01:14:24his options

01:14:25were running out.

01:14:26He felt trapped,

01:14:27unable to manipulate

01:14:28the course of a war

01:14:29he hadn't started

01:14:30and never really

01:14:31wanted to fight.

01:14:41The administration

01:14:42insisted that the U.S.

01:14:44was playing

01:14:44a support role

01:14:45in the conflict

01:14:46but the president's advisors

01:14:47privately admitted

01:14:48that that was illusionary.

01:14:51America couldn't place

01:14:52its fate

01:14:52in the hands of an army

01:14:53that was careening

01:14:54towards defeat.

01:14:56Whenever there were

01:14:57major decisions

01:14:57to be made,

01:14:58LBJ would escape

01:14:59the confines

01:15:00of the West Wing

01:15:01and retreat

01:15:02to his Texas ranch.

01:15:08There,

01:15:08he sought solace

01:15:09along the banks

01:15:10of the Perdenalis.

01:15:12He found it hard

01:15:13to accept

01:15:13that with all

01:15:14America's military superiority,

01:15:16the Pentagon

01:15:17seemed incapable

01:15:18of bringing

01:15:19the Communists

01:15:19to their knees

01:15:20if Westmoreland

01:15:21didn't know

01:15:22how to win this war,

01:15:23the General

01:15:23should find

01:15:24someone else

01:15:24who did.

01:15:26Sir,

01:15:26are we going

01:15:27to have to

01:15:27take another look

01:15:28some way

01:15:29as to our military

01:15:30leadership out there?

01:15:31I know all of us

01:15:32think we've got

01:15:33the best man we can

01:15:34but we're losing.

01:15:36As an old coach

01:15:37after I lose

01:15:38three or four years

01:15:39straight in a row

01:15:39I try to find

01:15:40a new coach.

01:15:43Well,

01:15:43we can certainly

01:15:43take another look

01:15:44at that one,

01:15:45Mr. President.

01:15:46And I don't know

01:15:46whether Westmoreland

01:15:47really,

01:15:49he may be the best

01:15:50but on the other hand

01:15:51he may be

01:15:52pretty much

01:15:52of a Westpoint

01:15:53accommodation.

01:15:55I don't know him

01:15:56at all

01:15:57but all I know

01:15:57is I've been

01:15:58him two years

01:16:00and I'm behind

01:16:01all the time

01:16:02and I've got

01:16:03to go to pass him.

01:16:04These guys

01:16:04are going to make

01:16:05a big push now

01:16:06and I don't think

01:16:08we ought to get run out.

01:16:09Right, sir.

01:16:10Okay.

01:16:10All right.

01:16:11Bye.

01:16:14Prodded by

01:16:15Johnson's request,

01:16:16Westmoreland

01:16:17undertook a reassessment.

01:16:18He concluded

01:16:19that the time

01:16:20had come

01:16:20to take on

01:16:21the enemy

01:16:21with a substantial

01:16:22U.S. ground force

01:16:23that to avoid defeat

01:16:25America had to deploy

01:16:26enough force to win.

01:16:28He wanted

01:16:29an immediate troop

01:16:30increase to 125,000 men

01:16:32with an additional

01:16:3375,000 by year's end.

01:16:38McNamara wrote

01:16:39that the request

01:16:39arrived in Washington

01:16:40like an exploding

01:16:41bomb show,

01:16:42the most disturbing

01:16:43cable he ever read

01:16:45as Secretary of Defense.

01:16:46The president

01:16:47who had prompted

01:16:48the review

01:16:48now felt trapped

01:16:50by its recommendations.

01:16:51He knew America

01:16:52had reached a crossroads,

01:16:53that this was going

01:16:54to be the one

01:16:55critical decision

01:16:56that he had tried

01:16:57so desperately

01:16:58to avoid.

01:17:01The request came

01:17:03as yet more members

01:17:03of the 1st Infantry Division

01:17:05were arriving

01:17:05on the beaches

01:17:06of the new naval base

01:17:07at Cameron Bay.

01:17:10With every arrival,

01:17:12the commitment grew

01:17:13and the road back

01:17:14was made all the harder.

01:17:27In July 1965,

01:17:29Lyndon Johnson knew

01:17:30he had reached

01:17:31the defining moment

01:17:32of his presidency.

01:17:35Only tens of thousands

01:17:36of U.S. ground troops

01:17:38could prevent

01:17:38a communist takeover

01:17:39of South Vietnam.

01:17:40The only thing worse

01:17:43than sending the troops

01:17:43in was pulling them out.

01:17:46Far better than the generals

01:17:47or his Secretary of Defense,

01:17:49the president could see

01:17:50the future

01:17:51and feared its wrath.

01:17:53It's going to be difficult

01:17:54for us to very long

01:17:56prosecute effectively

01:17:58a war that far away

01:17:59from home

01:18:00with the divisions

01:18:00that we have here,

01:18:02and particularly

01:18:02the potential divisions.

01:18:04And that's really

01:18:06had me concerned

01:18:07for a month,

01:18:07and I'm very depressed

01:18:09about it

01:18:09because I see

01:18:10no program

01:18:11from either defense

01:18:12or state

01:18:13that gives me

01:18:14much hope

01:18:15of doing anything

01:18:16except just praying

01:18:18and gasping

01:18:18to hold on

01:18:19during monsoon

01:18:20and hope they'll quit.

01:18:22I don't believe

01:18:22they're ever going to quit

01:18:23and I don't see

01:18:25how do we have

01:18:27any way

01:18:27of either

01:18:28a plan for victory

01:18:31militarily

01:18:32or diplomatically.

01:18:33Johnson returned

01:18:40to Washington

01:18:41in the near-unanimous

01:18:42view of his advisors

01:18:43that the administration

01:18:44should meet

01:18:44Westmoreland's request.

01:18:47There was one

01:18:48noticeable exception.

01:18:49George Ball

01:18:50warned the president

01:18:51that having jumped

01:18:52on the back

01:18:52of the tiger,

01:18:53he could no longer

01:18:53control the moment

01:18:54he might choose

01:18:55to get off.

01:18:59Out in the Pacific,

01:19:00the USS Iwo Jima

01:19:01was already steaming

01:19:02towards the South

01:19:03Vietnamese theater

01:19:04aboard the 1st,

01:19:06the 82nd

01:19:07and the 101st

01:19:08Aviation Battalions.

01:19:11From the carriers,

01:19:12U.S. Navy pilots

01:19:13took their air campaign

01:19:15within 80 miles

01:19:15of the Chinese border.

01:19:18And from their base

01:19:19on Guam,

01:19:2027 B-52s

01:19:22took part

01:19:23in their first

01:19:24combat duty of the war.

01:19:32The use of the B-52s

01:20:01fueled the growing

01:20:02anti-war movement

01:20:03on Capitol Hill.

01:20:04Critics demanded

01:20:05restraint.

01:20:06Privately,

01:20:07Johnson revealed

01:20:07he was a reluctant warrior,

01:20:09confronted with

01:20:10an impossible choice,

01:20:12either escalation

01:20:12or defeat.

01:20:15Westmoreland

01:20:16says that the offensive

01:20:18that he has anticipated,

01:20:20that he's been fearful of,

01:20:22is now on.

01:20:23And he wants people

01:20:24as quickly as he can get them.

01:20:26And my judgment is,

01:20:27I'm no military man at all,

01:20:29but I study it every day

01:20:31and every night

01:20:31and I read the cables.

01:20:33And if they get 150,

01:20:35they'll have to have

01:20:35another 150.

01:20:37And then they'll have

01:20:38to have another 150.

01:20:41To me,

01:20:41it's shaping up like this.

01:20:43You either get out

01:20:45or you get in.

01:20:47I don't think

01:20:48there's much more neutral.

01:20:49I think we've tried

01:20:50all the neutral things.

01:20:53And we think

01:20:55they are winning.

01:20:56Now, if we think

01:20:58they're winning,

01:20:58you can imagine

01:20:59what they think.

01:21:00Another dilemma

01:21:01for the president

01:21:01was that the country

01:21:02wanted to support

01:21:03the boys already

01:21:04in the fight.

01:21:06God bless America!

01:21:11God bless America!

01:21:13An opinion poll

01:21:14taken in July

01:21:15showed that 67%

01:21:16of the American public

01:21:18approved of Johnson's

01:21:19handling of the war.

01:21:20Only 11%

01:21:21supported withdrawal.

01:21:23So in the summer of 65,

01:21:25the anti-war movement

01:21:26seemed out of step

01:21:27with a country determined

01:21:28to resist

01:21:29communist aggression.

01:21:31In the middle of July,

01:21:33Johnson sent McNamara

01:21:34back to Saigon

01:21:35for what was reported

01:21:36to be a final review.

01:21:38After a series of briefings,

01:21:40the Secretary of Defense

01:21:41returned to Washington

01:21:42to present the president

01:21:44with three alternatives.

01:21:46First,

01:21:47to withdraw and face

01:21:48international humiliation.

01:21:51Second,

01:21:51stay with the existing policy

01:21:53that would result

01:21:54in defeat within the year.

01:21:56Third,

01:21:57expand the military commitment

01:21:58and take the fight

01:21:59to the enemy.

01:22:01For a man like Lyndon Johnson,

01:22:02the framing of the options

01:22:04ensured that the decision

01:22:05would be to fight.

01:22:07Even if he feared

01:22:08American soldiers

01:22:09weren't ready

01:22:10for a sustained guerrilla war.

01:22:13And I really believe

01:22:14they last longer

01:22:15than we do.

01:22:16One of their boys

01:22:17gets down in a rut

01:22:18and he stays there

01:22:19for two days

01:22:20without water,

01:22:21food or anything

01:22:21and never moves.

01:22:23No waiting to ambush somebody.

01:22:25Now American,

01:22:25he stays there

01:22:26about 20 minutes

01:22:27and how damn

01:22:27he got to get him a cigarette.

01:22:28They got a pistol

01:22:29at our temple

01:22:30and they got to react.

01:22:32And the only way

01:22:33we can react

01:22:33is to put a pistol

01:22:35at their temple.

01:22:36Now we don't want to do it.

01:22:38And we know

01:22:38that with two pistols

01:22:39at the temple,

01:22:40one of the lab

01:22:40will go off.

01:22:42On July 21st, 1965,

01:22:45the White House

01:22:45briefed journalists

01:22:46that the president

01:22:47intended to make

01:22:48a major address

01:22:48on the war in Vietnam.

01:22:51The country was told

01:22:52that in seven days,

01:22:53Lyndon Johnson

01:22:54intended to announce

01:22:55whether he favored escalation

01:22:56or withdrawal.

01:22:59As the date approached,

01:23:01Johnson began

01:23:02the first and last

01:23:03full-scale review

01:23:04of his entire Vietnam policy.

01:23:06Day after day,

01:23:08military and congressional leaders

01:23:09came in

01:23:10to discuss the war.

01:23:11He was warned

01:23:12by Clark Clifford,

01:23:13an advisor to presidents

01:23:14dating back to Harry Truman,

01:23:16that the venture

01:23:16would cost as many

01:23:17as 50,000 American lives.

01:23:20To counter those views,

01:23:21McGeorge Bundy insisted

01:23:23that America's word

01:23:24was on the line

01:23:25Robert McNamara

01:23:26and Dean Rusk

01:23:27felt that they could see

01:23:28light at the end

01:23:29of the tunnel.

01:23:30In reality,

01:23:31this four-day introspection

01:23:33settled nothing.

01:23:34The choice was as stark

01:23:35at the end

01:23:36as it had been

01:23:37at the beginning.

01:23:38An agonized Lyndon Johnson

01:23:40pondered the prospects

01:23:41and the consequences.

01:23:44If I pulled out,

01:23:45I think that our commitments

01:23:46would be no good anywhere.

01:23:48I think it would immediately

01:23:49trigger a situation

01:23:51in Thailand

01:23:52that would be

01:23:53just as bad

01:23:54as Vietnam.

01:23:54I think we'd be

01:23:55right back

01:23:56to the Philippines

01:23:57with problems.

01:23:58I think the Germans

01:23:59would be scared to death

01:24:00that their commitment

01:24:01to them was no good.

01:24:03And God knows

01:24:04what we'd have

01:24:05other places

01:24:05in the world.

01:24:06I've lost about

01:24:07264 lives

01:24:10up to now

01:24:10and I could lose

01:24:12265,000.

01:24:13It's mighty easy

01:24:14and I'm trying

01:24:15to keep those zeros

01:24:15down

01:24:16and at the same time

01:24:18not trigger

01:24:20a conflagration

01:24:21that would be worse.

01:24:24264 lives.

01:24:25He felt each one

01:24:27personally.

01:24:28He feared there

01:24:28would be many more

01:24:29regardless of which

01:24:31way he turned.

01:24:34In the East Room

01:24:36of the White House

01:24:36on July the 28th,

01:24:381965,

01:24:40the President

01:24:41announced his decision.

01:24:42This is really war.

01:24:46It is guided

01:24:47by North Vietnam

01:24:48and it is spurred

01:24:49by Communist China.

01:24:52Its goal

01:24:53is to conquer

01:24:54the South,

01:24:56to defeat

01:24:57American power,

01:25:00and to extend

01:25:01the Asiatic

01:25:03dominion

01:25:04of Communism.

01:25:07And there are

01:25:08great stakes

01:25:10in the balance.

01:25:12I have asked

01:25:19the Commanding General,

01:25:21General Westmoreland,

01:25:23what more he needs

01:25:25to meet

01:25:26this mounting

01:25:27aggression.

01:25:29He has told me

01:25:30and we

01:25:32will meet

01:25:33his needs.

01:25:36I have today

01:25:37ordered to Vietnam

01:25:38the Air Mobile Division

01:25:39and certain

01:25:41other forces

01:25:42which will raise

01:25:42our fighting strength

01:25:44from 75,000

01:25:45to 125,000

01:25:48men

01:25:48almost immediately.

01:25:51Additional forces

01:25:52will be needed later

01:25:53and they will be sent

01:25:55as requested.

01:25:58Within minutes

01:25:59of the address,

01:25:59the White House

01:26:00received a curious call

01:26:01from Vice President

01:26:02Hubert Humphrey,

01:26:03who had been watching

01:26:04the announcement

01:26:04from his office

01:26:05on Capitol Hill.

01:26:06Back in February

01:26:071965,

01:26:09Humphrey had opposed

01:26:10Rolling Thunder.

01:26:11In front of the

01:26:12entire cabinet,

01:26:13he'd argued for restraint.

01:26:15Johnson saw

01:26:15Humphrey's intervention

01:26:16as an unforgivable

01:26:18act of disloyalty

01:26:19and excluded him

01:26:20from the entire

01:26:21Vietnam Review.

01:26:23Now,

01:26:23in the wake

01:26:23of Johnson's decision,

01:26:25the Vice President

01:26:25was anxious

01:26:26to be seen

01:26:27as a team player,

01:26:28joining the Commander-in-Chief's

01:26:30march to war.

01:26:31But LBJ knew

01:27:00it was no time

01:27:01to celebrate.

01:27:02He told his staff

01:27:03the decision would define

01:27:04the rest of his presidency.

01:27:06Far better than any of them

01:27:07were the generals

01:27:08or his friends

01:27:09on Capitol Hill.

01:27:10The President knew

01:27:11the risk he was taking

01:27:12and feared the verdict

01:27:13of history.

01:27:16I do not find it easy

01:27:18to send the flower

01:27:21of our youth,

01:27:23our finest young men,

01:27:24into battle.

01:27:27I have spoken to you

01:27:28today of the divisions

01:27:30and the forces

01:27:32and the battalions

01:27:33and the units.

01:27:36But I know them all,

01:27:39every one.

01:27:42I have seen them

01:27:43in a thousand streets

01:27:44of a hundred towns

01:27:46in every state

01:27:48in this union,

01:27:50working

01:27:50and laughing

01:27:52and building

01:27:54and filled

01:27:56with hope

01:27:57and life.

01:28:00And I think I know, too,

01:28:02how their mothers weep

01:28:03and how their families

01:28:06saw it.

01:28:09And this is the most agonizing

01:28:11and the most painful duty

01:28:13of your oppression.

01:28:21He had placed his legacy

01:28:22in the hands of an enemy

01:28:23he neither understood

01:28:25nor could control.

01:28:26All he knew for sure

01:28:28was that a conflict

01:28:29begun under Eisenhower,

01:28:31expanded under Kennedy,

01:28:32would now

01:28:33and forevermore

01:28:34be known

01:28:35as Lyndon Johnson's War.

01:28:37He was a man

01:28:38and he was a man

01:28:39and he was a man

01:28:40and he was a man

01:28:41and he was a man

01:28:42and he was a man

01:28:43and he was a man

01:28:44and he was a man

01:28:45and he was a man

01:28:46and he was a man

01:28:47and he was a man

01:28:48and he was a man

01:28:49and he was a man

01:28:50and he was a man

01:28:51and he was a man

01:28:52and he was a man

01:28:53and he was a man

01:28:54and he was a man

01:28:55and he was a man

01:28:56and he was a man

01:28:57and he was a man

01:28:58and he was a man

01:28:59and he was a man

01:29:00and he was a man

01:29:01and he was a man

01:29:02and he was a man

01:29:03and he was a man

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