The Summerland Disaster | Historical Disaster Documentary | Fascinating Horror - video Dailymotion

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"On the 2nd of August, 1973, three boys were playing on the miniature golf course outside the Summerland Leisure Centre on the Isle of Man..."   As always, THANK YOU to all my Patreon patrons: you make this channel possible. https://www.patreon.com/fascinatinghorror  SOCIAL MEDIA: ► Twitter: https://twitter.com/TrueHorrorTales ► TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@fascinatinghorror ► Suggestions: hello@fascinatinghorror.co.uk  MUSIC: ► "Glass Pond" by Public Memory ► "Magenta" by Sextile  ​​​​​​​#Documentary​​​​ #History​​​​​​​​​ #TrueStories​

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00:00On the 2nd of August 1973 three boys were playing on the miniature golf

00:17course outside the Summerland Leisure Center on the Isle of Man. They ducked

00:22into an empty ticket booth so that they could share a cigarette. The oldest boy

00:27in the group was just 14. Their only worry at the time was being caught

00:32smoking, but they would soon have bigger concerns. A dropped match started a fire

00:38which grew rapidly out of control. Panicking, the three boys fled. They would

00:44live to see another day, but dozens of people who were inside Summerland when

00:49the fire began would not.

00:53Constructed in 1971, Summerland was a unique complex considered extremely

00:59advanced for its time. The building, large enough to accommodate 10,000 people,

01:04consisted of a swimming pool, also known as the Aquadrome, multiple restaurants

01:09and bars, a miniature golf course, a solarium, a theater, an underground disco,

01:14a sauna, a roller skating rink, a small fairground, and an amusement arcade. All

01:20of this was set across five floors in an ultra-modern building constructed

01:25mainly from metal and plastic, the bold design of which, a promotional pamphlet

01:29boasted, would set the architectural world alight. It was intended to be a

01:37one-stop centralized holiday location, one that could compete with sunnier

01:42destinations abroad. Inside Summerland it never rained, the wind never blew, and the

01:48temperature was never anything less than perfect. Visitors could spend the

01:53entire day inside, basking under an artificial sun, swimming in artificial

01:58pools, and enjoying a round-the-clock roster of entertainment. There was

02:03nothing else like it in the world. Of course, people flocked to the venue...

02:09500,000 in its first year. From 1971 until 1973 many happy memories were made

02:17within the plastic walls of the complex. It was hailed by the British Tourist

02:22Authority as an outstanding tourist enterprise, a destination that was close

02:27to home and yet offered boundless entertainment and a tropical climate. For

02:33a few short years Summerland thrived. Then, at the height of summer in 1973, the

02:41complex burned. At around 7.50pm on the 2nd of August three boys on holiday

02:47from Liverpool accidentally started a fire while sneaking a smoke on the

02:51miniature golf course. Panicking, they fled the scene, and the fire they had

02:56started consumed the kiosk they had been hiding in, causing it to slump against

03:00the wall of Summerland. Staff were called to the scene by worried patrons, but

03:07their response was less than ideal. They could see that the fire was licking

03:11against the outside wall of Summerland, but as far as they knew the walls were

03:16fireproof. To them, then, this fire wasn't a serious issue. It was relatively small,

03:23and it was outside the complex... certainly no cause for a mass evacuation.

03:29Instead staff tried to fight the fire with extinguishers, hoses, and poles. A

03:34lack of any real fire safety training meant that none of them placed a call to

03:39the fire brigade. They simply weren't sure whose responsibility it was to do

03:43so, and were in any case sure that they could handle things themselves. Little

03:50did these staff members know that the fire was already inside the building,

03:54feeding on flammable building materials in a hidden gap between the outer and

03:59inner walls. There, unseen, it spread outward and upward, and burned hotter and

04:06hotter until, very suddenly, it burst through into the main building. At this

04:13point in time, despite the fire outside sending a huge plume of smoke into the

04:18air, new guests were still being admitted through the entrance turnstiles. The fire

04:24brigade had still not been called by anyone at the complex, although the sight

04:28of smoke had prompted people miles away to raise the alarm. Indeed, one call came

04:34via the harbormaster, who was alerted by the captain of a ship out at sea. No

04:40guest inside the complex could have known that there was any cause for alarm...

04:44until, with shocking suddenness, flames erupted from the walls and raced along

04:50the ceiling of the arcade. A panicked scramble for the exits began. In many

04:57cases staff members, who'd barely had any fire safety training, were of little

05:02help. A ride operator fled the fairground without switching off the rides, leaving

05:08several children to be rescued from a moving carousel by their parents and

05:12other onlookers. Elsewhere an entertainer confidently assured patrons that the

05:18smoke was from nothing worse than a chip pan fire, and convinced them to remain in

05:23their seats... only to realize the severity of the situation just moments

05:27later, and begin screaming for people to run. Conditions within the building

05:32quickly became unimaginable. Firstly, the nature of the complex meant that many of

05:39the people within were part of family groups... but family groups that had felt

05:44quite happy to separate. While children enjoyed a magic show, parents might have

05:50gone up to another floor to relax in the solarium. When the fire burst into the

05:55building proper, then, many people began to frantically search for their families

06:00rather than to evacuate through the nearest exit. Secondly, there were only a

06:05small number of exits readily available. The rest were locked, and in some cases

06:11chained shut, ostensibly to prevent people from sneaking in without paying

06:16the entrance fee. Keys for emergency exits were supposed to be stored in

06:21glass-fronted boxes beside each set of doors, but in many cases these boxes were

06:27empty, or were situated so high up on the wall that they were out of reach for

06:31most people. In one instance a set of fire doors was blocked by a parked car

06:37outside the building... a car that, with horrible irony, belonged to Summerland's

06:43safety officer. In many cases in order to escape guests had to smash windows

06:49and batter open doors with whatever was available. Finally, escaping guests had to

06:56contend with the material from which Summerland was built. The majority of the

07:01building was clad in a kind of plastic sheeting known as oroglass. Survivors

07:07would later come to refer to it as horror glass. During the fire it melted,

07:13dripping down and burning people who were trying to flee the smoke and flames.

07:18The vast majority of deaths occurred within the main part of the building.

07:23Being open plan in design there was nothing to stop the spread of the fire,

07:28or to offer protection from smoke and hot gases. Many people died or were

07:34injured as they tried to descend from one level to another down staircases

07:39that were narrow and unprotected. Such was the crush around the few available

07:44staircases that some parents threw their children from the balconies in the hope

07:49that someone below would catch them. Many people jumped, with a few brave staff

07:54members remaining at their posts until the last possible moment to catch people

07:59jumping from upper levels. One staff member even doused himself in water from

08:04a fire extinguisher so that he could stay inside the building and assist

08:08escaping guests for longer. Throughout it all no alarm sounded. The fire had burned

08:15through the control circuit before it could be triggered. The fire service

08:21arrived and tackled the blaze, using water from the swimming pool and then

08:25from the sea to damp down the flames. The injured were ferried to a nearby

08:31hospital by ambulances which operated like shuttles, moving back and forth for

08:36two solid hours until the last seriously injured victim had been transported. By

08:42midnight the rescue operation was over and the fire service turned to the

08:47retrieval of bodies, a harrowing process that would take several days. In the end

08:5450 people lost their lives in the fire and 80 more sustained serious injuries.

09:02An investigation was launched and identified a wealth of failings. Exits

09:08should not under any circumstances have been chained shut. Staff should have been

09:14given fire safety training. The fire service should have been called within

09:18one minute of the fire outside the building being discovered. Mistake after

09:23mistake had been made, but the greatest errors had taken place long before

09:27Summerland was even open to the public. Because of budgetary issues during

09:33construction multiple firms had worked on the building. The company which built

09:38the outer shell hadn't known with any certainty how the interior would be

09:42divided up, and so hadn't been able to place fire exits appropriately.

09:47Additionally it is believed that the firm which handled the interior fitting

09:51out of Summerland might have inadvertently undone some of the

09:54fireproofing carried out by the firm which built the exterior. As well as this

10:00materials had been chosen that were cost-effective but which weren't

10:04sufficiently fireproof. Auroglass, for example, had been approved despite its

10:09flammability on the basis that it would soften and fall out of its frame in the

10:14case of a fire, facilitating escape. The fire safety budget had been a matter of

10:20contention, with owners repeatedly seeking cheaper options. Sprinklers were

10:25not installed because to do so throughout the building would simply

10:29cost too much. Again and again communication had failed, and decisions

10:36had been taken which prioritized convenience or cost reduction over human

10:40life. But despite all this the investigation concluded that nobody was

10:46to blame. There were no villains, said the report, only many human errors and

10:52failures. This judgment, incidentally, was applied equally to the three boys who

10:58started the fire. They were identified and brought before a judge, where they

11:04were fined three pounds each... about 30 pounds each in today's money. The burned

11:11shell of Summerland was eventually demolished and rebuilt. The new

11:16Summerland was smaller and constructed from traditional materials, with a

11:21state-of-the-art alarm and sprinkler system. It eschewed the open plan design

11:26of its predecessor and opted instead for a lower and more compartmentalized

11:31building. This new Summerland was a reflection of the impact that the fire

11:36had on the construction industry. Every lesson learned and new rule implemented

11:41was reflected in its design. The new Summerland epitomized a changed attitude

11:47towards fire safety in leisure and entertainment buildings. However, a flood

11:53in 2002 gutted the new complex, leading to its eventual demolition. Now all that

12:00remains of Summerland is a scarred cliff face. It should be hoped that the lessons

12:05learned from the fire, at such great cost, do not disappear so easily.

The Summerland Disaster | Historical Disaster Documentary | Fascinating Horror

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