Perceptual Confidence is the thesis that perceptual experiences can be probabilistic. This thesis has been defended and criticised based on a variety of phenomenological, epistemological, and explanatory arguments. One gap in these arguments is that they neglect the question of whether perceptual experiences satisfy the formal conditions that define the notion of probability to which Perceptual Confidence is committed. Here, we focus on this underexplored question and argue that perceptual experiences do not satisfy such conditions. But if they do not, then ascriptions of perceptual confidence are undefined; and so, Perceptual Confidence cannot be true.
WHY PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES CANNOT BE PROBABILISTIC By Matteo Colombo1 and Nir FrescoThe Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 75, No. 2 2025 ISSN 0031-8094
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