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  • 6/10/2025

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00:00There's the bay. We're going to be shooting off to the left side of it.
00:07A U.S. cargo plane attempts a difficult landing at the American naval base in Guantanamo Bay.
00:14Where's the strobe? Right over there.
00:18It requires avoiding restricted Cuban airspace.
00:22We were intimidated by the fact that there might be guards at the fence perimeter with guns.
00:28Everybody told us, they'll shoot you down, they'll shoot you down.
00:33What the hell?
00:35We heard an explosion. It was pretty devastating.
00:39Investigators are determined to find out why a DC-8 crashed so close to the Cuban border.
00:47To destroy a DC-8 like that, there had to be a high energy impact.
00:52I don't know who's put it down.
00:54Stop!
00:58D. D. D. D. D.
01:03Oh, fuck.
01:04D. D. D. D.
01:07Guantanamo Bay, an isolated US Navy training base that sits on the edge of the communist
01:34island of Cuba.
01:37Assistant Fire Chief Frank Krupa and some trainee firefighters prepare for a practice drill.
01:43All right, let's get at it.
01:46A typical duty day, like many fire stations, you're there training and staying prepared
01:52for the alarm strike.
02:01We heard an explosion, enough to shake the building.
02:06I didn't see the fireball at the end of the runway.
02:10Let's go, let's go, let's go!
02:14We knew something was wrong and headed for our truck.
02:19We knew that around 5 o'clock we were going to have a DC-8 landing.
02:23Let's go, let's go, let's go!
02:27The DC-8 was a cargo plane.
02:30Typically there would be three people on board.
02:33This type of aircraft was going to have quite a bit of fuel on board.
02:36The DC-8 cargo jet has crashed 400 meters in front of the runway.
02:42As I headed down the runway, I was passing parts of aircraft before I even reached the crash site itself.
02:53It was pretty devastating.
02:54I didn't expect to be survivors.
03:00Debris is scattered over a wide area.
03:05Something catches Krupa's eye.
03:10Incredibly, part of the aircraft is still intact.
03:15I realized that this was the cockpit, the forward section of the aircraft, which had broken away from the main fuselage.
03:22And I decided to walk over and see what I could see.
03:26It was the cockpit had been inverted.
03:28It was heavily damaged.
03:29Help!
03:30To Krupa's astonishment, he hears signs of life.
03:33Help!
03:34Help!
03:35Help!
03:36I heard...
03:41I heard these cries for help.
03:44Help!
03:45Help!
03:46Anybody?
03:47Help!
03:48Help!
03:49Help!
03:50Help!
03:51Through the aircraft, I could hear the moans of personnel inside and realized that someone had survived.
04:03We've got survivors.
04:06I got on the radio and I told them to leave their vehicle and come over and we had survivors.
04:17We needed to begin rescue.
04:20Krupa clears a path into the damaged cockpit.
04:23There was a small hole at the bottom of the cockpit.
04:28Okay, guys.
04:29We're gonna get you out of there.
04:30Just hang on.
04:31Hurry!
04:32He discovers three people in the cockpit, all alive, but only Ben.
04:47They were all seriously injured.
04:50A lot of traumatic injury and they were crying and moaning.
04:54Please help me.
04:56Please.
04:57They are First Officer Thomas Curran, Flight Engineer David Richmond, and Captain James Chapo.
05:06Yeah, I don't remember the exact moment of hitting the ground, no.
05:12Yeah, we were fortunate, you know, the DCA, they say, was built to separate at the cockpit and cabin bulkhead.
05:19And sure enough, that's where it busted the part and we rolled ahead of the airplane.
05:24Tom?
05:25Tom?
05:26Tom?
05:27I'm here too.
05:28Can you move?
05:29Can I?
05:30Yeah, yeah.
05:31My memory of the actual accident itself is gone.
05:32Please help us.
05:33I was told when the airplane hit the ground, a large boulder came through the cockpit by my
05:39rudder pedals and broke off the rudder pedals and severely damaged my legs.
06:00The impact and fire have obliterated the DC-8.
06:07The three surviving pilots are transported to hospital in Miami.
06:19We found out later that the State Department had contacted the Cuban government and received
06:24special permission to medevac these crew members right across Cuban airspace to save time to get
06:33into Miami.
06:36Within hours of the accident, a team of investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board
06:41is on its way to Guantanamo.
06:45We got notified that there was an airplane crash down in Guantanamo Bay.
06:51In 1993, Guantanamo Bay is a small US naval base surrounded by communist Cuba.
07:00The base stayed under American control even after the communist revolution in 1959.
07:06Did Cuba somehow play a role in the crash?
07:16All right, let's see what we've got.
07:19Greg Feith is the lead investigator for the NTSB team.
07:25He knows that the crashed cargo plane is a DC-8 operated by a US carrier.
07:32It was operated by American International Airways, which is actually owned by a company called
07:37Connie Coletta, Inc.
07:38The aircraft was operating as flight number 808.
07:43Feith is shocked by the extent of the destruction.
07:47It's always a devastating sight when you see this magnificent machine spread out in pieces.
07:59He wonders why a DC-8 on approach crashes 450 yards short of the runway.
08:09Take a look at that.
08:11Investigators examine the wreckage for clues that could explain why the aircraft came down so violently.
08:18We need to check the engine, wings, ailerons, rudder. Get on it.
08:24Both black boxes coming.
08:25While searching the debris, investigators recover the two black boxes.
08:30Nope. Both slightly damaged.
08:32One of the key tools for investigators for large transport category airplanes
08:37is the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder.
08:40Coming to you right now.
08:43Investigators send the boxes to the NTSB lab in Washington DC for analysis.
08:49Fire site, correct. Yep.
08:51We want to know what the actual performance of the airplane was.
08:56And we can marry it up against the cockpit voice recorder to see what the crew was talking about,
09:01what they were looking at, if there was a problem.
09:04While they wait for the black box data, investigators interview witnesses
09:11to try to understand what happened to Flight 808.
09:17So you saw the whole thing?
09:19Yeah, I watched them come in.
09:21They learned that the pilots of a US Navy transport watched the plane's final moments.
09:28Here it comes. On 10th.
09:32They were near the runway when Flight 808 began its approach.
09:37We were fortunate there was a C-130 crew, so you have some qualified pilots
09:43who are actually watching this airplane, the DC-8, as it was trying to land on runway 10.
09:49The DC-8 was turning towards the runway when something went wrong.
09:56They described that when they watched the airplane as it turned towards runway 10,
10:02the bank angle continuously increased.
10:05It's not going to make it. No way.
10:08At Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, US Navy pilots watching Flight 808 come into land realized it was in trouble.
10:19Come on, come on, come on, level off, bang, level off.
10:25Normally you don't want to be turning more than about 10, 20 degrees on final approach.
10:30They watched this airplane as it went from 30 degrees to 40 degrees to 50 degrees, 60 degrees,
10:36and they were really surprised.
10:41And then they saw the wings go about 90 degrees relative to the horizon.
10:46The nose pitched down and the airplane struck the ground.
10:49Sounds like a wing stall.
10:56Yes, sir, it sure looks like it.
10:59Yeah.
11:00What the pilots describe sounds like an aerodynamic condition known as wing stall,
11:05during which the wings aren't producing the lift needed to keep the plane in the air.
11:10So you now have the dynamic.
11:16You understand how the aircraft struck the ground.
11:19Now you have to determine why.
11:24Investigators wonder if the air traffic controller who handled Flight 808 can shed any light on the crash.
11:32There was a controller trainee at the time.
11:36That trainee was the one that was talking to the crew of Flight 808.
11:40So did you pick up anything unusual in your conversation with the pilots?
11:44Everything seemed fine.
11:46Guantanamo, this is Connie 808.
11:49Connie 808, Guantanamo, go ahead.
11:52Well, except for one thing.
11:54What was that?
11:57Investigators learned that 12 minutes before the crash,
12:00the crew of Flight 808 radioed in as they were approaching the island
12:04and made an unusual request.
12:08Connie 808 requesting, we'd like to make the approach for 10 this afternoon.
12:13Connie 808, understand you'd like runway 1-0?
12:19That's affirmative, runway 1-0.
12:21They asked to change runways.
12:24The controller typically will allow the crew to make the decision as to what runway,
12:28and that runway selection sometimes is based on wind conditions
12:32or certain types of weather conditions or possibly even airspace restrictions.
12:38Guantanamo has a single runway, with aircraft landing in either direction,
12:43identified as 2-8 from the east and 10 from the west.
12:49Flight 808 was originally scheduled to land on runway 2-8.
12:54Normally, airplanes land on runway 2-8.
12:59It's more or less a straight-in approach, landing to the west.
13:03But then the crew requested a switch to runway 10.
13:07That approach is closer to the border with Cuba.
13:11To avoid Cuban territory, landing aircraft are forced to approach from the sea
13:15and then make a sharp turn onto runway 10.
13:20You only have three-quarters of a mile from the border fence,
13:24so trying to manipulate or maneuver a DC-8 is a real challenge.
13:30The aircraft has to approach almost perpendicular to the runway,
13:35and when they get in close, they have to make a hard starboard turn.
13:40They have to turn and dip and drop onto the runway.
13:45Feith is puzzled.
13:47Why would the crew of Flight 808 choose the more difficult approach?
13:52Did they say why they wanted to land on 10?
13:55I think it caught her attention that why would you do that when everybody else lands on runway 2-8,
14:02which is the easiest approach.
14:06Investigators want to interview the three pilots of Flight 808 about their crash,
14:11but they are still in intensive care, and they remember little about the accident.
14:15We know that any time there's a surviving crew member or crew members,
14:22there's always the possibility that they aren't going to remember exactly what was transpiring
14:28because of their traumatic injuries.
14:31Even though the surviving crew can't offer any insight into why they flew a more challenging approach,
14:38Thanks very much.
14:40Investigators are determined to learn more about what happened.
14:43They wonder about the role the pilots played in the accident.
14:48Were they qualified to fly the DC-8?
14:51Let's have a look here.
14:53Feith studies the crew's personnel files.
14:57He learns that the captain, James Chapo, is a highly experienced pilot
15:02with over 20,000 hours of flight time under his belt.
15:08Weather's looking pretty good.
15:11Yeah, not bad.
15:1320,000 hours is a very experienced pilot, and this captain had a good reputation.
15:20Other pilots had talked about the fact that, you know, he was very dynamic, he was a good communicator.
15:25Is there anywhere to get a bite to eat on the base?
15:28Just the chow hall, unfortunately.
15:30First Officer Thomas Curran is a former Navy pilot.
15:33He had a first officer who, again, was very experienced, 15,000 plus hours.
15:40The flight engineer, Dave Richmond, is also a seasoned pilot.
15:45These guys had to know what they were doing.
15:47Doesn't make any sense.
15:48Feith wonders why an experienced crew allowed the aircraft to get into such a severe bank.
16:01From an accident investigation standpoint, when you have tens of thousands of hours between these three pilots, you know that they can operate the airplane.
16:11So now the question is, why didn't they?
16:15How come they weren't able to use that experience to successfully land this airplane?
16:21Investigators still don't understand what led AIA Flight 808 to crash at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.
16:31They know the crew was highly qualified, and now wonder if there was something wrong with the plane.
16:39Let's bring it up, please.
16:40An investigator is always keeping an open mind. We're somewhat inherently suspicious people, and consequently I look at a lot of different theories, but I'm not going to exclude anything until I know for a fact that it couldn't be that.
17:01Now Feith finally has access to the plane's critical digital flight data.
17:07He uses that data to recreate the exact flight path of the plane.
17:14When we looked at the flight path study, we had to understand what the dynamics of that flight was, and then see how the crew was handling flying this approach.
17:27Okay, so far so good.
17:30Investigators study the plane's flight path.
17:33Okay, let's see the proper approach.
17:46So they started their turn too late, and never recovered.
17:50The botched turn meant the crew of Flight 808 had to take the aircraft into a steeper and steeper bank in order to get it aligned with the runway.
18:01The pilot increased the bank, trying to salvage that turn and get the airplane lined up.
18:07But the steep bank was reducing the plane's ability to stay airborne.
18:13When you bank the airplane to 45 or 60 degrees, the amount of lift it's producing to hold the airplane in the air is compromised, because the wings are not pointed up, they're at this high angle.
18:26Now all of a sudden the airplane gets into an aerodynamic stall at a time that you don't expect it.
18:36And because you're low to the ground, you don't have sufficient altitude for proper recovery.
18:41The simulation has left investigators with urgent new questions.
18:49Why did they start that turn so late?
18:54Feith also needs to know why the crew didn't abandon an approach that was so clearly going wrong.
18:59It was kind of surprising for all of us that you would have been maneuvering an airplane of that size, that low to the ground.
19:12The cockpit voice recording is finally ready.
19:15It's Feith's last hope for solving the mystery.
19:20Investigators get a breakthrough when they listen to the recording.
19:24Okay, let's get started.
19:31We didn't hold a lot of hope out for getting good information from the flight crew.
19:37That's why the cockpit voice recorder became so important to us, because it could fill in the gaps.
19:43And what it reveals is extraordinary.
19:47Connie 808, you're required to remain within the airspace designated by a strobe light.
19:51Roger, we'll look for the strobe light, Connie 808.
19:55Feith hears the air traffic controller discussing a strobe light with the crew of Flight 808.
20:01So what do we know about the strobe they keep talking about?
20:05They study a navigational chart for Guantanamo Airport.
20:11There it is.
20:14They learn that a strobe light marks the base's border fence with Cuba.
20:24On the approach to runway 10, there are certain visual cues that the crew would use in order to get themselves lined up so that they wouldn't overfly the restricted airspace.
20:33One of those cues was a high-intensity strobe light that was mounted along the border fence.
20:41Are they giving us 28?
20:43Yeah, if it's available.
20:45Investigators hear the crew talking about using the easier runway, 28, for the landing.
20:51They initially lined up for 28 and that was to be their landing runway.
20:58So why did they switch to 10?
21:01How to make that 1-0 approach?
21:04Just for the heck of it and see how it is.
21:09If we miss it, we'll just come back around and land on 28.
21:13Okay.
21:15Stop the tape.
21:16For the heck of it?
21:20That's why he's landing on runway 10?
21:23Feith is struck by the captain's decision to use runway 10.
21:28When there was a comment by the captain going,
21:31why don't we just try runway 10 just for, I think, the heck of it?
21:35I mean, you don't just do things for the heck of it in an airplane of that size.
21:40I think that caught us by surprise.
21:42Investigators learned that neither pilot had ever landed a DC-8 at Guantanamo.
21:50They wonder if the captain knew that runway 10 was a more challenging approach than runway 28.
21:56They study the airline's procedures.
22:01They had to watch a video.
22:04That's it.
22:05That's it.
22:07Because of the difficulty landing at Guantanamo, military pilots require special training to land on runway 10.
22:15But AIA only required its civilian pilots to watch a short video.
22:21Exercise extreme caution when landing on runway 10.
22:25Records show the captain and first officer had both watched the training video within the past year.
22:30Align your base leg just to the right of the strobe beacon.
22:34This beacon identifies the U.S.-Cuban boundary beginning at the shoreline.
22:39Landing on runway 10 was very unique.
22:42That's why the airport was classified as a special use airport.
22:46Because it takes specialized training.
22:51Let's keep going.
22:52Investigators now know why the crew chose runway 10.
22:58But why didn't they abandon their disastrous approach?
23:04There's the airport straight ahead.
23:07Huh?
23:12Feith learns that as flight 808 approaches Guantanamo, Captain Chapo is finding it difficult to get a visual fix on the airport.
23:20There's the bay. We're going to be shooting off to the left side of it.
23:34The airport's going to be on that side of the bay.
23:40We're going to come back around and hang it right.
23:43Yeah, that's right.
23:44The crew repeatedly has to explain its location to him.
23:50Before they actually started the final portions of the approach to the runway, they were having problems trying to find the airport.
23:57I wonder if that's the airport right there straight ahead of us.
24:00That is the airport straight ahead of us.
24:02That is the airport straight ahead of us.
24:07What's wrong with this guy?
24:10I wonder if that's the airport right there straight ahead of us.
24:15That is the airport straight ahead of us.
24:17Captain seems out of it.
24:18Investigators listening to Flight 808's cockpit voice recorder can't understand why the pilots continued their disastrous approach instead of going around and landing on the other, easier end of the runway.
24:32You're at 1400 feet.
24:36You want to get all dirty and slowed down and everything?
24:39Oh, I will.
24:41Yeah.
24:43The first officer tells the captain they're low enough to extend their flaps and gear, which will slow the plane for the approach.
24:49I remember as we were approaching the shoreline, we were intimidated by the fact that we were told that there might be guards at the fence perimeter with guns.
25:04To avoid Cuban airspace on the left, the plane must make a tight right turn.
25:12The runway's right there, man.
25:14Yeah, I got it. Yeah, I got it.
25:16We're gonna have to really honk it. Let's get the gear down.
25:22Alright.
25:30The crew seems increasingly anxious as they remind the captain to get the aircraft ready to land.
25:37The dynamic in the cockpit changed, but as they started to get into this high-stress, high-anxiety situation...
25:44Slow. Airspeed.
25:47The airplane was getting slower. It was in a very high drag condition, appropriate for landing, but it requires a lot of power.
25:58But strangely, the captain ignores the warning to speed up.
26:03Slow. Airspeed.
26:04We should be talking about doing a go-around.
26:07This captain found himself in a position where he ended up trying to salvage a bad situation when he should have abandoned the approach.
26:18Where's the strobe?
26:19Where's the strobe?
26:21Right over there.
26:22Where?
26:23Right over there.
26:24Where?
26:25Right over there.
26:26Where?
26:27The captain cannot locate the strobe light that marks the Cuban border.
26:39Because everybody told us, you know, they'll shoot you down, they'll shoot you down.
26:43You know, we're not getting airspeed back there.
26:46The flight engineer notices that the plane is still flying more than 10 knots too slow.
26:50Where's the strobe?
26:51Where's the strobe?
26:52Right down there.
26:53I still don't see it.
26:54Instead of increasing his airspeed, the captain keeps trying to find the strobe light.
27:04It was a clear indication that the airspeed was below what the flight engineer felt was acceptable.
27:13And the captain was still fixated with trying to find that strobe light.
27:17I still don't see it.
27:19He's obsessed with that strobe.
27:24All of a sudden, you lose the first officer and the flight engineer in the conversation.
27:30And now the captain's basically dominating.
27:32He's become autonomous in that cockpit where I'm going to do this, we're going to do this.
27:37I'm trying to find the strobe.
27:41Oh hell, we're never going to make this.
27:44Huh?
27:45The flight engineer can see the DC-8 isn't properly positioned for the landing.
27:51Do you think you're going to make this?
27:53Yeah.
27:55If I can catch the strobe light.
27:57The first officer is also concerned.
28:00The first officer and the flight engineer, they only challenged the captain by what I call hinting and hoping, where they would throw out a suggestion.
28:10Do you think we're going to make this?
28:12Yeah, if I can catch that strobe light.
28:14Yeah, if I can catch that strobe light.
28:16But the captain isn't taking the hint.
28:21So now that crew is now split apart into three autonomous pilots, and two of which don't like what's going on, but never voice an opinion as to why they don't like it and we got to do something else.
28:34The DC-8 begins its critical final turn.
28:45But the captain still can't see the runway.
28:47He realizes he must have begun the turn too late.
28:51To compensate, he makes the turn even steeper.
28:55It was about double what airline passengers would experience in a routine passenger flight.
29:01Maximums normally around 30 degrees.
29:03This was going to require something near 60 degrees to be able to make the airplane turn quickly enough, and they're going to do it at low altitude.
29:14The plane needs an airspeed of 147 knots to stay airborne in the tight turn.
29:22Watch. Keep your airspeed up.
29:24The flight engineer is probably the one that has the largest picture view of what's going on.
29:31If somebody said, we're not going to make this, that would be a clear red flag warning.
29:37140.
29:38They need another seven knots of speed.
29:46Suddenly, the flight computer activates a stick shaker warning.
29:5355 degree bank, you get a stick shaker.
29:56It's a warning that shakes the control column to notify a pilot of an imminent stall.
30:03Call warning.
30:05I got it.
30:08Stall warning.
30:10Stall warning.
30:12I remember the stall warning.
30:14And everybody put their hands on the throttles and pushed the throttles up to full blast.
30:21Flex power.
30:23I got it. Back off.
30:25There was a delay of several seconds before the power went up.
30:28But we were only about 350 feet when the airplane stalled.
30:31So there was only a couple of seconds to recover anyway.
30:34Let it go!
30:36No! No!
30:38No! No!
30:42Let it go!
30:44Stop! Stop!
30:49He completely tuned out his crew.
30:53Investigators are struck by the captain's peculiar behavior.
30:56His hostility.
30:57His fixation on the strobe.
31:00And the way he ignored his crew's warnings.
31:03We knew that there was some bad decision making going on in this particular cockpit.
31:09We knew that there were some attitudes that had started to come out during the latter portions of the approach.
31:14We knew that communication had broken down.
31:18And the question was why?
31:20This new evidence turns the focus back on the pilots of Flight 808.
31:26Investigators will need to look beyond their stellar track record to see what they can uncover.
31:32Okay.
31:33Let's find everything we can out about these guys.
31:39Greg Feith studies the duty rosters and pilot logbooks of the AIA DC-8's crew to see if they offer any clues about the three pilots' strange behavior.
31:52What are we here?
31:55As part of looking at the performance of the flight crew, we typically do a 72-hour look back at the crew.
32:03What have they been doing in the last 72 hours?
32:05So you look at their time off, you see when they came on duty, you see what kind of flying they had done just prior to the accident.
32:12Feith learns that the day before the crash, the crew started flying from Dallas-Fort Worth at midnight and flew all night.
32:19They crossed the country before arriving back at their Atlanta base just before 8am.
32:27It's called the backside of the clock, flying.
32:31That is flying at night, which the typical cargo haulers do.
32:34That was supposed to be the end of the crew's shift, but they were called back for one last flight.
32:49Montanamo Bay, here we come.
32:53Nothing more I'd rather do.
32:55I can think of a few things.
32:57By this point, the crew members have been awake for about 15 hours each.
33:03In the last 48 hours, the captain had only 7 hours of sleep.
33:07I was not particularly enthusiastic to go out for another 7-8 hours of flying.
33:14I'd much rather have gone home and get a good night's sleep and a home meal.
33:20The new flight headed to Virginia to pick up cargo that included submarine parts.
33:25They wanted us to go to Norfolk and then go to Guantanamo Bay, unload, and then fly back to Atlanta.
33:37Could the lengthy duty time have impaired the pilots' performance to the point they crashed their plane?
33:43It's real easy to write it off as pilot error, saying they screwed up, they didn't maintain airspeed, they stalled the airplane, they crashed the airplane.
33:51But that doesn't tell us the whole story.
33:54Investigators ask NASA for help in analyzing the sleep patterns of the DC-8 crew.
34:00Thanks for helping out with us.
34:02Mark Rosekind leads that effort.
34:05He's the head of NASA's Fatigue Countermeasures Program.
34:08We knew that fatigue was a risk, so we knew bad stuff was already going on in flight.
34:14The key was, how do you demonstrate fatigue actually played a role in that crash?
34:20Rosekind calculates how many hours of sleep the crew had in the few days leading up to the accident.
34:29He discovers that the pilots' long work day wasn't the only reason they would have been tired.
34:34They were all sleep deprived.
34:41The crew also experienced an accumulated lack of sleep, or sleep debt, from the two night shifts before the crash.
34:49Gear up.
34:53Tom.
34:55Yep, got it.
34:56What most people don't realize is that when you lose sleep, it actually builds into what's called a sleep debt.
35:07And you should think about that just like a bank account. It's like going in the red.
35:11The captain's sleep debt was large. He had only 15 hours sleep in the previous 72 hours.
35:18Magnifying the effect of fatigue and sleep debt were the crew's biological clocks, known as circadian rhythms.
35:30We actually have a clock in our brain, and that body clock controls everything on a 24-hour basis.
35:35So as soon as humans alter that pattern, like trying to work at night and then sleep during the day,
35:40you're basically opposing your biology to do that. There is a cost to it.
35:45Flying at night and sleeping during the day was wreaking havoc on their circadian rhythms.
35:50Connie 808, understand you'd like runway 1-0?
36:01That's affirmative. Runway 1-0.
36:06Rosekind determines the effect of the disruption would be felt most intensely between 3 o'clock and 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
36:14Precisely when flight 808 was approaching Guantanamo Bay.
36:18Everything you are as a human is degraded or impaired in some way.
36:23Your memory, your decision-making, your vigilance, reaction time, your communication skills.
36:28You name it, every one of those things is degraded.
36:31And it's impaired potentially anywhere from 20 to 50 percent.
36:39Again, and again, and again, and again.
36:45The captain in particular was showing noticeable symptoms of fatigue.
36:51One was what we call cognitive fixation. The captain just got stuck on finding a strobe light.
36:57Where's the strobe?
36:59Right over there.
37:01Where?
37:03And he kept saying, if I can just find the strobe light. If I can just find the strobe light.
37:07Oh, hell. We're never going to make this. Huh?
37:10We're never going to make this. Huh?
37:13All three pilots were suffering from the cumulative impact of fatigue. A very long shift.
37:19Do you think you're going to make this?
37:22Sleep debt.
37:24Yeah.
37:25And disrupted circadian rhythms.
37:27Even one of them could have put him at risk, but it was the whole crew, really, that was suffering from fatigue at the time of the asking.
37:35What investigators have uncovered raises a disturbing question.
37:38Why did a sleep-deprived crew suffering from fatigue accept the last-minute flight to Guantanamo?
37:50After a lengthy recovery in hospital, investigators are finally able to interview the seriously injured crew of Flight 808.
37:58At long last, they'll get a chance to hear the crew's side of the story.
38:02I was tired. We were all tired.
38:09You didn't have to accept the flight.
38:13Technically, no. But we didn't really have a choice.
38:17If you had an objection to taking a trip, you could be in for a little bit of a conversation with the boss.
38:25So we decided we'll take the trip.
38:27The cargo industry is notorious as being a cutthroat industry.
38:33They will push the crews routinely to the edge of duty time limits.
38:38So there's this constant feel of almost a military-type, we've got to get this done, philosophy that becomes the corporate culture.
38:48So now you have pilots who think the same way.
38:52I'll do whatever it takes to make things happen.
38:54Why? Because there's this fear of intimidation and the loss of a job that if you don't do it, I'll find somebody that will.
39:07That fear may have led to disaster.
39:10That fear may have led to disaster.
39:16Stall warning.
39:19I got it.
39:23Stall warning.
39:24Stall warning.
39:27Max power.
39:29I got it. Back off.
39:31There it goes.
39:32Things happen very rapidly.
39:33We were too low and our reactions were too slow.
39:37And I should have turned it over to Tom, but I was already just sort of out of it.
39:43No!
39:44No!
39:45No!
39:46No!
39:47No!
39:49No!
40:01No!
40:03It still...
40:04Still gets to me because it still boils down to the captain.
40:07You know, the captain made the mistake.
40:08and that's a hard thing to live with all the time.
40:17Investigators discover one final tragic piece of the puzzle.
40:21The strobe Captain Chapo spent so much time looking for
40:25wasn't even working that day.
40:28And no one had told the controller that the strobe was down.
40:34She never told them that it was inoperative.
40:37Where's the strobe?
40:39So now they're trying to find something that doesn't exist.
40:42And when they saw something flash out there,
40:45which they thought was the strobe,
40:46it was actually the tin roof on a little cabana,
40:49they assumed that that was the strobe.
40:52In his final report on the crash of AIA Flight 808,
40:57Greg Fyfe emphasizes the central role played by fatigue.
41:02This accident that happened in Guantanamo Bay with this flight crew
41:06was precedent setting.
41:08It was the first commercial aviation accident caused by fatigue.
41:12Not fatigue contributing to the accident,
41:14but actually caused by fatigue.
41:16And the industry took notice.
41:18A quarter century after the accident,
41:22Captain Jim Chapo and First Officer Tom Curran
41:26finally meet the man who brought them out of the wreckage,
41:29firefighter Frank Crouper,
41:31who was decorated for his work that day.
41:34Hang on.
41:40Help us, please.
41:41Get us out of here, please.
41:44I know these old guys.
41:46I mean, thank you so much for it.
41:49You're the man.
41:50Ah, well, I'm one of them.
41:52I'm representing the crew.
41:54Yes, it was the worst aircraft crash I've been on,
41:58but the guys survived.
42:00And...
42:08Despite losing his right leg,
42:10First Officer Tom Curran went back to flying
42:13and eventually joined the NTSB as an investigator.
42:17I live with considerable discomfort.
42:20So every time I take a step, I remember it.
42:24But you have to shunt things to the side.
42:28You can either decide to go forward,
42:31or you can hibernate, you know, retire through oblivion.
42:37That's not my type A personality.
42:41Captain Jim Chapo suffered back injuries in the crash
42:45and never returned to commercial flying.
42:48You know, I think about those things a lot,
42:51and I would want people to realize it can happen to them.
42:55If you're fatigued, call it in and just stick with it.
43:02Flight engineer David Richmond, who was badly injured,
43:06regained his health
43:07and went on to captain commercial cargo flights.
43:10In the aftermath of the Flight 808 crash,
43:17the Federal Aviation Administration
43:19tightens regulations on crew sleep requirements.
43:29And mandates airlines to take into account
43:32the latest sleep research
43:34as they manage pilot rest times.
43:40Today we have much more scientifically bound
43:45crew duty time limits.
43:47As an industry, we're better about all of those today,
43:50but we can still improve, and we should.
43:53We will manage our Nirvana and a Davidson.
43:56We are going to look ahead next week.