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Martin Smith reviews the response of key political figures before and after Hurricane Katrina's destruction on the U.S. Gulf Coast.

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00:00FEMA is not going to hesitate at all in this storm.
00:22We're going to move fast, we're going to move quick, and we're going to do whatever it takes
00:25to help disaster victims.
00:27We will do everything in our power to help the people and the communities affected by
00:31this storm.
00:32They said everything was under control, but then came the test.
00:35We're asking, is anybody out there listening?
00:42Does anybody out there care?
00:43Who was in charge of that disaster?
00:46Was it Mike Brown?
00:47Was it Michael Shertoff?
00:48Or was it the president?
00:49It's too doggone late.
00:51Now get off your asses and let's do something, and let's fix the biggest crisis in the history
00:57of this country.
00:58Tonight on Frontline, correspondent Martin Smith asks what went wrong.
01:02Did you fail?
01:03No, I did not fail.
01:05I'll make a great confession here.
01:06You know what?
01:07FEMA makes mistakes in every disaster.
01:09And whether America will be prepared next time disaster strikes.
01:14I'm sorry.
01:21I don't know.
01:27Wow, look at the blast.
01:48Geez.
01:52I can't believe that now.
01:53Here it comes, it's in the house.
02:07It's up to the top.
02:12I never thought I'd die this way.
02:14Almost three months after Katrina, there are still questions.
02:28Why didn't New Orleans evacuate sooner?
02:34Why were so many people left behind?
02:36Okay, I better get off the air, put this thing in a watertight bag.
02:45Man, look at that stuff.
02:49When's that supposed to stop?
02:56Where was the National Guard?
02:57Where was the Army?
03:05Where was FEMA?
03:07I can't believe it.
03:09I didn't know.
03:09That thing's coming from the bottom, sir.
03:14There are just as many explanations for what went wrong.
03:20Local and state officials failed to plan.
03:22The U.S. military waited too long.
03:31FEMA was poorly led.
03:35The government was indifferent to victims who were mostly poor and black.
03:43Hello?
03:46How you doing, man?
03:47I had to leave out of my house, man.
03:49I don't know whether that water's coming over that lefty or what.
03:52The last I heard, it's not.
03:54Huh?
03:55The storm missed us.
03:57Think I can get in, man, and get somewhere?
03:59I got no room.
04:05In the first few hours after Katrina hit,
04:08many believed that New Orleans had dodged a bullet.
04:10Is there a right corner there, sir?
04:13At the headquarters of the Louisiana National Guard,
04:18located in the Lower Ninth Ward.
04:20The soldiers were not yet aware that the canal levees were giving way.
04:28The guard's commander was monitoring the situation from Baton Rouge.
04:31I spoke to an airman at Jackson Barracks,
04:36and I asked him, I asked him about the water.
04:41And he told me that it rained very little,
04:44and there was just, except for just a few puddles of water,
04:47in the parking lot, there just was no water.
04:50And then he hesitated a minute, and he said,
04:52would you hold the line a minute?
04:53I need to look at something.
04:54And he came right back, and he said,
05:00I don't know why, but there's probably a foot of water on Claymont Street.
05:06Then immediately he said, sir, there's two feet of water on Claymont Street.
05:12Very shortly, he said,
05:14cars are beginning to float out of the parking lot.
05:17There is a river of water moving into this area.
05:25Trapped inside the headquarters were around 300 soldiers.
05:29They lost power.
05:31Their backup generators flooded.
05:33Their communication center was useless.
05:37They lost 15 high-water trucks with mobile communications packages.
05:41The guard spent most of the next 24 hours saving itself.
05:48Across town, the police headquarters was also underwater.
05:53Only three-quarters of the force showed up for duty.
05:57Police operator 1-5.
05:59Okay, ma'am.
06:00What is your location?
06:03District 23, North Airport.
06:04Between Cooper, North and right outside.
06:06Okay, you in the attic.
06:07With most of the city's switchboards flooded,
06:09residents were lucky if they could make a 911 call.
06:13Handicapped, girl.
06:14My wallet is coming up.
06:15You said you're on the roof?
06:17Lower 9th Wall was in real bad shape.
06:20The 5th District was in real bad shape.
06:23At 3 and 4 o'clock in the morning,
06:25they were still calling for help.
06:27I mean, and sobbing on the air.
06:29Saying, please, come and get me out.
06:32Did you have enough boats?
06:34No.
06:34There you go.
06:35Go panic.
06:36Go panic.
06:36If anything haunts me about this whole situation,
06:41it's pulling them back and saying,
06:43look, we got to go back out at first light.
06:49For many, it was too late.
06:51And the failure of communication systems cost lives in those first days.
07:00Fair statement?
07:02If any lives were lost because people were late to getting theirs,
07:07because the people that couldn't call 911 and tell them where they were,
07:12that's communications.
07:13They couldn't pick up their cell phone,
07:15they couldn't pick up their house phone,
07:16and call anybody and say,
07:18I'm trapped in an attic, come get me.
07:20Nor could a SWAT team that was in a forward position call for backup.
07:24That's correct.
07:25Nor could a soldier that's out in a boat,
07:28in some cases,
07:29call back and say,
07:30I've got five people on the roof,
07:32and my boat can only handle four.
07:33That kind of business.
07:34We've got hungry people,
07:40we've got frustrated people,
07:42we've got angry people.
07:43No food, no water.
07:45I mean, a bare necessity.
07:47We need help.
07:49New Orleans needs assistance.
07:50And we're asking, you know,
07:52is anybody out there listening?
07:54Is anybody out there watching?
07:57Does anybody out there care?
07:59New Orleans is hot.
08:01We can't take this.
08:02We've been out here for three days.
08:04We've been asking for help.
08:06Where the police are at?
08:07Where the men are at the control of all this?
08:10I'm swimming in it.
08:11People trying to give me their babies that are sick,
08:14and senior citizens saying that they, you know,
08:16they couldn't take it anymore.
08:18We need help.
08:19We need troops.
08:19We need resources.
08:21We need food.
08:22We need water.
08:23Somebody on the ship.
08:25We need a ship.
08:25But it was the mayor's responsibility
08:30to stock the shelters with enough food and water
08:32and to mobilize city and school buses for evacuation.
08:38500 were flooded when the levees broke.
08:43Did you ever talk about having buses on higher ground
08:47prior to the storm?
08:49No, other than what we normally do
08:52was to put our RTA buses, you know,
08:55at the location that was never flooded.
08:57Why not move buses to high ground?
09:00We did not have the drivers.
09:02We had the buses, but there were no drivers.
09:04We had to scrounge around to find enough buses.
09:07And you had no National Guardsmen to drive the buses.
09:10National Guard were not on the ground.
09:12There were National Guardsmen at Jackson Barracks.
09:16At Jackson Barracks?
09:17Jackson Barracks flooded.
09:19On day three of the disaster,
09:24President Bush flew over the area.
09:26The National Guard has nearly 11,000 Guardsmen
09:29on state active duty to assist governors
09:31and local officials with security
09:33and disaster response efforts.
09:36FEMA's moving supplies and equipment
09:37into the hardest-hit areas.
09:40What the president couldn't see
09:42was what was happening on the streets below.
09:45What did you say to the president of the United States
09:50and what did he say to you?
09:52I basically told him we had an incredible crisis here
09:56and that his flying over in Air Force One
09:58does not do it justice.
10:00How is a three-week-old infant
10:01going to be able to survive out here
10:02with no milk, no water?
10:03I don't want to die like this.
10:07On day four, Mayor Ray Nagin
10:10went on a local radio show.
10:11I don't want to see anybody do
10:13any more goddamn press conferences.
10:15Put a moratorium on press conferences.
10:18Don't tell me 40,000 people are coming here.
10:20They're not here.
10:22When I hear you on the radio there on Thursday,
10:25you seem a little unglued.
10:27I was.
10:28I mean, you know,
10:29I was watching all this suffering at the Superdome
10:31and I was hearing the president do a press conference.
10:34I was hearing the governor do a press conference
10:36and I was hearing all these people doing press conferences.
10:39And what they were saying was not reality.
10:42To Mr. President,
10:44thank you, thank you, thank you.
10:46We are extremely pleased with the response
10:48that every element of the federal government...
10:49And I just, I said, uh-uh.
10:51I've had enough of this.
10:53And then I called up behind it
10:54and I said, look,
10:55here's what's really going on.
10:58And the rest is history.
10:59It's too doggone late.
11:02Now get off your asses and let's do something.
11:04And let's fix the biggest goddamn crisis
11:06in the history of this country.
11:12State and local officials were 80 miles away
11:14in the state capital, Baton Rouge.
11:18Director Brown, I hope you will tell President Bush
11:20how much we appreciate it.
11:23These are the times that really count.
11:26What I've seen here today is a team that is very tight-knit,
11:28working closely together, being very professional,
11:32doing, and in my humble opinion, making the right calls.
11:35In his first full-length TV interview, Post-Katrina,
11:38former FEMA director Michael Brown tells Frontline
11:41that during the crisis,
11:43he misled the public to quell panic.
11:46Well, because I'm not going to go on television
11:48and publicly say that I think that the mayor
11:52and the governor are not doing their job
11:54and that they're not, they don't have the sense of urgency.
11:56I'm not going to say that publicly.
11:57I don't think that's the proper thing to do.
11:59So though you said that,
12:00you didn't feel that way at that time.
12:01Oh, absolutely not.
12:02You know, I'm just not going to go on public television
12:05and bash in the middle of a disaster
12:08what I think people should or should not be doing.
12:14Brown's assurances weren't convincing.
12:16We have been eating in like five days.
12:19By day four, he appeared completely out of touch.
12:22Where is the aid?
12:24It's the question people keep asking us on camera.
12:27Brian, it's an absolutely fair question.
12:28And I've got to tell you from the bottom of my heart
12:31how sad I feel for those people.
12:34The federal government just learned about those people today.
12:37You say, Brian, it's an absolutely fair question.
12:41The federal government just learned about those people today.
12:43Now, you have subsequently said that you had misspoken.
12:46But you said it again to Ted Koppel.
12:48Don't you guys watch television?
12:50Don't you guys listen to the radio?
12:51We've been so focused on doing rescue.
12:53And I'll take you one further.
12:54I think I actually said it to Soldad O'Brien.
12:56I don't understand how FEMA cannot have this information.
12:59Soldad, I learned about it listening to the news reports.
13:03So you said it three times?
13:04I said it three times.
13:05So how do you misspeak three times?
13:07I don't understand.
13:08I understand why people can now look at that tape and say,
13:12Brown's saying he just learned about that?
13:14He really must be an idiot.
13:16I simply misspoke.
13:17I knew about it 24 hours before,
13:19and I should have said we just learned about it 24 hours ago, Brian.
13:22I just don't understand how you would misspeak three times about that situation.
13:27Well, I'll tell you what it will do.
13:29Next time there's a really big disaster, we'll put you in charge of it.
13:33We'll not give you any sleep,
13:34and we'll put you on this side of the chair, on this side of the camera,
13:37and we'll pepper you with questions for a couple hours at a time
13:40and see how tired you are.
13:42Brown's counterpart in Baton Rouge was Governor Kathleen Babineau-Blanco,
13:50a former schoolteacher and two-term lieutenant governor.
13:54Her critics say she was unprepared and made vague, confusing requests to Washington.
13:59You know, I asked for help, whatever help you can give me.
14:03If somebody asks me for help, and I'll say,
14:08okay, well, I can do this, this, this, and this, what do you need?
14:11But nobody ever told me the kinds of things that they could give me.
14:15My first conversation with President Bush was asking for all federal firepower.
14:22I mean, I meant everything.
14:24Just send it.
14:25Give me planes, give me boats, give me people.
14:28You've been criticized for not asking for help in the right way,
14:32that you didn't understand the system.
14:33When you say, help, help, just, you know.
14:36Well, did you ask for troops?
14:37I wanted, you know, more help.
14:39I wanted whatever assets they had.
14:42Mayor Nagin was asking the same questions of the governor.
14:46What were you asking for?
14:47We need help.
14:48We need troops.
14:49We need resources.
14:51We need food.
14:51We need water.
14:53You name it, we need it.
14:54And what did she say to you?
14:55She said she was going to help.
14:57And then?
14:59Then time went on.
15:02With all due respect to them, I think they were just truly overwhelmed.
15:06Well, as I understand it, when local officials are overwhelmed, that's why we have FEMA.
15:11That's correct.
15:12But FEMA does that based upon the priorities of what the state establishes.
15:17The state is still in control.
15:19We don't come in and take over.
15:21We don't have the resources to take over.
15:24And Brown claims that he couldn't really help Louisiana because officials didn't tell him what they wanted.
15:29I talked to General Landreau, the adjutant general, about some of the things.
15:37You know, I actually went to him and said, help me help you.
15:39What do you need?
15:41And I remember being surprised because he didn't have like a list of priorities or things that he needed.
15:49But General Landreau says Brown is wrong.
15:51Are you saying that he's making this up?
15:54I'm not going to, you know, I'm not going to comment on what Mr. Brown said.
16:00But he's making a charge about you.
16:02He didn't say.
16:03But I can assure you that we requested assistance from FEMA.
16:10We've got documentation to show that.
16:12After that interview, General Landreau sent Frontline a 48-page document from FEMA.
16:18It shows hundreds of specific requests that FEMA had received from the state for manpower, equipment, and supplies.
16:26Other Louisiana emergency managers say FEMA simply didn't deliver.
16:31We were flabbergasted by some statements made by high FEMA officials, including under Secretary Brown, when he said that he did not come, or FEMA didn't come, because the locals didn't ask.
16:45The locals did ask.
16:46You told FEMA that you needed help.
16:48We needed this.
16:48We needed this.
16:49Not only help, we needed specifics.
16:51And then you heard Brown saying that you hadn't made those requests.
16:55That's correct.
16:56What went through your mind?
16:58It was, you know, anger.
17:01It was betrayal.
17:03It was calamity was going to be, you know, intensified.
17:09And we were going to look at now devastation squared.
17:19Good morning.
17:22Yesterday I saw the aftermath of one of the largest natural disasters ever to strike America.
17:26In Washington, it took six days for the administration to acknowledge the inadequacy of the federal response.
17:33Many of our citizens simply are not getting the help they need, especially in New Orleans.
17:39And that is unacceptable.
17:40There was a period of days.
17:42We weren't sure who was directing the federal response and were all the actions being taken.
17:47And the impression given in those four days is basically indelible.
17:52And it is injurious to the president.
17:55There's no question.
17:59Everyone pointed fingers at everyone else.
18:03No one came in for more criticism than FEMA Director Brown.
18:06My only understanding is that someone didn't pull the trigger to get the resources there.
18:13And who was responsible for pulling the trigger is questionable.
18:17Because I could never figure out who was in charge of that disaster.
18:21For the first five days of the disaster, was it Mike Brown, was it Michael Schurtoff, or was it the president?
18:26It had been a very long week.
18:30America's top National Guard officer says he hopes next time things would be done differently.
18:36What was the impact of the flooding of your headquarters?
18:41Oh, just a traumatic effect.
18:42So did it make sense to have it in a place where you knew there was a possibility of flooding?
18:47In hindsight, no.
18:48You wouldn't do it that way again?
18:50No, I don't think they would.
18:51I don't think they would.
18:52But General Landrineau insists he made the right call.
18:57So you'd do it the same way?
18:59You wouldn't change the way you deploy?
19:01No, we would have personnel and equipment at Jackson Barracks again.
19:05I talked to General Landrineau and he said he would do it again.
19:08He would do it exactly the same way.
19:11Well, I would hope that he would think that through a little more carefully.
19:22Exceptional tides flooding inland on the Texas coast underlined the warnings of the approach of Hurricane Carla.
19:35The establishment of FEMA grew out of a series of disasters back in the 60s and 70s.
19:41Evacuation was aided by school buses, which took nearly a thousand men, women and children to safety.
19:47Reports put the total number of refugees at half a million.
19:50They were wise to get out in time.
19:53The first, Carla, struck on September 11th, 1961.
19:58When the hurricane struck, it lashed in at 170 miles an hour.
20:03Hurricane Carla, the wildest of the century.
20:07A wave of monster storms followed.
20:09Another 25,000 refugees to swamp already overcrowded shelters.
20:13When Hurricane Betsy struck Louisiana in 1965, half of New Orleans flooded.
20:20Four years later, Hurricane Camille devastated the Gulf Coast again.
20:28From Biloxi to Bay St. Louis, everything's in shambles.
20:33There seemed to be no end.
20:37It's been more than a week since Hurricane Agnes brought the floodwaters.
20:41There was no FEMA in those days.
20:43Relief work was the collective responsibility of more than 100 different federal agencies.
20:48Free food is being passed out.
20:50Much of it comes from the Department of Agriculture.
20:52People often complained about lack of coordination and poor results.
20:56Many of the people here and others in the path of Hurricane Agnes were completely wiped out.
21:01Many of them feel that federal aid is too slow in coming and too little.
21:07Eventually, it was state governors who pressed President Jimmy Carter into streamlining federal response.
21:13The Federal Emergency Management Agency was created in 1979.
21:17Ironically, over the next decade, there were fewer disasters to respond to.
21:23I remember I used to write position papers about disaster planning.
21:26We always had to use examples out of South America or a Mexico earthquake or Africa or something
21:31because there weren't killer disasters in the U.S.
21:35FEMA quickly became a sort of backwater.
21:38Under Reagan and Bush, it endured scandal and became a parking lot for political appointees.
21:43George Bush, one appointed, this is like deja vu all over again,
21:49he appointed a non-emergency planning person in charge of FEMA.
21:53That was Wallace Stickney.
21:54The only claim to FEMA I ever heard was that his wife and another fellow's wife used to go shopping together
21:59and that's how he got the job to be the head of FEMA.
22:02In fact, Stickney was hired because he was a friend and past advisor to Bush's chief of staff,
22:08former New Hampshire Governor John Sununu.
22:09In 1992, his FEMA would face the first Category 5 hurricane to hit the U.S. in 23 years.
22:18I was at the Hurricane Center two days before Andrew even developed real well,
22:23and I saw it unfolding, and you could see what was going to happen.
22:28I can remember that a lot of people just didn't take it seriously.
22:32Andrew was compact, just 60 miles across, with ferocious 175-mile-an-hour winds.
22:42But it missed Miami.
22:44The news media, first thing they did was go to Miami Beach and around Miami,
22:48and they said, oh, yeah, you know, it doesn't look too bad.
22:52And nobody even paid any attention to poor Florida City or even Homestead.
22:56And I could tell when I got up there that nobody in the state of Florida could handle the situation.
23:02The storm had damaged or destroyed 125,000 homes.
23:07Thousands were stranded without food or water.
23:10Overwhelmed, local emergency managers waited for FEMA.
23:15And we waited. And we waited.
23:17It became apparent that the outside world really didn't get what was going on,
23:24really didn't understand how desperate the situation was.
23:28And you're looking at people in your community dying as a result of it.
23:34We had people from FEMA telling us that they couldn't give us the resources
23:38because we hadn't asked the right way.
23:40We simply didn't get the resources down there in time.
23:43We had no relationship with the state of Florida,
23:46so we weren't sitting with the governor finding out what was going wrong.
23:50And we were dysfunctional, just as FEMA was dysfunctional during Hurricane Katrina.
23:55At that point in time, it became apparent that we needed to do something extraordinary.
24:00We had nowhere else to go.
24:02If we do not get more food and water into the South End in a very short period of time,
24:08we are going to have more casualties because we're going to have people who are dehydrated,
24:12who are without food, babies that need formula.
24:16All I know are a lot of people are saying,
24:18why aren't we doing more?
24:19We're doing everything we can.
24:21Where in the hell is the Calvary on this one?
24:24Within three hours, apparently,
24:26the switchboard of the White House was just absolutely inundated with calls
24:34from all over the United States.
24:36The Pentagon was activated in three hours.
24:39Mr. President, do you ask President there some responsibility for the delay in federal health?
24:44We're not talking about delay.
24:46The military was ready to move instantly.
24:49Hot planning right from the very beginning.
24:52President Bush nudged his FEMA director to the sidelines
24:55and inserted his Secretary of Transportation, Andrew Card, as fix-it man.
25:00This is not a time to stand around and talk.
25:03It's a time to get busy, and that's what I'm down here to do.
25:05Card was immediately besieged with questions over why it had taken five days to send in the troops.
25:11As soon as Governor Childs made the request for our federal troops to come in and assist,
25:17we acted on that request.
25:18I'm not going to participate in the blame game, and nor is Governor Childs.
25:22Andrew was an election-year disaster for the Bush administration.
25:27The new Clinton White House recognized the political value of reforming FEMA.
25:32After Hurricane Andrew, which was in the last year of the Bush administration,
25:36everyone realized that FEMA had been a dumping ground for political favors and political appointees.
25:42And the Clinton administration said,
25:44OK, we don't want to have that happen on our watch,
25:46what happened to President Bush 41 with Hurricane Andrew.
25:51So let's clean out all the political appointees,
25:54not put Democratic political appointees in there,
25:57but get professional emergency responders
26:00from state emergency response units
26:03and create it as a professional agency.
26:06Clinton tapped James Lee Witt, formerly Arkansas's state emergency manager,
26:13to become the first FEMA director in the agency's history
26:16with direct experience in disaster management.
26:21He was also a very savvy Paul.
26:24I remember the first day he was there,
26:27he stood in front of the entrance of FEMA to take a politician,
26:31and he shook hands with the FEMA employees coming at 8 o'clock in the morning.
26:34I'm James Witt, I'm your new director, glad to meet you.
26:37And right away people thought, hey, this is interesting,
26:39this is something different.
26:41Everybody across the country loved to hate FEMA,
26:44and the morale was just terrible, it just wasn't performing.
26:48And we made FEMA a more functional organization,
26:51a flatter organization, and with less bureaucracy.
26:55Republicans and Democrats alike agree that under Witt,
26:59FEMA finally became the professional disaster agency
27:03it was supposed to be.
27:04You were never tested with a disaster of this proportion, though.
27:11Well, I don't know if you, not the magnitude, I guess you would say,
27:16but probably close.
27:19Northridge earthquake was one of the largest in history.
27:24The Mississippi River flood was quite large,
27:26nine states, Hurricane Floyd,
27:28which flooded almost all of North Carolina.
27:32Witt focused on prevention, or mitigation,
27:36working with communities to prepare for disasters.
27:40He began Project Impact with $30 million in seed money.
27:44Congress asked us to do a cost-benefit analysis on the mitigation,
27:49and we did that.
27:51And we found that every dollar spent saved anywhere from $3 to $5 in future losses,
27:56but it did more than that.
27:58It saved lives.
28:00Project Impact gave money to seven pilot cities,
28:03and by 2000, nearly 250 communities had joined.
28:09But not all cities had participated in the program.
28:13New Orleans, for one, opted out.
28:15What would New Orleans have gotten
28:17had they participated in Project Impact?
28:20New Orleans could have sat down
28:22and brought all their community leaders together,
28:24both private sector and public sector,
28:26and looked at what their risks were.
28:28Obviously, everyone in New Orleans recognizes
28:30that they live below sea level,
28:32recognizes that the levees are a protection,
28:35but, as we've seen, not the ultimate protection.
28:38Then they could begin to address some of the issues.
28:42I, um, you know, as governor,
28:46one of the things you have to deal with is catastrophe.
28:50I can remember the fires that swept Parker County, Texas.
28:53In the 2000 presidential debates,
28:55Bush praised Witt and FEMA.
28:58I've got to pay the administration a compliment.
29:00James Lee Witt of FEMA has done a really good job
29:03of working with governors during times of crisis.
29:06But after Bush became president, Witt left the agency.
29:10I, Joe Albaugh, do solemnly swear.
29:13I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States.
29:16Like his father, Bush stocked FEMA with political appointees
29:20with little or no professional experience in emergency management.
29:24His campaign manager, Joe Albaugh,
29:26became FEMA's new director.
29:28I couldn't have made it to Washington without him.
29:32And I can't tell you how honored I am
29:34that he has come to Washington to serve his country.
29:38Thank you for accepting this responsibility.
29:41Following the Bush budget-cutting agenda,
29:44Albaugh set out to trim FEMA.
29:46One of the proposed cuts was Project Impact.
29:51In late February 2001,
29:53Microsoft was hosting a conference in Seattle
29:56when a major earthquake struck.
30:11That same day,
30:12as Seattle officials were crediting Project Impact
30:15with minimizing damage to life and property,
30:18the administration cut the program from its budget.
30:21And in May 2001,
30:28Albaugh told Congress that FEMA was, quote,
30:31an oversized entitlement program.
30:34He brought in his friend of 25 years,
30:38Michael Brown,
30:39to be FEMA's new general counsel.
30:41In certain areas,
30:42I think that FEMA had become bloated.
30:44There was a general desire
30:46to make it as lean and mean as possible,
30:49that if there was any fat that needed to be cut out,
30:51we should cut that out.
30:53To focus the agency,
30:56Albaugh identified the three most likely disasters
30:59facing the country.
31:00They were an earthquake in California,
31:04a hurricane hitting New Orleans,
31:06and a terrorist attack in New York.
31:08By all accounts,
31:21FEMA performed well after 9-11.
31:25When 9-11 happened,
31:26the career people in FEMA
31:27did what they always do.
31:29They went up to New York
31:31and immediately set up
31:33a disaster field office,
31:35set up communications.
31:36Find a way to get down to B-2.
31:37Go for it.
31:38For the heat of this thing is...
31:39Albaugh would not talk to Frontline on camera,
31:43but in a telephone interview,
31:44he told producer Martin Smith
31:46that the FEMA you saw on 9-11
31:48is not the FEMA we see today, unquote.
31:52Albaugh says the fault lies
31:53with what happened next.
31:57Tonight, I propose a permanent
31:59cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security
32:01to unite essential agencies
32:03that must work more closely together.
32:07It would be the largest reorganization
32:09of government in 40 years,
32:11made up of 22 federal agencies
32:14scattered across Washington, D.C.
32:16and Northern Virginia.
32:18For the new boss,
32:19the challenge was to get this archipelago
32:22of agencies to function as one unit.
32:25This would test the competence
32:27of a Jack Welch or a Lee Iacocca.
32:30The Department has this huge management challenge,
32:33a huge budget,
32:34about $30 to $40 billion or so,
32:37the third largest agency in the government,
32:39and all cobbled together in a matter of months.
32:42And yet we had at the top
32:43someone who'd never managed anything
32:45larger than the immediate staff of a governor
32:47or the immediate staff of a congressman.
32:49The department is under the command
32:51of a superb leader
32:53who has my confidence.
32:56Congratulations, Tom,
32:57and thank you for serving me.
32:58If you look at Department of Homeland Security,
33:00it's like a holding company
33:01where you had some mergers and acquisitions.
33:04You had a couple new startups
33:06basically putting together
33:0820-plus units of government
33:09and about 180,000 people.
33:12The department became much larger
33:14than Congress had ever proposed.
33:16Then they decided to form
33:18a larger department
33:19than you would recommend.
33:19Correct.
33:21Bad idea? Good idea?
33:23I thought it was a bad idea
33:24because I think that
33:25any government reorganization
33:27has to come in relatively small bites
33:29or else you get indigestion.
33:33If you look at our original report,
33:35it was a much leaner organization.
33:37The key parts of it were FEMA,
33:40the Coast Guard,
33:42immigration and customs enforcement.
33:45But here,
33:46you had a lot of other things that went in.
33:47Which, in my opinion,
33:49didn't belong there.
33:51In the bureaucratic shuffle,
33:53FEMA was downgraded
33:54from an independent agency
33:55to a sub-department
33:57of Homeland Security.
33:59What it looked like to us
34:00was that,
34:01for whatever reasons,
34:03a well-run system
34:04was either on purpose
34:05or accidentally
34:06just being pulled apart
34:07and shredded.
34:08Because our system wasn't perfect,
34:10but it worked pretty well.
34:11FEMA was a very small agency
34:13being moved into a huge department
34:16where it would have agencies
34:18like Immigration Services,
34:20Transportation Security Administration,
34:22groups and organizations
34:23that had 10,000 to 20,000 employees in it.
34:26And a small agency like FEMA
34:27could not possibly compete.
34:29The creation of the Department
34:31of Homeland Security
34:32became a death knell for FEMA.
34:35The morale at FEMA plummeted.
34:37Scores of lifelong employees
34:39left the agency.
34:41Director Joe Albaugh
34:42left for the private sector.
34:44Michael Brown took over.
34:46When you move FEMA
34:47into the Department
34:48of Homeland Security,
34:49you do create this added layer
34:51of bureaucracy
34:52that FEMA has to deal with
34:53in terms of budgets,
34:55in terms of personnel,
34:56IT systems, everything.
34:58There was almost $80 million
34:59that was taken
35:00out of FEMA's budget
35:01to use in other areas
35:02of the Department
35:03of Homeland Security.
35:04And once we moved FEMA in there,
35:06these taxes started to occur
35:08and we started to lose
35:09the resources.
35:10That was a mistake.
35:11People inside FEMA
35:12complained that they got taxed
35:14to pay for this new overhead.
35:15Well, it's quite interesting
35:16they use the word tax
35:18because these agencies
35:21and their individual heads
35:23understood that as part
35:25of the integration process
35:26that we're going to redistribute
35:27some of the dollars they had.
35:29You don't think FEMA was hurt
35:30by the reorganization?
35:31No, of course not.
35:31No.
35:33Terrorism was the issue du jour.
35:35That was the issue.
35:37And I want to emphasize
35:38that I don't minimize that issue
35:40because I do believe
35:41it's important.
35:42But you need to be prepared
35:43to respond to a disaster
35:45regardless of what causes it.
35:48Brown was also planning
35:49to leave FEMA
35:50for the private sector
35:51around the time
35:52Katrina struck.
35:55Let's get started immediately.
35:59National Hurricane Center,
36:00you want to give us an update?
36:02That's a very, very large hurricane.
36:05For all the cutbacks at FEMA,
36:07Brown faced Katrina
36:08with some planning
36:09under his belt.
36:10Okay, we'll move on now
36:12to the states, Louisiana.
36:14A year earlier,
36:15the agency had sponsored
36:17an exercise called
36:18Hurricane Pam
36:19that forecast Katrina.
36:21Pam is the perfect model
36:24of what happened here.
36:26You know,
36:26everything that happened
36:27in Pam,
36:28which was purely fictional
36:30and an exercise,
36:31happened in Katrina.
36:33But Pam set up
36:34false expectations.
36:36Commitments were made
36:37at the end of the exercise.
36:39This is what we're going to do.
36:40This is what you're going to do.
36:41This is what this one's going to do.
36:43And the problem here
36:45that developed in Katrina
36:46is that the locals
36:48accepted that.
36:50We believed it.
36:51After 20 days
36:53and $850,000,
36:56the administration
36:57cut FEMA's funding
36:58for the Pam exercise
36:59before it was completed.
37:01This 121-page draft report
37:04shows that key planning decisions
37:06were not yet made.
37:09The issue of medical care
37:10for hurricane victims
37:11was not yet finalized.
37:14Communications
37:14were not addressed at all.
37:17Key transportation decisions
37:18were left to be determined.
37:23As Katrina approached,
37:25state and city officials
37:26knew they were unprepared.
37:29The storm was coming.
37:30It was heading dead on in.
37:33It had been gaining strength.
37:35It had been headed closer.
37:38A direct hit
37:39was going to be really bad
37:40for the city.
37:41They knew for days
37:43that a hurricane
37:43was going to hit a city
37:44that was already
37:45below sea level.
37:47I said,
37:48Mr. President,
37:49it's going to be a big one.
37:50It's going to be bad.
37:51And I'm going to need
37:52a lot of help.
37:53We have a, you know,
37:54have a very small state.
37:57Ladies and gentlemen,
37:58I wish I had better news
37:59for you,
38:00but we are facing
38:01a storm
38:02that most of us
38:04have feared.
38:05In those last hours
38:06before landfall,
38:07dozens of copies
38:08of the Pam report
38:09were distributed
38:10to emergency planners.
38:11every person
38:13is hereby ordered
38:14to immediately evacuate
38:16the city of New Orleans.
38:18But when it came
38:19to evacuation,
38:20they were forced
38:21to improvise.
38:22Thank you, God!
38:24We basically communicated
38:26with all of,
38:27you know,
38:28the people in the city,
38:29especially the churches,
38:30to say,
38:30look,
38:31this thing is coming.
38:32We faxed out to everyone.
38:34We had talked about
38:34a buddying system.
38:36And for the most part,
38:37a lot of churches
38:38participated
38:38and got people out.
38:39Can we evacuate cities, really?
38:46I think it would prove
38:49to be virtually impossible
38:52on very short notice
38:54to get urban America
38:57out of the way,
38:58as it were.
38:59So I think one of the
39:02difficult lessons
39:03from a Katrina-like event
39:05is that it's very difficult to do.
39:08We weren't as well prepared
39:09as we should have been,
39:10pure and simple.
39:12Why weren't you prepositioned?
39:14We were prepositioned.
39:15With buses that you could
39:16get people evacuated out.
39:17We did not have buses
39:18prepositioned
39:19because that was
39:20a state and local responsibility.
39:22And I don't want to sound
39:23like I'm, you know,
39:23passing the buck here,
39:25but we rely upon
39:26state and local governments.
39:28Evacuation laws
39:29are state and local laws.
39:30That's not a federal law.
39:31But Brown is not entirely correct.
39:35Evacuation is a shared responsibility.
39:38U.S. federal law
39:39governing Homeland Security
39:40states clearly,
39:42the functions of the Federal
39:43Emergency Management Agency
39:45include conducting
39:47emergency operations
39:48to save lives
39:49through evacuating
39:50potential victims.
39:52Weren't people dying
39:54while waiting to be rescued?
39:55Yes.
39:58They absolutely were.
40:00Because people who
40:01either did not
40:02or could not evacuate,
40:03and as the waters
40:04began to rise,
40:05they found themselves
40:06in situations
40:07where they were going to die.
40:09And every rescuer
40:12on every helicopter
40:13and every boat
40:14was trying to get
40:15to every person
40:16that they could.
40:19The red and white on it!
40:21We might have to get on
40:22the last one up there.
40:23One busload
40:25would have saved
40:27some people.
40:28Two busloads
40:28would have saved
40:29twice as many people.
40:30Things like that
40:31that I just wish
40:32all of us
40:33had been a little more
40:35oomph about.
40:38Brown's regrets aside,
40:40there was an age-old
40:42political caution operating,
40:44a belief in maintaining
40:45strict constraints
40:46on federal power.
40:48Shouldn't it be the role
40:49of the federal government
40:50to be setting standards
40:51for evacuation?
40:52I think it's
40:53the mayor's responsibility.
40:55It's not the federal
40:55government's responsibility
40:56to make sure
40:57that our cities
40:58can be evacuated
40:59in a timely fashion?
41:00We are really talking
41:01about a logic path
41:03that takes you
41:04to pretty Orwellian nature.
41:06But yet we have
41:07educational standards.
41:08It's the responsibility
41:08of states to have
41:09good clean air policies.
41:12Yeah, I hear you.
41:13I know, I think I...
41:14It's not Orwellian
41:15to have clean air standards
41:17nationwide.
41:17It's a step
41:18in the direction.
41:19And I would offer
41:20that if, in fact,
41:22the mayor or the governor
41:25had had that imposed
41:27on them,
41:28there would have been
41:29some not-so-fast
41:31associated with it.
41:36The Hurricane Pam exercise
41:38had predicted
41:39that more than 100,000 people
41:41would be left behind.
41:42The vast majority
41:44of the more than 900 people
41:46who died in New Orleans
41:47were elderly.
41:52154 of them,
41:53patients in New Orleans
41:54area nursing homes
41:55and hospitals.
41:5934 died in this facility alone.
42:04Why did that happen?
42:06It appears that the staff
42:08did not implement
42:10their plan,
42:11which requires
42:12them to evacuate.
42:14And I suspect
42:16didn't believe
42:17that the storm
42:17was going to be
42:18as disastrous
42:19as it was.
42:21And when they realized it,
42:23they couldn't do anything.
42:25And so they decided
42:26to save themselves.
42:27And they ran
42:27and left these,
42:29you know,
42:3030-some-odd older people
42:32to fend for themselves.
42:34And they died
42:34in their chairs.
42:36The rescue of thousands
42:48of city residents
42:49was delayed for days
42:51by the inability
42:52of people
42:52to communicate
42:53with each other.
42:55All of the existing
42:57communications
42:57were out.
42:59They just were non-existent
43:00for probably 36 hours.
43:03Electricity is gone.
43:04Power is gone.
43:04Your phone system
43:06is gone.
43:07Your ability
43:07to communicate
43:07is literally gone.
43:09Those people
43:09were blinded,
43:10they were deafened,
43:11and they were dumb.
43:13And that was probably
43:19the most frustrating thing
43:21and the thing
43:22that hampered efforts
43:24the most.
43:26And not have
43:27a portable network
43:29in place
43:29to take care of that.
43:35Secretary Ridge
43:36told me that
43:37post-crisis
43:38communications
43:39emergency systems
43:40was something
43:41that they had.
43:44And, for example,
43:45FEMA does have that.
43:46FEMA has...
43:46So what happened to it?
43:47We used it.
43:49The problem is
43:49FEMA doesn't have enough of it.
43:51But whose responsibility
43:52is that?
43:53Whose fault is that
43:54if FEMA doesn't have enough?
43:56Well, that's all of our fault.
43:58That means that Congress
43:59and the administration
44:00and the FEMA director
44:01and everybody else
44:02needs to sit down
44:03and say,
44:04if we're going to
44:05truly be ready
44:06for a catastrophic disaster,
44:08we need A, B, and C.
44:12If we believed
44:13this president
44:14was focused
44:15on any one thing,
44:16it was certainly
44:17preparedness
44:18and the war on terrorism.
44:20But yet,
44:21four years after 9-11,
44:22we have no results
44:24on communications.
44:25Yeah, well,
44:26I think that's a failure.
44:27I think it's a failure
44:28on the part of the Congress,
44:29it's a failure
44:30on the part
44:30of the administration,
44:31specifically a failure
44:32on the part of DHS,
44:34people should have
44:36paid more attention to that.
44:37I mean,
44:37if we ever learned anything,
44:39we learned at 9-11
44:40in New York
44:40that those valiant people
44:42who lost their lives,
44:43many of them
44:44might not have lost
44:45their lives
44:45had they been able
44:46to talk to each other.
44:47They just weren't able to.
44:53The ability
44:54of first responders
44:55to talk with one another
44:56is called interoperability.
44:59Despite widespread
45:00recognition of its importance,
45:02very few cities have it.
45:04You've got to get
45:06interoperability
45:07of communications
45:08or else you're going
45:08to have disaster
45:09no matter what goes on.
45:11Primary channel
45:12is going to be spec one.
45:14If spec one goes down,
45:15NOPD guys,
45:16your backup channel
45:17is going to be on spec two.
45:18If I were in a position
45:19to make a decision,
45:21the first thing I would do
45:22is to start funding
45:23interoperability
45:24for every major metropolitan area
45:26in this country
45:26and I'd get it done
45:27this year.
45:28here we are four years
45:31after 9-11
45:32and we still don't have
45:34robust interoperable
45:37communications.
45:38Why?
45:42The interoperable
45:45communication dilemma
45:47is one that has existed
45:48to your point
45:49before 9-11
45:50and the tragic consequences
45:51were most vivid
45:52on 9-11.
45:53ultimately
45:54a nationwide
45:56system
46:00I think is the goal
46:02of all the emergency
46:03responders
46:03but it will take time
46:04to develop.
46:06Back in 2003,
46:08New Orleans got a chance
46:09to upgrade its system.
46:11The city of New Orleans
46:12and seven surrounding parishes
46:13won a major federal grant
46:15to operate an emergency
46:17communication system.
46:18It was big news.
46:20A $7 million grant
46:21from the Department of Justice
46:23to build an interoperable
46:25communications network.
46:26Deputies from opposite parishes
46:28will be able to communicate
46:29with special radios.
46:31This is quite ambitious
46:32but I think it reflects
46:34a realization
46:35that we must encounter
46:36the risk that we face
46:38together
46:38if we're going to be successful.
46:40The city was ready
46:41to build a network
46:42that would allow
46:43all existing
46:44first responder radios
46:46and phones
46:46to interconnect.
46:48But big tech companies
46:49with competing plans
46:51lobbied the mayor's office.
46:54With no federal guidance,
46:56the project stalled.
46:57Why not just say
46:59you have to have
46:59such and such a system
47:00in place
47:01in one year from now
47:02and you've got to buy
47:03this system
47:04to these specifications
47:05and that's the deal.
47:06We're not going to pick
47:06a vendor over another.
47:08You can keep pressing me
47:08on this point
47:09as long as you want.
47:10The fact of the matter
47:11is that they're spending
47:12hundreds of millions
47:12of dollars
47:13to make their systems
47:14interoperable.
47:15They've begun that process
47:16four years ago.
47:17The process continues today
47:18and in time
47:19that is what will occur.
47:21It will not occur overnight
47:23but there's sufficient intensity
47:25to this proposition
47:27that it will be done.
47:28The public safety
47:29wireless network
47:30says that three states
47:31Delaware, Michigan,
47:32North Carolina
47:33have mature
47:34or widespread interoperability.
47:35Yep.
47:36Well, if Delaware, Michigan
47:38and North Carolina
47:39can do it,
47:39why can't the rest
47:40of the country do it?
47:41It's a federal system
47:42of governance
47:43and it's one
47:44of the challenges
47:45as you build
47:46a department
47:47and try to create
47:48not a federal capability
47:49but a national capability.
47:52Well, that's baloney.
47:54We impose standards
47:55on airports.
47:57We impose standards
47:58on interstate highways,
48:00on bridges.
48:01We impose standards
48:02on harbors.
48:03We impose standards
48:04on almost everything.
48:06And the federal government,
48:07if it's going to give out money,
48:09has a right
48:09to demand standards.
48:11And interoperability
48:12is one of those standards.
48:14And to say that somehow
48:15that that is
48:17impinging on federalism
48:19is, to use a polite word,
48:21baloney.
48:24Over the last three years,
48:26the Department of Homeland Security
48:27has handed out
48:28$8.1 billion
48:30to the states.
48:32They've bought everything
48:33from bullhorns
48:34to hazmat suits
48:35to helicopters.
48:37There are no specific goals,
48:41no specific requirements,
48:42requirements,
48:43and no plan
48:44to get from here
48:45to there.
48:47As a result,
48:48we have cities
48:49that bought
48:49bulletproof vests
48:51for canine patrols.
48:53No!
48:54Sit!
48:54So that we have dogs
48:55with bulletproof vests.
48:57We have cities
48:57that bought
48:58air-conditioned garbage trucks
48:59with Homeland Security money
49:01without ever solving
49:02their communications problems.
49:05The federal government
49:06has handed out
49:07a lot of money.
49:08In my personal opinion,
49:10it has handed out
49:11that money
49:11with far too few conditions
49:13on how the state
49:14and local agencies
49:15spend it.
49:17State and local agencies
49:18have the authority
49:19under the Constitution
49:20to spend money
49:21as they wish
49:22on things they want to buy.
49:24Attention citizens
49:25of New Orleans,
49:26be advised that
49:26the Superdome
49:27and Convention Center
49:28have been closed.
49:29That's the deal
49:29in a federal governance system.
49:32That, unfortunately,
49:33is federalism.
49:33Be advised that
49:35the Superdome
49:35and Convention Center
49:36have been closed.
49:37It wasn't until
49:39day six of the disaster
49:40that the federal government
49:42flexed its muscle.
49:447,000 troops
49:45from the 82nd Airborne
49:46and 1st Cavalry Divisions
49:48under the command
49:49of General Russell Honore
49:50hit the ground.
49:52The situation
49:53began to improve.
49:55I really believe
49:56the most serious mistake
49:57that I made
49:58was not just saying,
50:00look,
50:01we just can't get this
50:02done by ourselves.
50:03Let's go ahead
50:03and get all these troops
50:04in here now.
50:06We're heading back
50:07and let's don't get
50:08500 troops
50:09to come in here
50:09to help with distribution.
50:10Let's get 10,000 troops
50:11in here and do something.
50:12What, two, what, two,
50:13what, five?
50:18The Louisiana National Guard
50:20had been overwhelmed.
50:22Not only was
50:23its headquarters flooded,
50:24but 35% of its soldiers
50:26were on duty
50:27in Iraq and Afghanistan.
50:28Americans have every right
50:32to expect a more effective
50:34response in a time
50:35of emergency.
50:36Two weeks after Katrina,
50:38President Bush addressed
50:38the nation from New Orleans.
50:40It is now clear
50:41that a challenge
50:41on this scale
50:42requires greater
50:43federal authority
50:44and a broader role
50:45for the armed forces,
50:47the institution
50:48of our government
50:48most capable
50:49of massive logistical
50:51operations
50:51on a moment's notice.
50:52In his speech,
50:53he called for all
50:54federal, state,
50:55and local agencies
50:56to review their performance.
50:59This government
50:59will learn the lessons
51:00of Hurricane Katrina.
51:03Military planners
51:04are now considering
51:05setting up
51:06a permanent
51:06rapid reaction unit
51:08designed to respond
51:09to domestic disasters.
51:11The price tag
51:12has not yet been determined.
51:19Meanwhile,
51:19plans have been drawn up
51:21to further reduce FEMA.
51:24In June 2005,
51:25two months before Katrina,
51:28Director Michael Brown
51:28sat down to write a memo
51:30to the number two official
51:31at Homeland Security.
51:34This is to express
51:35serious concerns
51:36about the direction
51:37this is taking
51:38emergency management
51:39in this nation,
51:40Brown wrote.
51:42The proposed
51:42organizational structure
51:43is doomed to fail.
51:46I don't want to see us
51:47fail this president
51:48or the nation.
51:50The latest reorganization
51:52that Secretary Shurtoff
51:53has suggested,
51:54FEMA loses more
51:55stature.
51:56FEMA becomes an office.
51:58And not just that,
51:59it loses all
52:00of the preparedness functions.
52:02And FEMA becomes
52:02a very small
52:03response recovery
52:05mitigation organization.
52:08But on October 18th,
52:11President Bush
52:11signed the order
52:12to take responsibility
52:13for preparedness
52:14out of FEMA.
52:15As everyone struggles
52:23to answer questions
52:24about Katrina,
52:26the storm's lesson
52:28remains clear,
52:30the high cost
52:32of being unprepared.
52:34came up pretty fast.
52:37I've been pretty
52:38ineffective
52:39at my vertical evacuation.
52:43Oh, look,
52:44there's somebody
52:44swimming around outside
52:46going to get in my tree.
52:47Who's that?
52:50It's my neighbor,
52:51apparently.
52:52What the hell's he doing
52:55swimming down the block?
53:00Imagine what this guy's
53:01doing out.
53:07Well,
53:07next time on Frontline,
53:22Next time on Frontline,
53:37Spontaneous healing.
53:38Alternative medicine.
53:39Coffee Animas.
53:40It's a $48 billion business.
53:42The American people
53:43demanded it.
53:44I feel good.
53:44I feel better
53:45than I've ever felt.
53:46But do the alternatives work?
53:48There's no evidence for it.
53:49We think that's pseudoscience.
53:50And are they safe?
53:52Do you think
53:52the average American
53:53realizes that the herb
53:55or supplement
53:55they're picking up
53:56does not have to prove
53:57that it's safe?
53:58The Alternative Fix.
54:00Watch Frontline.
54:06Frontline's The Storm
54:07is available on
54:08videocassette or DVD.
54:11To water,
54:12call PBS Home Video
54:13at 1-800-PLAY-PBS.
54:22And we'll see you next time.